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ments Commission, may determine to be necessary for this purpose, having regard for the geographical position, regional or special obligations, and relative resources of member states. All national forces and facilities shall operate under their national authorities subject to the general control of the Executive Committee and the technical coordination of operations provided by the General Security and Armaments Commission. ... 8. Any action by the Council under this Article shall require a two-thirds majority vote including three-fourths of the states members of the Executive Committee.” Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945. Dept. of State Publication 3580. General Foreign Policy Series 15. Released February 1950. Washington, D. C., 1949, p. 478.

The contingent system is adopted by the Charter of the United Nations which provides : “ARTICLE 43. 1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. ARTICLE 44. When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces. ARTICLE 45. In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. ARTICLE 46. Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. ARTICLE 47. 1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. 2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work. 3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently. 4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees. ARTICLE 48. 1. The

action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members. ARTICLE 49. The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.”

The Resolution 377 (V) A, entitled “Uniting for Peace,” adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1950, provides “that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations.” The Resolution provides for the establishment by the General Assembly of a Peace Observation Commission composed of 14 member states "which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security”; and of a Collective Measures Committee consisting of 14 member states. This committee is directed to study and make a report “in consultation with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate” on methods “which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter).” The Resolution “invites each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for the restoration of international peace and security”; and “recommends to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the rights of individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter.”

Prior to the adoption of the Resolution “Uniting for Peace" by the General Assembly of the United Nations, a resolution (the Thomas-Douglas Resolution S. Con. Res. 52, 81st Cong., 1st sess.) was submitted, on July 8, 1949, to the U. S. Senate. It contained the provisions: “... be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), (I) That the Congress reaffirm its faith in the United Nations as the cornerstone of the international policy of the United States and as an institution which can progressively be made more

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adequate to assure the security of its members; (II) That to this end the Congress pledges its support to a supplementary agreement under Article 51 of the Charter open to all members of the United Nations, by which the signatories agree, if the Security Council is prevented from fulfilling its duties, to come to the aid of the victim of attack if requested to do so by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, including three of the permanent members of the Security Council; (III) That such an agreement should specify the forces that each signatory agrees to maintain, under the spirit of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 43, for immediate use of the United Nations-(a) upon call of the Security Council, or (b) upon call of the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote, including at least three of the permanent members of the Security Council, and (IV) That such an agreement should specify that if a matter pertaining to a threat to or breach of the peace, or act of aggression, is on the agenda of the Security Council, and the Security Council is prevented from fulfilling its duties, the signatories who are members of the Security Council will take such steps as may be required to remove it from the agenda of the Security Council; and (V) That such au agreement should come into force when ratified by a majority of the United Nations including three of the permanent members of the Security Council. Sec. 2. Such an agreement shall not in any way impair the inherent right of the parties to engage in self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, individually or through other collective arrangements consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter, or the North Atlantic Security Pact, or the Pact of Rio de Janeiro.”

The Collective Measures Committee suggested in its first report (General Assembly. Official Records: Sixth Session. Supple. No. 13 [A/1891,] New York, 1951) that the United Nations, “whenever it determines upon the use of collective force,” should appoint an "executive military authority" responsible for the direction and control of its military operations. This agency “should be empowered to coordinate the efforts of individual States and to organize contributions of forces, assistance and facilities in order to initiate effective military operations against the aggressor in the shortest possible time. Accordingly, upon the determination to adopt measures involving the use of United Nations armed force, the Organization should authorize a State or group of States to act on its behalf as executive military authority, within the framework of its policies and objectives as expressed through such resolutions as it may adopt at any stage of the collective action.” As to the relationship between the executive military authority and the state victim of an aggression, the Report states: "In some cases, the victim State might itself be designated as the executive military authority, particularly when it is in a position to conduct its own defence with only limited assistance from the United Nations. More often, however, it might be appropriate for the executive military authority to consist of a group of States, of which the victim State would be one. Finally, the executive military authority might be a State or a group of States which would not include the victim State. Special consideration should also be given to the inclusion in the executive military authority of States situated in, or contiguous to, the area of hostilities, particularly when those States are participating in the United Nations action with their full military potential.” “In the theatre of operations the executive military authority should have full responsibility for the coordination and strategic direction and control of the United Nations forces, within the framework of the policies and objectives as expressed through such resolutions as the United Nations may adopt at any stage of the collective action. ... In accordance with its responsibility, the executive military authority should be authorized to

