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opponent which is not a particular enemy of their country could leave much to be desired.19 Since a many-headed international agency cannot satisfactorily fulfill the functions of military command, the appointment of a commander in chief is indispensable. For understandable reasons, this appointment is a very difficult task especially if the commander in chief is not appointed only for a particular military action but as a permanent organ of the international community.

A still greater difficulty consists in concluding the agreements concerning the strength and composition of the contingent each member state has to place at the disposal of the organization.20 Even if this difficulty is surmounted, the operation of the quota system would depend on the willingness of the member states to fulfill their main obligation: to respond to the call of the central organ by placing their contingents at its disposal. The same political considerations which could prevent the government of a member state from resorting to war against a state which has attacked another state, could prevent a government from placing the contingent of its armed forces at the disposal of the security organization. Hence, the central organ might never know in advance which armed forces would be at its disposal, and consequently the organ would not be in a position to base its military operations on a prearranged plan which is an essential condition of quick and effective action.

Since the armed forces at the disposal of the organization must be superior in numerical strength and armament to the armed forces of any potential aggressor, universality or at least quasi-universality of the organization is an essential condition of the effectiveness of the quota system. In addition, the treaty constituting the security organization must not stipulate expulsion from the organization as a sanction and not allow withdrawal from the organization. However, even if the treaty does not contain a clause authorizing the members to withdraw under certain conditions, or even if it does contain a prohibition expressly forbidding a member state to denounce the treaty by a unilateral act, actual withdrawal of a member state and hence loss of its contingent can hardly be prevented.22

21

(C) THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE ORGANIZED AS A PERMA

NENT AND SEPARATE ARMED FORCE AT THE DIRECT DISPOSAL OF THE SECURITY ORGANIZATION

Most of the difficulties and insufficiencies involved in the organization of military sanctions discussed in the previous sections could be avoided by placing at the direct disposal of the security organization an international armed force which is not established on an ad hoc basis, as under the quota system. In other words, the international

armed force would not be available only in case of a particular military action of the organization, but would be permanent and completely separate from and independent of the national armed forces of the member states, a separate armed force belonging exclusively to the security organization and not an armed force composed of parts of the armed forces of the member states.

It is usual to designate such a permanent and separate armed force at the direct disposal of a security organization as a true “international" armed force in contradistinction to the merely "joint” or "collective” force which exists under the quota system. This terminology is not quite correct. An armed force composed of contingents of the armed forces of member states is as “international” as a permanent and separate armed force of a security organization. There is even an international armed force under a constituent treaty which does not provide for contingents of the armed forces of member states but only obliges or simply authorizes member states to take military action through their own armed forces against the aggressor. In the first place, the international character of an armed force depends on the law under which the force is used. If this law is international law, the armed force is an international force. Hence, if used in the execution of a sanction provided for by international law, even the national armed force of a state would have an international character. In the second place, this character depends on the international character of the authority under the control of which the armed force is operated, and this authority is “international” if it is established on the basis of international law or if its functions are determined by international law. Hence an armed force composed of the armed forces of member states, but operated by the organ of a security organization constituted by a treaty, is certainly an international force, and, if in exercising a right conferred upon it or in fulfilling an obligation imposed upon it by international law, a state uses its armed force to execute a sanction provided for by international law, this state may very well be considered to be an international organ. Hence the armed forces which execute sanctions provided for by any system of international security, however organized, may be considered to be international forces.

Another terminology, the correctness of which is doubtful, is to designate as an international "police" force only a permanent and separate armed force at the direct disposal of the central organ of an international security community. A police force is an armed force used in the performance of a police action. A police action is any enforcement action performed by an organ of a community for the welfare of its members, their health, morals, prosperity and, espe

cially, their security. However, it is not a sanitary police force or a police force for the purpose of morals or economics, but a security police force with which an international security organization is concerned. The specific functions of a security police force are to prepare and secure by enforcement actions the judicial or quasi-judicial procedure for ascertaining a violation of the law, and to execute the sanction ordered by the judicial or quasi-judicial organ. There is a difference between the so-called police force of a state and its "armed force," the term designating its army, navy and air force. The former is used to maintain order within the state, whereas the purpose of the latter is to defend the state against external aggression. Hence the armament of the two forces is not the same. Neither artillery nor bombers are necessary to maintain order within a state as long as the disturbance of the internal order does not assume the character of a revolutionary movement. If it does, however, the army, navy, and air force may be used, and if used for the maintenance of internal order their function is a police function. The difference between a "police force” for the maintenance of internal order and an "armed force" for defense against external aggression is irrelevant within an international security organization. The aggression against which the armed force of this organization is used is always external aggression from the point of view of the state which is its victim and internal aggression from the point of view of the international community, if this community is universal. If it is not universal, the aggression is external aggression also from the point of view of the security organization if the aggressor is a non-member state and if the constituent treaty also provides for enforcement action in this case. It is true that the constituent treaty may also provide for enforcement action in case an internal aggression takes place within a member state that is, in case a revolution is directed against the legitimate government. However, as has been pointed out, in this case the attacked government must use its armed forces itself, and if it is assisted by the armed forces of the security organization, both actions are police actions, insofar as they are taken to maintain or restore the internal order of the state, although they are taken by forces which are "armed forces" with respect to their armament. Consequently, any enforcement action taken in conformity with the legal order constituting an international security system is a police action, whether it is performed by the armed force of an individual state, or by an armed force composed of contingents of the armed forces of the member states, or by a permanent and separate armed force under the direct control of a security organization. There is no cogent reason

