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mitted by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, notes that the immense majority of its members are of opinion that this draft, while in harmony with the ideals of mankind, is under existing world conditions incapable of being carried into execution, that it can only be realized when international organization is strengthened in respect both of methods of pacific procedure and the system of sanctions, and that, consequently, the said draft cannot be accepted by the Commission as a basis for its work, which work must be pursued along the lines already mapped out.” Doc. A/AC.50/2, pp. 54, 55. On 19 April 1932 the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference, created on 8 February 1932, adopted the following resolution: "In view of the opinions expressed during the discussion at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the General Commission considers that the reduction of armaments, as provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall, after this Conference has taken the first decisive step of general reduction to the lowest possible level, be progressively achieved by means of successive revisions at appropriate intervals. Loc. cit. p. 89.
In a draft resolution submitted to the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission (Doc. DC/SC. 1/15/Rev. 1, 8 March 1955, and DC/SC. 1/22, 1 April 1955), Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States suggested that the disarmament program should be carried out in the following stages:
"I. After the constitution and positioning of the control organ which shall be carried out within a specified time, and as soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect: (a) conventional armament and overall military manpower shall be limited to levels existing on 31 December 1954, or such other date as may be agreed at the World Disarmament Conference, (b) overall military expenditure, both atomic and nonatomic, shall be limited to amounts spent in the year ending 31 December 1954, or such other date as may be agreed at the World Disarmament Conference.
II. As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect: (a) one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect; (b) on completion of (a): the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons shall cease.
III. As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect: (a) The second half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect; (b) On completion of (a): i. The total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes shall be carried out; ii. The total prohibition and elimination of all other prohibited weapons shall be carried out; The measures mentioned in subparagraphs II and III above shall be accompanied by consequent reductions in over-all military expenditure.”
Second Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, Annexes 4 and 11.
On 4 May 1956, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America submitted to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission a Declaration (DC/SC.1/46), which contains the following statements : "(1) The programme (of disarmament] should proceed by stages. Progress from one state to another must depend upon the satisfactory execution of the preceding stage and upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems. (2) The programme should begin, under effective international con
trol, with significant reductions in armed forces, to such levels as are feasible in present unsettled world conditions. There should be corresponding reductions in conventional armaments and in military expenditures. Further reductions would be carried out as world conditions improved. (3) The programme should provide that, at an appropriate stage and under proper safeguards, the build-up of stockpiles of nuclear weapons would be stopped and all future production of nuclear material devoted to peaceful uses. (4) The programme should provide for a strong control organization with inspection rights, including aerial reconnaissance, operating from the outself and developing in parallel with the disarmament
The control measures should also provide against major surprise attack. This is particularly important so long as it is impossible to account for past production of nuclear material. (5) Preliminary demonstrations of inspection methods on a limited scale would help to develop an effective control system and could bring nearer agreement on a disarmament programme. (6) Provision should be made for the suspension of the programme, in whole or in part, if a major State failed to carry out its obligations or if a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should occur.” Third Report of the SubCommittee of the Disarmament Commission (Doc. DC/83, 4 May 1956), Annex 10.
45. In its Third Report, adopted on 17 May 1948 (AEC/31), the Atomic Energy Commission declared that it had reached an impasse in its work caused by the fact that the U. S. S. R. held that a convention outlawing atomic weapons and providing for the destruction of existing weapons must precede any control agreement on the ground that the prohibition of atomic weapons would be the only valid reason for the establishment of a control system, whereas the majority of the Commission considered that such a convention, without safeguards, would offer no protection against non-compliance.
46. The majority of the members of the United Nations was always of the opinion that effective control is an essential condition of reduction and limitation of armaments and especially of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Resolution 192 (III), adopted by the General Assembly on 19 November 1948, contains the statement "that the aim of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces can only be attained in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in international relations, which implies in particular the application of control of atomic energy involving the prohibition of the atomic weapon.” In Resolution 299 (IV) adopted on 23 November 1949, the General Assembly “Calls upon Governments to do everything in their power to make possible, by the acceptance of effective international control, the effective prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons"; and in Resolution 290 (IV) adopted on 1 December 1949, the General Assembly “Calls upon every nation" "To agree to the exercise of national sovereignty jointly with other nations to the extent necessary to attain international control of atomic energy which would make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons and assure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only." By resolution 502 (VI) adopted by the General Assembly on 11 January 1952 the Atomic Energy Commission was dissolved and the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations established. In this resolution the General Assembly declared that "in a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces—including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic" ; and that the implementation of this disclosure and verification “is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution" (Italics supplied). In its Resolution
914 (X), adopted on 16 December 1955, the General Assembly declared that “a control system" "is the keystone to any disarmament agreement.”
47. On 23 March 1928 the delegation of the U.S.S.R. submitted to the Prepatory Commission for the League of Nations Disarmament Conference a draft convention for the reduction of armaments, the principles of which were stated by the representatives of the U.S.S.R. on 17 April 1929 as follows: "(1) The substantial reduction of existing armaments; (2) the carrying out of reduction on proportional principles, with certain deviations in favour of less protected and smaller countries; (3) the establishment at once of a coefficient for proportional reduction.” In response, the Commission declared on 19 April 1929 that it “has not seen its way to adhere to the method of reduction based on the proportional principle" and to accept "numerical coefficients for the reduction of armaments" constituting this method. (Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 55) The Resolution 502 (VI) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 11 January 1952 required a "balanced” reduction of all armed forces and all armaments.
