International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium ModelRowman & Littlefield, 2003 - Всего страниц: 262 This book presents a punctuated equilibrium framework for understanding the nature of policy decision-making by governments as well as a theory of the creation, functioning, and evolution of international norms and institutions. |
Содержание
Introduction | 1 |
The Ontology of International Institutions and Regimes | 13 |
Individual Decision Making with Norms and Policies | 29 |
Decision Making with Norms | 31 |
The Instrumentality of Norms | 53 |
Moral Norms | 79 |
Structures of Norms | 99 |
Organizational Decision Making | 125 |
Individuals and Organizations | 145 |
International Institutions | 167 |
Creating International Institutions | 169 |
A Functional Model of International Institutions | 193 |
Sanctions and International Institutions | 221 |
References | 239 |
| 257 | |
About the Author | |
Другие издания - Просмотреть все
International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model Gary Goertz Просмотр фрагмента - 2003 |
International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model Gary Goertz Недоступно для просмотра - 2003 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
action actors analysis apply approach argued artificial intelligence basic behavior bureaucrats Cambridge chapter choice common pool resource compliance concept conflicting norms constraints context core decision-making procedures defined discussion economic sanctions effect environmental epistemic communities example exist expected utility expert systems foreign policy formal framework functionalist fuzzy logic game theory GATT goals hegemonic Hence identity illustrates important individual level individual-institution institution creation institution literature interests international institutions international norms international relations issue Kingdon Krasner definition major means methodology minor premise moral norms Nash equilibrium necessary condition norm structures norm violation norms and rules ontology organizational output Oxford payoffs peacekeeping politics preferences principal-agent principles problem production function provides punctuated equilibrium model realist Regime theory role self-interest sense situation social solution strategy structure of norms syllogism theoretical theorists theory of institution tion trade treaty University Press values variable World World Bank