why the term “police force” should be restricted to an armed force of this latter type.

There are some characteristic problems involved in organizing a permanent and separate armed force at the direct disposal of a security organization. First of all, there is the question of recruitment.23

In regard to recruitment, there are two possibilities. A security organization may have the right to recruit directly with its own organs in the territories of member states. Such a right requires the corresponding obligation imposed on the member states by the constituent treaty to allow, and if necessary to support with their own organs, the recruitment procedure. Of the two methods of recruitment, compulsory conscription and voluntary enlistment on the basis of free contract, only the latter is a practical consideration. The former is not excluded, but direct recruitment presupposes the power of the security organization to impose by legislative acts the obligation upon the citizens of the member states to do military service in the armed force of the organization. Hence, this direct recruitment is not compatible with the international character of a security organization. Legislative power exercised directly over individuals brings a security organization very near to being a super-state.

The other possibility is indirect recruitment. The recruitment of the members of the international armed force may be left to the governments of the member states acting on behalf of the security organization and obliged to place at the disposal of the organization a certain number of recruits, determined by agreement or by a binding decision of the central organ of the organization. In the case of indirect recruitment, compulsory conscription is more feasible and practical than it is in the case of direct recruitment. If a state has the power to impose by national law upon its subjects the obligation to do military service in its own armed force, it also has the power to impose in this way upon its subjects the obligation to do military service in the armed force of an international organization of which this state is a member. However, voluntary enlistment on the basis of free contract is in both cases preferable to compulsory conscription, for the length of time of military service in a separate and independent armed force of an international security organization must be much longer than that of military service in a national armed force. In contradistinction to the latter, the former can hardly have effective reserves at its disposal. If a member of a separate and independent armed force of an international security organization returns to civil life, he ceases to be under the control of the international organization and hence is not liable to call, unless this function is also performed by the governments of the member states on behalf of the international organi

zation.24 For the same reason, in order to make the terms of enlistment sufficiently attractive, the wages paid to the members of the armed force of an international security organization must be much higher than the small pay to which the enlisted men below the rank of commissioned and non-commissioned officers are entitled in a national armed force. If an international security organization is so centralized that it assumes the character of a federal state, its armed force may be recruited in the same way as that of a national state.

Another problem of a permanent and separate armed force of an international security organization is the personal legal status of its members. Since they owe allegiance only to an international organization, they should not be citizens of a particular state. They should be released from their nationality during the time of their service in the armed forces of the organization,25 and their status of belonging legally to the international community constituted by the security treaty, a legal status analogous to that of national citizenship, should be recognized by the member states and certified by appropriate documents, such as passports. This problem is not particular to the organization of a permanent and separate armed force but applies to all organs of an international security organization.28 In order to guarantee complete independence of the governments of the member states, the members of the armed forces should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the member states and should be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the international organization which should be endowed with special organs competent to exercise this jurisdiction. 27

A most delicate problem is the location of the armed forces. The inconvenience of stationing the armed force of an international security organization in the territory of a member state is obvious, and stationing the force in the territory of a non-member, even if permanently neutralized, like Switzerland, is out of the question. Besides, as we shall see later, the institution of neutrality and especially of permanent neutralization is not compatible with a universal or quasi-universal security organization. The only satisfactory solution of this problem is to locate the armed forces and the main organs of the security organization in a territory which is under the direct sovereignty of the organization and not under the sovereignty of an individual state. This internationalized territory may be of relatively small size, like that placed under the sovereignty of the Pope, the territory of the state of the Vatican City. However, for purely strategic reasons, military bases at different points all over the surface of the earth would be needed. Hence, it would be necessary to have not one but several internationalized territories. Such territories could be acquired only with the agreement of the states in possession of them.

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