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for the establishment of a well organized control system is a blank cartridge. It does not guarantee that degree of security which is a necessary prerequisite for disarmament.64 Control implies two functions: disclosure and verification. The international control agency must get all the necessary information concerning their armaments from the states concerned and must have the power to verify them by inspection and investigation in order to know not only the declared but also the clandestine activities of the states which are parties to the disarmament convention. The term "control,” especially if applied to atomic disarmament, is sometimes used in a wider sense meaning not only disclosure and verification by inspection but also certain measures constituting participation of the international control agency in the direction or management of the undertakings, especially international ownership of the material essential for the production of atomic energy.45

It stands to reason that full knowledge of all the facts relevant to the armaments or disarmament of states is an essential condition of all disarmament efforts. Hence, the states must be obliged to furnish the necessary information to the international control agency which may publish it. This information can be verified effectively only by an inspection carried out on the territory of the state whose armaments are to be investigated. The most important question in this respect is whether such investigations should have an obligatory character with the states which as parties to the disarmament convention are obliged to allow on-the-spot inspection, or whether inspection by the international control agency should be possible only with the consent of the state concerned given in each concrete case. Inspection may be organized as a regular institution on a continuous basis, involving investigating at least once a year and whenever the control agency considers it necessary, or it may consist only of occasional investigations conducted by the control agency in case of suspicion, especially at the request of one or more members of the security organization and/or the suspected member itself. It may be conducted not only as a field inspection but also by aerial surveys and operated by a corps of technically qualified inspectors partly stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the disarmament program.

The reduction and limitation of armaments are not possible without the control of the manufacture of, and the trade in, arms, ammunition, and other war material. There are two different ways of organizing this control: direct national control of manufacture and trade exercised by the government of each state within its country under the supervision of an international control agency—that is,


indirect international control; or direct international control of manufacture and trade without the interposition of direct national control.

If the manufacture of arms and ammunition remains in the hands of private enterprise, it may be controlled by a system of licensing, with the licenses issued by the national government responsible for the strict handling of this system to an international control agency which must be kept informed by the national governments through detailed reports covering the production by value, number and weight of licensed private manufacture. The results of these reports should be published. Publishing the results of private manufacture is an essential element of this system.

National control of the manufacture of arms and ammunition is perfect if private manufacture is abolished and a state monopoly of manufacture established. Publicizing state manufacture is a prerequisite of its international control. The reports submitted to the international control agency may be verified by inspection on the spot, but the international control agency may be authorized to call for explanation only if it has reason to believe that the information is not reliable or, in case the national manufacture is limited by convention, that the imposed limits have been exceeded.

National control of the trade in arms and ammunition may be exercised by a system of export and import licenses to be issued by the government. As to publishing and verifying these licenses, the same principles apply as in the case of manufacture.

Direct international control of private manufacture may be exercised by a system of licenses to be issued not by the national governments but by the international control agency. International control of this phase of the armaments process reaches its highest degree in the internationalization of the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Direct international control of the trade in arms and ammunition may be exercised by having the international control agency issue export and import licenses; by completely prohibiting the export and import of war material, except that states unable to manufacture the quantities allotted to them should be permitted to import the necessary quantities from abroad; by prohibiting the export and import of certain categories of arms and ammunition, or the import to certain territories; by prohibiting the export to private persons and permitting such export only to governments. In this case, the question of the recognition of government arises which, in case of a civil war, may be answered in different ways by different authorities. The principle of publicity applies also to a direct international control of the trade in arms and ammunition. In order to be effective, inspection on the spot is indispensable.68

As far as the main organ competent to carry out the disarmament program is concerned, the first question is: should this organ be different from the central organ of the international security organization, and, if so, what should be the relationship between them? In view of the fact that disarmament is an essential and probably the most important function of a security system, subordinating the disarmament organ to the central security agency would seem to be adequate. If a special organ for the control of atomic energy is established, the same principle applies to the relationship between this organ and the disarmament agency. The composition of these organs may follow the patterns which have been indicated with respect to the composition of the central organ of a security organization.69

A highly disputed issue is that of the procedure in the disarmament agency. In particular, there is the question of whether or not the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members—the so-called veto right-should apply to the decisions of the atomic energy control agency. It seems that, with the exception of the Soviet Union and of some other communist governments, most governments agree that the application of sanctions to be directed against a state which violates its obligations under the convention concerning control of atomic energy should not be prevented by the exercise of a veto right.70

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Since in the course of the social evolution of civilized nations the almost general conviction has been formed that destroying human life is immoral, except as a sanction, it may be possible to bring the mass of the people to the belief that war, like murder, is a detestable crime. If this is achieved, the fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations may become not only the content of an international convention but also the content of the conscience of mankind. This is the ultimate goal of moral disarmament.71

