C. ARMY GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES The Department of Defense for many years, and under several Administrations, has been striving to make the "One Army" concept a reality as well as a slogan. You may recall that when I appeared before the Congressional Committees in May 1961 in support of President Kennedy's recommendations on the realignment of the Army reserve components, I noted that "they must be so organized, trained, and equipped as to permit their rapid integration into the active Army." Since that time we have not only been working on the question of how the reserve components should be organized but also on how the reserve and active Army structures could best be meshed together. This latter question requires not only a comprehensive analysis of the total Army force requirement but also a very careful and detailed analysis of which elements of the total structure should be provided in the active forces and which in the reserve forces. Fundamental to this type of analysis is the concept of a "division force". Although the combat division has long been the most widely used standard for measuring the strength of the land forces, it accounts for only about one-third of the combat and support units required to sustain the division in combat over an extended period of time. By itself, the division is neither the best measure of combat capability nor a sound basis for force planning, although it has in fact been used for both purposes in the past. Because the other two-thirds of the combat and support units are vital to the division's effective employment, they too must be provided in the force structure, and they must be so manned, trained, and equipped that they are ready when needed. A "ready" division without "ready" support elements would be incapable of combat. division force concept ensures that our planning explicitly recognizes this relationship (indeed, interdependence) between the division and its major support elements, since it requires us to identify these elements in detail. The As a first approach to the problem, we have grouped all of the organized (TO&E) units of the division force into three categories: (1) The Division itself. (2) The Initial Support Increment (ISI) - i.e., the non-divisional combat and combat support units which are required to support the division in the initial combat phase. (3) The Sustaining Support Increment (SSI) - i.e., the additional non-divisional units including the combat, combat support, and service support needed by the division for sustained combat operations beyond the initial phase. By structuring the division force in this way, we can see more clearly the relationship of the divisions themselves to the other Aray units shown on the classified table provided to the Committee. For example, the Armored Cavalry Regiments and the Separate Support Brigades, shown under Major Supporting Forces, are part of the Initial and Sustaining Support Increments for the division forces. (A brigade force consists of the brigade itself and the supporting increments. Three brigade forces are the equivalent of one division force.) Similarly, most of the Combat and Support Battalions are either units of the divisions and brigades themselves or their initial and sustaining support. In addition, the division force concept helps us to: (1) Relate standards of unit readiness, manning levels, etc., directly to the time phased unit deployment schedules, which underlie our contingency planning. (2) Determine more precisely which units must be provided in the active forces and which could be provided in the reserve components. (3) Tailor forces for particular missions, operational environments, and tempos of activity. (4) Understand better the relationship between support functions (supply, maintenance, transportation, etc.) and combat functions (maneuver and fire power), thereby enabling us to achieve a better allocation of resources among them. (5) Calculate more precisely the personnel and materiel requirements of each unit. - While the concept still needs considerable development before all of the foregoing advantages can be fully realized, it has already proved of significant value in our force planning. Very substantial progress has been made in working out the detailed composition of each division and brigade force infantry, mechanized, armored, etc. not only in terms of maneuver battalions but also in terms of the various other combat and support units, e.g., artillery, engineer, maintenance, etc. And, we have now tentatively identified which of these units should be provided in the active forces and which in the reserve components. Much of the sustaining support for the active divisions is included in the reserve forces, reflecting the fact that these types of units are usually deployed after the divisions themselves. Because it will take some time to deploy all of the active divisions, the initial support increments for some of them can also be assigned to the reserves. Thus, the reserve component units (for which there is a military requirement) have been fully integrated into the total Army force-structure plan. The remaining reserve component units, which we are supporting as a result of a combination of circumstances arising from the strength mandate of the FY 1967 Defense Appropriation Act and the failure of our proposed reserve force reorganization to win Congressional approval, are simply excess to this plan. 11 The integrated active-reserve Army force structure proposed for the FY 1968-72 period is grouped under three main headings Division and Brigade Forces, Major Supporting Forces, and Combat and Support Battalions. a. Division and Brigade Forces Because of the temporary Vietnam augmentations to the active Army, the force structure we are proposing at the end of FY 1968 is the equivalent of 27-1/3 division forces in the active and reserve structure combined (18-1/3 active and 9 reserve components). The recommended equipment authorization of 26-1/3 division force sets requires in effect that the equivalent of one set of equipment be "borrowed" from the reserves by active forces which have been