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7. The principle of not recognizing an illegally established situation is known as the Stimson Doctrine, named after the U. S. Secretary of State Stimson and formulated in an identical note to Japan and China of January 7, 1932 in which the Government of the United States declared that it "... cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement, which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.” The principle of non-recognition has been confirmed by a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations on 11 March 19: which contained the following statement: "It is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement, which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."
The Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, published by the Harvard Research in International Law, lays down the principle that an aggressor does not acquire rights or relieve itself of duties by becoming an aggressor (Article 2); Articles 3, 4, and 5 contain specific applications of this principle.
8. An interesting suggestion concerning the centralization of financial sanctions was made by M. Busch in two articles published on 22 and 23 September 1915 in the Neue Züricher Zeitung, later presented by Camille Gorgé, Une nouvelle sanction du droit international. Le Projet Busch (1926), and Schücking, Rühland, Böhmert, "Die Organisation der Völkerbundsexekution gegen den Angreifer.” Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, 1932, pp. 560 ff. The essential idea of the suggestion (as formulated in the last mentioned article) was that each member of a security organization would deposit a certain amount of gold, determined in proportion to the number of its inhabitants and its economic resources, at the disposal of the central organ of the organization. Each member state would then have the right to circulate bank notes which would have to be covered by this amount of gold on deposit. In case a state were declared to be an aggressor by the competent organ of the organization, its gold would be confiscated and, if necessary, transferred to the victim of the aggression. This confiscation of gold would then probably lead to the breakdown of the monetary system of the aggressor state. Cf. also F. N. Keen, The World in Alliance, p. 58 (quoted by John A. Hobson, Towards International Government, London 1915, pp. 94 f): "The States comprised in the international scheme might be required to keep deposited with, or under, the control of, the International Council sums of money, proportioned in some way to their relative populations or financial resources which might be made available to answer international obligations, and an international bank might be organized which would facilitate the giving of security by states to the International Council for the performance of their obligations and the enforcement of payments between one state and another (as well as probably assisting in the creation of an international currency and discharging other useful international functions)."
9. Cf. International Sanctions, pp. 24 ff., 60 ff., 76 ff., 91 ff., 106 ff. According to this study, a complete international boycott involves : “(a) the complete closing
of land frontiers, even to mails, in either direction; (b) the severance of telegraphic, telephonic, and radio communication; (c) exclusion of the shipping and aircraft of the boycotted state from the harbours and airports of all other states; (d) the prohibition and prevention of the shipping of all other states from entering the harbours of the boycotted state ; (e) the prevention of all illicit communications, by land, sea, or air; (f) the internment or the repatriation of all nations of the boycotted state resident in other countries; (g) the withdrawal of all diplomatic and consular officers on both sides.” Op. cit., p. 109. The economic sanctions stipulated in Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Covenant of the League of Nations constituted a complete boycott. The provisions ran as follows: “Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.” An analogous provision is Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations which runs as follows: "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”
10. Article 16, paragraph 3, of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided : “The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State ..." Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates : “If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems."
11. Cf. p. 61.
12. According to Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, the enforcement measures to be taken by the Security Council in case of a threat to or breach of the peace may be directed not only against a member but also against a non-member state, and according to Article 51 the exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense is justified not only in case of an armed attack launched by a member but also in case of an armed attack by a nonmember state.
12a. Article 14 of the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression stipulates : "Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to excuse any State for a violation of the humanitarian rules concerning the conduct of hostilities, prescribed by international law or by a treaty to which it is a party." This applies also to the conduct of hostilities against an aggressor.
13. Cf., pp. 122 ff.
14. This system of military sanctions was adopted by the Covenant of the League of Nations, which in Article 16, paragraph 2, provided : "It shall be the duty of the Council in such case [if a Member of the League resorts to war in violation of the Covenant] to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.” The words "to contribute to the armed forces to be used ..." are misleading. There were no armed forces other than those of the members.
15. This is the case under the Charter of the United Nations. Of Note 16.
16. The first attempt to organize military sanctions on the basis of the contingent system was made in a proposal submitted by the representative of France to the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference following the first World War. This proposal contained the following provisions :
“III: MILITARY SANCTIONS
(i.) International Forces
The execution of the military sanctions on land or at sea shall be entrusted either to an international force, or to one or more Powers members of the League of Nations, to whom a mandate in that behalf shall have been given,
The International Body shall have at its disposal a military force supplied by the various member States of sufficient strength :
(1.) To secure the execution of its decisions and those of the International Tribunal;
(2.) to overcome, in case of need, any forces which may be opposed to the League of Nations in the event of armed conflict.
(ii.) Strength of International Contingents
The International Body shall determine the strength of the international force and fix the contingents which must be held at its disposal.
Each of the member States shall be free to settle as it deems best the conditions under which its contingent shall be recruited.
The question of the limitation of armaments in each of the member States will be dealt with elsewhere.
(ii.) Permanent Staff
A permanent international Staff shall investigate all military questions affecting the League of Nations. Each State shall appoint the officer or officers who shall represent it in a proportion to be determined later.
The Chief and Deputy Chiefs of Staff shall be appointed for a period of three years by the International Body, from a list submitted by the member States.