As a means of achieving this goal, an international agreement might be concluded in which the contracting states would assume the obligation to take certain legislative and administrative measures in the fields of social and especially political life that is, in the fields of press, broadcasting, stage, cinema and, above all, education--for the purpose of influencing public opinion in favor of the maintenance of a durable peace. The most drastic measure in this agreement would be the application of penal law to certain acts dangerous to the peace. As punishable acts of this kind the following might be considered: undertakings calculated to disturb international relations, especially those whose purpose is incitment to war; propaganda against peace; agitation with a view to exerting pressure on the government in favor

of war while negotiations for the peaceful settlement of a conflict are in progress; founding or directing or even only belonging to an association whose aims are dangerous to the peace; publishing in the press false and tendentious reports on the international situation. In addition to a law providing for the punishment of those responsible for such reports, there would have to be legal provisions stipulating the right of having a reply to such reports published in the newspaper concerned or even authorizing the government to suppress the selling or spreading of the press products containing such reports. Governmental control of broadcasting, theatrical performances, and cinema shows with a view to preventing any abuse of these instruments of public opinion for the purpose of political propaganda incompatible with the idea of moral disarmament would also be necessary.

The most important means for effecting such disarmament is the organization of the education of youth and the training of teachers in a way that they may inspire the ideal of international peace and mutual respect between nations. In this connection, it would be necessary to control schoolbooks, especially those dealing with history, with a view to eliminating everything capable of arousing hatred of other peoples, and instruction in the basic principles of international law and in the organization and purposes of the United Nations would have to be compulsory.72

Some of these measures would constitute a radical restriction of the individual freedoms guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic states, especially the freedom of opinion and its expression. It may be very difficult to find a satisfactory compromise between this political ideal and that of moral disarmament. A still more serious difficulty confronting every intellectual movement directed against international war is the fact that, in almost all of the states of the world, there are political parties fostering a revolutionary ideology. As long as the actual circumstances of social life are such that a considerable part of the population considers, rightly or wrongly, civil war to be justifiable or even to be a necessary and inevitable means of improving their economic and political situation, the attempt to convince them that international war should be condemned under all circumstances remains problematical.


1. Cf. Salvador De Madariaga, Disarmament (1929), pp. 217 ff. : "It is therefore hopeless to try to solve the problem of armaments in isolation from the remaining problems of the world. ... There is only one way of solving the problem of disarmament, and that is by considering it, in the admirable French saying, as the organization of peace."

2. Some modern writers in the field of international law and politics are rather sceptical about the possible effect of disarmament on international security. Stone, op. cit., p. 100, speaks ironically of “the slogan 'arbitration, security and disarmament'.” He agrees with the opinion that this "slogan" was "one of the reactions to the messianic view that arbitration might be a specific against war. From this aspect the insistence of the slogan that all three elements were interdependent was a brilliant diplomatic device for shaking off the hounds of pacifist idealistic public opinion.” Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 383 ff., says: “At the foundation of the modern philosophy of disarmament there is the assumption that men fight because they have arms"; but, so he objects, "Men do not fight because they have arms. They have arms because they deem it necessary to fight. ... Reducing the quantity of weapons actually or potentially available at any particular time could have no influence upon the incidence of war; it could conceivably affect its conduct. Nations limited in the quantity of arms and men would concentrate all their energies upon the improvement of the quality of such arms and men as they possess. They would, furthermore, search for new weapons that might compensate them for the loss in quantity and assure them an advantage over their competitors. The elimination of certain types of weapons altogether would have a bearing upon the technology of warfare and, through it, upon the conduct of hostilities. It is hard to see how it could influence the frequency of war or do away with war altogether.” This pessimistic evaluation of a policy aiming at disarmament starts from a wrong premise. Such a policy is not necessarily based on the illusion that disarmament will have the effect of making war impossible. Its reasonable aim is to make war as a profitable enterprise more difficult, and, as far as qualitative disarmament is concerned, to make the conduct of war more human. Disarmament is not the condition of peace but, as Marion W. Boggs (Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy. The University of Missouri Studies, Vol. XVI, no. 1, 1941, p. 104) states, “only one among the several indispensable conditions of peace.” Morgenthau admits : “Disarmament or at least regulation of armaments is an indispensable step in a general settlement of international conflicts. It can, however, not be the first step. Competition for armaments reflects, and is an instrument of, competition for power. So long as nations advance contradictory claims in the contest for power, they are forced by the very logic of the power contest to advance contradictory claims for armaments. Therefore, a mutually satisfactory settlement of the power contest is a precondition for disarmament. Once the nations concerned have agreed upon a mutually satisfactory distribution of power among themselves, they can then afford to reduce and limit their armaments. Disarmament, in turn, will contribute greatly to the general pacification.” However, an agreement on "a mutually satisfactory distribution of power” necessarily implies an agreement concerning a mutually satisfactory "disarmament or at least regulation of armaments." For, as Morgenthau says (p. 27): "In international politics ... armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation." His attempt to distinguish political power from military power is of no avail. He defines political power as “the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority” (p. 26); and by "control” he understands “a psychological relation between two minds” (p. 27). This relationship, he says, “is of the essence of political power.” From this assumption he concludes that political power “must be distinguished from force in the sense of the actual exercise of physical violence.” But if-as he affirms-armed strength, that is military power, is essential to political power, political power cannot be separated from military power.

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