created in lieu of mobilizing the reserves. Of these 26-1/3 division forces, 18-1/3 are active and 8 are in the reserve components. You may recall that funds were included in the FY 1967 Budget to initiate procurement of long-lead-time items for the conversion of a second division to the airmobile configuration, if experience proved this desirable. The existing airmobile division, the 1st Cavalry, proved its worth in Vietnam and I have, therefore, tentatively approved the conversion of an airborne division to an airmobile configuration. The actual timing of this action is subject to the preparation of a detailed conversion plan by the Army and the JCS, but for planning purposes we have scheduled it for early FY 1969. Our much improved airlift and sealift permits us to meet early deployment requirements with either airmobile or infantry divisions, both of which are better suited to a wider range of operations than the airborne type. During FY 1968, one of the reserve infantry divisions will be converted to a mechanized division. Three reserve brigades have been temporarily augmented to "brigade force" status for the duration of the Vietnam conflict. b. Major Supporting Forces This grouping covers the major supporting forces, most of which represent the initial or sustaining support for the division and brigade forces. In FY 1969 (when an airborne division is converted to airmobile), the Army will keep a portion of the airborne assets to form a new permanent airborne brigade, thereby establishing the brigade total at seven. With respect to the Priority Reserve, I authorized in the fall of 1964, as part of the proposed realignment of the reserve components, an increase in the number of separate support brigades from 11 to 16, and the procurement of equipment for them. As mentioned earlier, we are temporarily treating three of the existing brigades as brigade forces, leaving 13 in the supporting forces in FY 1968. No important changes are proposed for the Special Forces Groups or the one remaining Missile Command. C. Combat and Support Battalions This major grouping recapitulates the principal combat and support elements of the division and brigade forces discussed previously. Included in this category are the "maneuver battalions", which are the basic building blocks of the land forces. We now proposed to make a small increase in the number of maneuver battalions. Last year, I mentioned the Army's program to shift the numerical and geographic distribution of the various types of maneuver battalions in order to increase the armor content of the Europe-oriented forces and the infantry content of the other forces, so as to make both forces better adapted to the kinds of terrain on which they would most likely have to fight. This exchange of maneuver battalions will be completed in FY 1967. No change is presently planned in the total number of Priority Reserve maneuver battalions, although the specific mission assignments of some of them will change when the temporary active force augmentations are dropped. With respect to artillery battalions, the demands of the conflict in Southeast Asia together with our continuing study of the peacetime force requirements have caused us to make a number of changes in the structure. First, we now plan to increase the number of artillery battalions in the active forces. Second, our experience in Vietnam has shown that the mix of separate artillery battalions should contain more heavy 8" howitzers and 175mm gun battalions. Accordingly, a significant portion of the increase in artillery battalions will be of these types. one The number of Engineer Combat battalions in the active forces has been temporarily increased in order to meet Southeast Asia needs. engineer combat battalion is organic to each active and reserve division. The remainder are separate units which are part of the initial and sustaining support increments. The Army is presently restudying the requirement for combat engineer units in the permanent forces in light of our recent experience in Vietnam. Temporary increases have also been made in the number of Engineer Construction battalions. These units are equipped with more and heavier types of construction equipment than the Combat Engineer battalions and are capable of undertaking larger and longer term jobs such as the construction, repair, and maintenance of permanent type roads, buildings, and bridges. They are also used to support the Air Force in the construction of runways and other air base facilities. The build-up of aviation units in the Army will continue through FY 1968. By that time the active army will have more than three times as many helicopters in units than it had at the end of FY 1961. Even the Army reserve components will have more than doubled the number of helicopters in units over that period. No major change is being proposed for the surface-to-surface missile force from that presented last year. Over the last few years we have taken a number of steps designed to increase the capabilities of our PERSHING missile battalions, particularly so that those stationed in Europe might take over the quick reaction alert (QRA) mission now being performed by tactical aircraft. Because of its mobility, PERSHING could provide a more survivable capability for the QRA nuclear mission, while the aircraft released from the QRA role could provide our ground forces with more air support in the early stages of a non-nuclear conflict. Last year I described to the Committee the steps we were taking to improve the Army's forward area air defense capabilities. These included the deployment of the new gun/CHAPARRAL system, the conversion of a number of HAWK battalions to a self-propelled configuration, the HAWK Improvement Program, and the SAM-D development program. We now plan to initiate in FY 1968 a new development program designed to ensure that the NIKE-HERCULES can continue to operate effectively in the 1970s. This new program, together with the HAWK Improvement Program, will provide a hedge against possible slippage in the development of the SAM-D which is tentatively planned as a replacement for both HERCULES and HAWK. |