(iv.) Functions of the Permanent Staff
It shall be the duty of the permanent international Staff to deal, under the supervision of the International Body, with everything relating to the organisation of the joint forces and the eventual conduct of military operations. It will in particular be charged with the task of inspecting international forces and armaments in agreement with the military authorities of each State, and of proposing any improvements it may deem necessary, either in the interna
tional military organisation or in the constitution, composition, and methods of recruiting of the forces of each State.
The Staff shall report the result of its inspection, either as a matter of routine or at the request of the International Body. Military instruction shall be given in each member State in accordance with rules designed to procure, as far as possible, uniformity in the armaments and training of the troops destined to act in concert.
The International Body shall be entitled, at any time, to require that the member States introduce any alteration into their national system of recruiting which the Staff may report to be necessary.
(v.) Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General Staff When circumstances shall so require, the International Body shall appoint, for the duration of the operations to be undertaken, a Commander-in-chief of the international forces.
Upon his appointment, the Commander-in-chief shall nominate his chief of General Staff and the officers who are to assist him.
The powers of the Commander-in-chief and his Chief of General Staff shall cease when circumstances become such that an armed conflict is no longer to be feared, or when the object of the military operations has been attained.
In either case, the date at which the powers of the Commander-in-chief and the General Staff shall cease shall be fixed by a decision of the International Body.”
On 5 February 1932, at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armament, the French delegation submitted a set of proposals which contained a plan for the establishment of an international armed force organized according to the contingent system. The object of this plan was to set up on behalf of the League of Nations : “(1) an International police force to prevent war; (2) a first contingent of coercionary forces to repress war and to bring immediate assistance to any State victim of aggression. (a) The police force will be permanently available with complete freedom of passage to occupy in times of emergency areas where a threat of war has arisen, and to assist the action of commissioners of the League of Nations on the spot, and also to contribute to all conservatory measures within the scope of the Convention to improve the Means of Preventing War and of Article 11 of the League Covenant. This police force will be made up of contingents furnished by each of the contracting parties in a proportion to be determined. France is prepared to contribute a mixed brigade, a light naval division and a mixed group of reconnaissance and fighter aircraft. The League of Nations will arrange for the command of the international police force and will be entitled to inspect its component elements. (b) The first contingent of coercionary forces would in conformity with the undertakings to be assumed by contracting parties, be made up of elements of strength varying according to the regions concerned. These undertakings entered into by States towards the League of Nations would oblige them to come to the help of any State victim of aggression with forces of definite strength constantly available. The contracting parties would have the option of increasing this contribution on the recommendation of the Council of the League (Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant) or, in the event of aggression, with a view to applying regional conventions of mutual assistance coming within the scope of the Covenant. The undertakings of the various States
would differ according to the place of the conflict-a conflict concerning another continent from that to which the State belongs; a conflict concerning the continent to which the State belongs; a conflict in which the aggressor has a common frontier with the contracting State. France is prepared to undertake the following contributions: In the case of a conflict outside Europe, a mixed brigade, a light naval division, a mixed group of aircraft, material for land warfare without personnel, and munitions ; for a conflict in Europe: a division of all arms, a naval division, a mixed group of aircraft, material for land warfare with personnel, and munitions ; for a conflict in Europe in which the aggressor has a common frontier with France the contingents provided for in the pre ceding paragraph and, in addition, forces, the strength of which would be decided in each case in agreement with the League. As far as material for land warfare is concerned, the contracting parties which possess tanks or similar armoured implements, as well as heavy field artillery, undertake to contribute from them to the forces which will be placed at the disposal of the League under the conditions mentioned above. In these various eventualities the undertakings of each State would only become operative if the forces thus placed at any moment at the disposal of the League reached a minimum total to be determined, and if there were equitable proportion between the contributions of the principal States.” Series of League of Nations Publications, IX. Disarmament, 1932. IX. 63; Vol. I, p. 115.
A special subcommittee on international organization, appointed in 1943 by Secretary of State Hull, prepared a Draft Constitution of International Organization which in its Article 10 contained the following provisions: “1. Any menace to the peace of nations, wherever it arises, is a matter of vital concern to all states. The International Organization through its Executive Committee [composed of representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China] or Council [composed of eleven representatives, including one representative designated by the United States of America, one by the United Kingdom, one by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one by China, two by the group of European states, two by the group of American states, one by the group of Far Eastern states, one by the states of the Near and Middle East, and one by the British Dominion) shall take any action necessary to safeguard or restore peace. 2. In the event of a breach, or imminently threatened breach, of the peace between nations, the Chairman of the Council, on consultation with such members of the Executive Committee as may be available, shall request the parties to desist from any action which would further aggravate the situation and shall forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. The Council shall request the parties to restore or maintain the position existing before the breach or threatened breach of the peace and to accept procedures of peaceful settlement. The state or states failing to comply with this request within the time specified shall be presumed to intend a violation of the peace of nations and the Executive Committee or the Council shall apply all the measures necessary to restore or maintain the peace. 3. Members of the International Organization undertake in no case to give a state, declared by the Council to be threatening or committing a violation of the peace, assistance of a character which in the opinion of the Council would aggravate the dispute. 4. Members of the International Organization agree to make available for action taken under paragraph 2 to restore or maintain peace such armaments, facilities, installations, strategic areas and contingents of armed forces, and to afford such freedom of passage through their territories, as the Council or the Executive Committee, advised by the General Security and Arma