designate the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces and to replace him. Where the executive military authority consists of a group of States, the Commander-in-Chief should be designated by mutual agreement. The Commander-in-Chief's authority should be defined by the executive military authority, and he should receive instructions from that authority." As to the identification of the United Nations character of operations, the Report states : "In identifying military measures with the United Nations, the Security Council or the General Assembly and the executive military authority should take action of several types. First, the body deciding upon or recommending military measures should provide that the forces serving under the executive military authority will be known as the United Nations Forces. The Commander-in-Chief should initiate and conduct all operations as Commander of the United Nations Forces, and should issue all orders, reports and instructions, and carry on all relationships, in the name of the United Nations Command. The Security Council or the General Assembly should authorize the use of the United Nations flag in the field, and the Commander-in-Chief should ensure that that flag, in addition to national flags, is used in United Nations operations. Arrangements should be made for the proper identification of personnel and property of the United Nations in the theatre of operations. Similarly, consideration should be given to providing a United Nations service medal for the forces engaged in future United Nations military action."

The Secretary-General of the United Nations submitted to the Collective Measures Committee the proposal to create a “United Nations Volunteer Reserve.” In its second Report (General Assembly. Official Records: Seventh Session. Suppl. No. 17 [A/2215] New York 1952), the Collective Measures Committee states: "The Secretary-General proposed the creation of an international organizational framework through which, in his opinion, some States would be further enabled to contribute combatant or ancillary units. In addition, under these proposals, in his estimation at least fifty or sixty thousand volunteers willing to serve the principles of the United Nations might well become available through a United Nations Volunteer Reserve. Such a reserve would constitute additional supplementary strength to other forces provided to a United Nations Executive Military Authority at the time such an Authority was appointed to resist aggression.” “Volunteers to a United Nations Volunteer Reserve would be recruited on behalf of the United Nations through the existing national military establishments of States willing to participate in the proposal.” They would be “trained in advance on a part time voluntary basis."

17. The Charter of the United Nations provides in Article 17, paragraph 2, that "the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.” It seems that the expenses of a military action taken by the Security Council are not to be considered as “expenses of the Organization.” This may be inferred from Article 50 : “If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.” This provision presupposes that each state must bear the expenses of its own armed force which carry out the measures taken by the Security Council. From Article 49, which stipulates that the members of the United Nations "shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,” may follow the principle of an

equitable sharing of the burdens involved in collective measures. Cf. the Second Report of the Collective Measures Committee, p. 6.

18. It is assumed that the difficulty of cordination in naval operations is not as pronounced as in land operations. International Sanctions contained the following statement: “Division of effort between navies is more easily organized than between armies, particularly in the type of operations that are likely to be needed in common action against an aggressor state. Sea power is not the instrument of an aggressor; of itself it can do little against any Great Power. It is only when sea power is allied to land power that it has any strength for conquest; intrinsically, it is rather the weapon of collective defence against aggression. Such naval operations as an aggressor undertakes are likely to be strictly local, in support of, or ancillary to, his main effort by land, whereas the naval action taken against him may be widespread, and therefore easily apportioned between various Powers without such close contact as is likely to involve the difficulties of jealousy or divided command.” Loc. cit., p. 119.

19. Cf. International Sanctions, p. 119.

20. As a matter of fact, the special agreements which, according to Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations, are to be concluded between the United Nations, represented by the Security Council, and the member states for the purpose of determining the numbers and types of forces to be placed at the disposal of the Council, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance to be provided, have not yet been concluded, nor is it very likely that they will ever be concluded.

Under Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council, after having determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, may make “recommendations” or “decide" upon enforcement measures involving or not involving the use of armed force (Articles 42 and 41). The armed forces referred to in Article 42 are the armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council according to Article 43. As long as the special agreements referred to in Article 43 are not concluded, the Security Council is not in a position to “decide” to take enforcement measures involving the use of armed force. Consequently, when, on 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea and the Security Council in its Resolution of 25 June 1950 (UN Doc. S/1501) determined the existence of a breach of the peace, the Council did not adopt a decision legally binding upon the members of the United Nations but, in its Resolution of 27 June 1950 (UN Doc. S/1511), recommended "that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.” Seventeen states actually contributed armed forces to the action recommended by the Security Council. On 7 July 1950, the Security Council adopted a Resolution (UN Doc. S/1588) in which the Council “1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950, to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area ; 2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea ; 3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States; 4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces; 5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces con

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