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but also wartime armaments and the view that disarmament efforts should be restricted to permanent peacetime armaments (effectives, material and expenditure) and not affect wartime armaments.30 Restriction to peacetime armaments has been justified by the assertion that only this kind of armament is capable of effective control. For this reason, trained reserves, to be considered as part of wartime armaments, should not be prohibited or limited, and the question of war potential should not be considered.31
Another difference of opinion concerns the question of whether disarmament should refer to land, sea and air armaments or only to one or the other.32
The disarmament effort may aim at a complete abolition—that is, the prohibition and elimination of all kinds of armaments. If successful, it would thus affect all states of the world.33 The disarmament effort may aim only at a reduction and limitation of armaments.84 It would thus affect only states possessing substantial armaments. Reduction presupposes a final level of armaments and especially of armed forces. The aim of reduction is to bring armaments down to a minimum, recognized as necessary, representing the final military position of each state. Limitation means that, as of a certain date, no increase in armaments and especially no increase in armed forces is permitted, and total strength and total amount of equipment is frozen at a level determined by disclosure and verification.35
The reduction and limitation of armaments may be combined with the complete prohibition of certain types of armaments or of specific categories of arms and their use in warfare such as nuclear weapons and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction ; 38 chemical and bacterial weapons; 37 submarines,38 tanks and large mobile guns; 39 and aircraft, especially bombers. 40
A kind of partial disarmament is so-called geographic disarmament—that is, the limitation or prohibition of armaments and armed forces in certain definite territorial areas or the establishment of demilitarized zones.41
There are two reasons why total disarmament is not considered to be possible: first, the need of each state to have at its disposal a certain armed force for the maintenance of internal order—that is to say, a national police force, a so-called irreducible component; second, the necessity of sanctions, especially enforcement measures involving the use of armed force as reactions against violations of the legal order constituting the security organization and in particular as reactions against violations of the provisions concerning the reduction and limitation of armaments. As long as these sanctions are to be executed by the members of the organization employing their
own national armed forces, no real disarmament is possible. The establishment of an international police force—that is, an armed force at the direct disposal of the international organization and different from, as well as independent of, the armed forces of the members—is an essential condition of an effective attempt to reduce and limit the latter. The only question is whether the abolitionthat is, the prohibition and elimination of certain types of armaments or categories of arms mentioned above, must be restricted to national or may be extended to international armed forces. If the abolition were extended, certain armaments or arms, e. g., nuclear, chemical, bacterial weapons, and bombardment from the air, would be prohibited even in the execution of international sanctions. If the abolition were not extended, there would not be an absolute abolition but rather an internationalization of these types of armaments or of the production, possession, and use of such weapons. In this respect, the internationalization of military aviation plays an important part in the discussion of disarmament.43
Immediate, complete or gradual (progressive) disarmament. One of the most important conflicts of views in the discussion of the disarmament problem is the conflict between immediate and complete disarmament and gradual (progressive) disarmament. It is understandable that a state, and especially a great power, would be reluctant to accept the obligation of immediate disarmament because it would be afraid to become the victim of another state, especially, a great power, which would not fulfil its obligation. Hence, a plan of gradual disarmament would have a far better chance of being successful."* In this respect, the question arises as to the relationship between the reduction of armaments and the establishment of an effective organization for its control. There is a divergence of opinion between those who suggest that a convention for the reduction and limitation, or even for the total or partial prohibition and elimination of armaments, should precede the organization of control, and those who prefer a reverse procedure because they think it a hopeless attempt to impose upon states the obligation to disarm without having previously established a legal system guaranteeing the fulfillment of this obligation. The question of the priority of control plays a decisive role in the discussion of nuclear (atomic and hydrogen) disarmament.45 A kind of compromise between these opposite views is the proposal to put into force a convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments and for the abolition of nuclear weapons, simultaneously with the establishment of an effective control machinery.46
Proportional or balanced disarmament. In contradistinction to proportional “7 reduction, the balanced reduction of armaments aims at avoiding the dangerous situation of disequilibrium between the different categories of armaments of one state and between the total armaments—and hence the war power-of different states. Only if this disequilibrium is avoided, it has been argued by the representative of France in Committee 1 of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, might countries “pass from one stage to another without any danger to or even any lessening of their security. Each intermediate step after the initial balance should be marked by increasing security until a final balance was reached in which no state could menace the life of its neighbors. Balanced reduction was inconsistent with proportional reduction. The essential task was to render war impossible. If peace was threatened by a disequilibrium between certain armaments, it was not evident how proportional reduction could lead to security:
The term "geographical disarmament” has been suggested by J. H. Marshall-Cornwall 49 to designate “the restriction or prohibition of armaments and armed forces in certain definite territorial areas," that is to say, the demilitarization of particular zones of territory. There are two types of demilitarization: 1) the prohibition imposed upon states against erecting fortifications and stationing troops in certain zones of their territories in time of peace; 2) the exclusion of a certain part of state territories from any military operations in time of war.50 The purpose of the first type of demilitarization is to prevent a future conflict by a regime maintained during time of peace. The purpose of the second is to restrict and localize hostilities once they have broken out.51 This second type is sometimes termed the "neutralization" of a definite zone of territory (to be distinguished from the permanent neutralization of an entire state territory, such as the neutralization of Switzerland) or, to use a terminology suggested by Marshall-Cornwall, the “immunization” of a definite zone of territory from war. 52 Both types of demilitarization may be effected by international agreement or by the decision of the agency of an international security organization.
