in the strategic offensive forces program at this time is the provision of penetration aids and other improvements for our presently planned strategic missile force, and the production and deployment of the new POSEIDON. These are relatively expensive programs, particularly POSEIDON, but they are far more important to our future Assured Destruction capability than a new manned bomber. Indeed, if the Soviets were to deploy a full scale and highly sophisticated ABM system and enhance : their strategic missile capability, I believe the requirement for a new highly survivable ICBM would have a far higher priority than a new manned bomber. Nevertheless, we plan to continue work on the engine, avionics, and the related airframe studies, for which a total of $26 million is programmed for FY 1968.

3. Air Launched Missiles

Last year I said that we planned to keep the HOUND DOG missiles in the operational inventory through FY 1970, phasing their number down in step with the phase out of the B-52C-Fs. We now propose to phase out

the older HOUND DOG "A" by end FY 1968, retaining only the "B" models. These missiles will be more than sufficient to meet the primary HOUND DOG mission attack of area bomber defenses and lower priority airfields.

The SRAM program is unchanged from that which I presented last year. While we still do not plan to deploy SRAM on the B-52G/Hs, we are continuing the development of the necessary avionics to permit such a deployment if it should become desirable.

The strategic reconnaissance force is the same as that presented a year ago.

The Civil

The strategic defensive forces proposed for the FY 1968-72 period are shown on the classified table provided to the Committee. Defense program for FY 1968 is shown separately on Table 2.

The programs shown under this heading are, with two exceptions, the same as those I presented last year. Activation of BUIC III control centers will slip somewhat from the schedule shown last year due to delays in firming up the technical details of the program. The delay will be made up by the temporary retention of two of the BUIC II control centers

and 12 of the manual backup centers through FY 1968. By end FY 1969 all 19 BUIC IIIs should be operational and the remaining BUIC II and manual control centers will be phased out.

The second change pertains to the search radars. Last year we had planned to reduce the number of these radars to 151 by end FY 1967. As you may recall, this reduction was predicated on the internetting of our radar system with that of the Federal Aviation Agency. However, in order to make the inputs from the FAA radars compatible with the SAGE-BUIC III system, they must first be converted into appropriate computer language by a special piece of equipment called a "digitizer". Because of a slippage in the production of this digitizer, five more Defense Department radars will have to be operated until FY 1969, when we expect to be able to reduce the number to 149.

Under our present plan, the 19 BUIC III stations will be fully integrated with the 12 SAGE direction centers. Two BUIC IIIs are to be deployed in each of eight SAGE sectors along the western, northern, and eastern borders of the United States. Three sectors will need only one BUIC. In each of these 11 sectors, the direction center and the BUIC IIIs will be integrated with 10 to 15 radars, thus enabling any one of the centers or BUIC IIIs to handle the entire sector even if the others were destroyed. The remaining interior SAGE sector will not have BUIC and will operate only with its direction center. All 12 sectors will feed into five combat centers. These, in turn, will feed into the NORAD Combat Operation Center which is now fully functioning in its new underground facilities deep in the Cheyenne Mountain caves.

2. Manned Interceptors

The manned interceptor forces are generally the same as those presented last year.

As you know, we have been studying during the past several years various ways of modernizing our air defense forces. Interceptor versions of both the SR-71 (F-12) and the F-111 have been considered for this role. Either one, equipped with the improved ASG-18/AIM 47 fire control and missile system and used with an effective Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), would be better than the present interceptors in operating from degraded bases and independently of the vulnerable fixed ground environment, and in countering concentrated bomber attacks, including airto-surface missiles. In fact, a small force of such aircraft operating with AWACS would have a combat capability superior to the programmed force of several hundred Century series fighters and the hundreds of ground radar and control sites.

The feasibility of this plan, however, depends upon the successful development of the AWACS. We now have a test program underway to examine three proposed solutions to the problem of developing an overland airborne radar which could provide effective coverage at all altitudes. Design efforts are also being pursued on the airframe and avionics. We hope that by the end of this year sufficient data will be available to demonstrate the feasibility of the AWACS. Only then will we be in a position to make a decision on the interceptor force. Accordingly, we propose to continue development work on both the F-12 and the F-111 types of interceptors and on the fire control and missile systems, and $20 million is included in the FY 1968 Budget for this purpose. Although no additional funds are requested for work on the AWACS airframe, another $10 million is included in the FY 1968 Budget to continue work on overland radar technology.

The NIKE HERCULES and HAWK missile forces are the same as planned a year ago except that we now intend to replace eventually some of the present HAWK missiles with the new Improved HAWK which is now in development.

In addition to the Improved HAWK, which is designed primarily for the field forces, we also have in advanced development a new surfaceto-air missile called the SAM-D. While this system is also primarily oriented toward air defense of the field forces, it also has a potential application for Continental Air Defense. This effort, thus far, has been directed mainly to development of the required components or "building blocks" and and a deployment decision at this time would be premature. Additional funds have been included in the FY 1968 Budget to continue development.

4. Ballistic Missile Warning

The

The numbers of Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) and Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar sites are the same as shown last year. OTH radars, themselves, provide another form of early warning of ballis-' tic missile attack, as I described to the Committee last year, particularly against Soviet missiles fired on trajectories beyond the BMEWS coverage.

We are also continuing work on "back scatter" Over-the-Horizon radars. In this system, echo signals from the target would be returned directly to the transmitter, thereby making separate receiving stations unnecessary. An interim capability to detect sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) is being phased in during FY 1968. The SLBM detection system will include modified SAGE and SPACETRACK radars.

As described in previous years, we have a capability to intercept and destroy hostile satellites within certain ranges. This capability

will be maintained through FY 1968.

The Civil Defense program proposed for FY 1968 is essentially the same in content and objectives as that approved for the current year.

As you know, in addition to its important training, public information, warning, coordination, and control functions, the Civil Defense program's major effort in recent years has been directed toward the development of a nationwide fallout shelter system to provide protection for our population from the radiological effects of a nuclear attack. A significant amount of fallout protection exists today. By the end of the current fiscal year, we expect that this effort will have identified about 160 million shelter spaces with a standard protection factor of 40 or more. Of this total, about 97 million spaces will be marked and 82 million actually stocked with survival supplies for an average of about eight days.

Currently, there are a number of programs underway which will increase substantially the total amount of available shelter in the years ahead. These include the regular survey, marking and stocking of potential shelter spaces in newly constructed larger buildings, a more recently initiated survey of smaller structures, a survey to identify and measure shelter in private homes, community shelter planning, etc. Through these efforts, more than 50 million shelter spaces will be added in the next five years.

But, even after taking credit for all of the additional shelter space which can be expected from these programs, a substantial portion of our population would still be left without adequate fallout protection both at their places of work and at home because of maldistribution of shelter spaces in relation to population. Some of this shortfall, because of locally prevailing building practices, could be met only with special purpose construction a step we are not proposing at this time. However, much of the shortfall, we believe, could be met by making, at little or no cost, relatively minor changes in the design of new buildings, changes which would significantly increase their shelter potential. Accordingly, we intend to seek out every way possible to encourage private and public builders to make these changes.

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The funds requested would carry forward the Civil Defense program at about the same level as the current fiscal year. A financial summary of the program, estimated to cost $111.0 million in FY 1968, appears on Table 4.