Demilitarized zones are normally placed on the frontier between two states.53 They may be restricted to the territory of one state only, as in the case of the unilateral demilitarization of the Rhineland in the peace treaty of Versailles, 54 or they may be established on the territories of two neighboring states on both sides of their common frontier so that the demilitarized zone is determined, as
Marshall-Cornwall 55 formulates it, by three lines: the political frontier between the two states and, parallel to it and at a certain distance on either side, the boundaries of the demilitarized zone. “Although the zone boundaries are in principle parallel to and equidistant from the political frontier, they must in practice conform to the local topographic, economic, and military circumstances and must be precisely demarcated on the ground.” 56
REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF EXPENDITURES The reduction and limitation of armaments may be brought about not only directly by the reduction and limitation of effectives and war material but also indirectly by the reduction and limitation of the sums to be spent on armaments—that is, by the reduction and limitation of the armaments expenditures or, as it is usually termed, the national defense expenditures. This term may be defined as “all expenditure necessitated or entailed by the creation, maintenance and training in time of peace of armed forces and formations organized on a military basis and by measures immediately connected with the preparation for national mobilization.” 57 Although the reduction and limitation of expenditure are the most tangible proof of the reduction and limitation of armaments, there can be little doubt that the limitation of expenditure is not in itself an adequate measure of disarmament. Hence, a combination of the reduction and limitation of effectives and war material and a reduction and limitation of expenditure is advisable.58 There may be a limitation of the total expenditure or limitation by categories—that is, by the separate limitation of expenditure for land, sea, air armaments or the separate limitation of expenditure for effectives as distinguished from expenditure for material, the expenses in manufacture, purchase, and upkeep of weapons and other war material.59 As far as the distinction between peacetime and wartime armaments is concerned, it would seem that budgetary limitations can be effectively established only for peacetime armaments.
Some writers hold that an essential condition for an effective limitation of expenditure is publishing the budget, either the military budget only or the total budget. Some governments which have not been in favor of budgetary limitations have wished to restrict budgetary regulations of a disarmament convention to publishing the budget. There is a divergence of opinion with respect to the question of whether budgetary limitations should be introduced immediately or should be preceded by a period of years during which only a system of budgetary publicity is established. The working of such a system would show to what extent budgetary limitation
is feasible.60 The difficulties with which the establishment of budgetary limitations is confronted are, in the main, the fluctuations in the purchasing power of currency and the differences in the budgetary systems of the different states. Consequently, unification of the military budget has been suggested.
In connection with budgetary publicity and limitation, the abolition of secret funds has been suggested.
On 29 August 1955, the French government submitted to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission a draft agreement on the financial supervision of disarmament and the allocation for peaceful purposes of the funds made available. In this proposal reductions of military expenditures are combined with the allocation of the funds made available by these reductions for the improvement of levels of living and the development of underdeveloped areas.62
DEROGATIONS It is generally recognized that under certain circumstances a party to the disarmament convention may be permitted to go beyond the limits of armaments laid down in the convention. There is a tendency to restrict such permission to the case of an unprovoked aggression. To provide derogation for any war without any qualification whatsoever makes any limitation of armaments illusory. Other circumstances under which it has been suggested that derogation might take place are: a civil war, a threatened attack by another state, an unforeseen circumstance such as a new weapon, a radical change in military laws, a radical change in the political organization of a neighboring state, an alteration in the value of money. Such derogation may be possible only with the consent of the central organ of the security organization competent to decide the question as to whether these circumstances exist in the concrete case. If the decision is left to the state concerned the provisions of the disarmament convention concerning the reduction and limitation of armaments can hardly be considered to be effective.
Another condition of an effective disarmament convention is an appropriate measure of control or supervision. In view of the close connection between control and sanctions it is understandable that the antagonism of opinions regarding the latter applies also to the former. There is a view that treaties rest on mutual confidence and that their fulfillment should not be supervised because any such attempt would only cause suspicion between states, while according to another view a disarmament convention which does not provide