48. The representative of France declared also: "The security of a State or group of States was indivisible. Effectives and conventional armaments could not be separated from atomic armaments because the latter contributed to national security as long as they were not prohibited. Proportional reduction could not be considered since there was neither~(1) equilibrium between atomic armaments nor (2) equilibrium between conventional armaments and armed forces. The existing disequilibrium in one area compensated for the disequilibrium in the other. The U.S.S.R. proposals for prohibition of atomic weapons and proportional reductions of conventional weapons would reduce the security of some instead of increasing the security of all. The only way to meet the problem was to group atomic and conventional elements and to take the precarious initial balance resulting from the excess of atomic bombs on one side, and the excess of divisions on the other, as a point of departure. If there were excess of one thousand atomic bombs on one side and an excess of one hundred divisions on the other, the suppression of the atomic bomb should involve the dissolution of the hundred divisions. By this means a first balanced reduction would have been effected with a general increase of security. After that, matters would be simpler, since all armaments would be conventional. Reduction might take place in three stages, in each of which each country would reduce its arms by one-third of the difference between the minimum levels set for it and the forces existing on the completion of the first reduction." Second Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, pp. 51, 52.
On 28 May 1952 France, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission a Working Paper setting forth proposals for fixing numerical limitations of all armed forces. (United Nations Disarmanent Commission Doc. DC/10, 28 May 1952.) It contained the following working formula fixing numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America :
“(a) There should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America which should be worked out with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security among themselves or with other States and thus reducing the danger of war. It is tentatively suggested that the maximum ceilings for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
States of America and China should be the same and fixed, at, say, between 1 million and 1.5 million, and the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France should be the same and fixed at, say, between 700,000 and 800,000.
(b) For all other States having substantial armed forces there should be agreed maximum ceilings fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one per cent of the population. Moreover, they should be less than current levels except in very special circumstances."
A Supplement to this Working Paper (DC/12, 12 August 1952) reads as follows:
"I. It is contemplated that any agreement for the numerical limitation of armed forces would necessarily comprehend:
(a) provisions to ensure that production of armaments and quantities of armaments bear a direct relation to the amounts needed for permitted armed forces;
(b) provisions for composition of permitted armed forcas and armaments in order to prevent undue concentration of total permitted armed forces in a manner which might prejudice a balanced reduction;
(c) procedures in conformity with the directive contained in paragraph 6 (b) of General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, for the negotiation within overall limitations of mutually agreed programmes of armed forces and armaments with a view to obtaining early agreement on these matters among States with substantial military resources.
Procedures should be worked out to facilitate the development under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission, of mutually agreed programmes of armed forces and armaments to be comprehended within the treaty or treaties referred to in General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952.
II. One possible procedure, advanced for the purpose of initiating discussions, might be:
(a) Upon acceptance of the proposals set forth in Working Paper DC/10 with respect to fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces, arrangements might be made for a conference between China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and the United States of America with a view to reaching tentative agreement among themselves, by negotiation, on:
(1) the distribution by principal categories of the armed forces that they would consider necessary and appropriate to maintain within the agreed numerical ceilings proposed for their armed forces;
(2) the types and quantities of armaments which they would consider necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed forces within the proposed numerical ceilings ;
(3) the elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being understood that provision will be made for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the pro ition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
The distribution of armed forces within stated categories and the types and volumes of armaments would not necessarily be identic, even for States with substantially equal aggregate military strength, inasmuch as their needs and responsibilities may be different. The objective of the agreements would be to
reduce the possibility and fear of aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security. Such agreements would necessarily be tentative, as they would have to be reviewed in the light of further tentative agreements to be reached, as indicated in the following paragraph.
(b) When tentative agreement is attained at the conference referred to in paragraph II (a), regional conferences might be held, to be attended by all governments and authorities having substantial military forces in the respective regions, for the purpose of reaching similar tentative agreement on
(1) the overall numerical ceilings for the armed forces of all such governments and authorities, as proposed in paragraph 5 (b) of the Tripartite Working Paper on numerical limitations,
(2) the distribution of the permitted armed forces within stated categories,
(3) the type and volume of armaments necessary and appropriate to support the permitted armed forces, and
(4) the elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being understood that provision will be made for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
(c) Thereafter a draft treaty might be worked out, as contemplated in operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, comprehending and bringing into a balanced relationship all essential components of the programme.
III. The timing and co-ordination of the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations should ensure the balanced reduction of overall armed strength and should avoid creating or continuing any disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security during the period that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are being put into effect. In particular, the initial limitations or reductions in armed forces and permitted armaments and the initial steps toward elimination of prohibited armaments should commence at the same time. Subsequent limitations and reductions should be synchronized with subsequent progress in elimination of prohibited armaments. An international control authority should be established at the commencement of the programme and it should be in a position to assume progressively its functions in order to ensure the carrying out of such limitations, reductions, curtailments and prohibitions. Thus, when the limitations and reductions in armed forces and permitted armaments provided by the treaty or treaties are completed, production of prohibited armaments will have ceased, existing stockpiles of prohibited armaments and facilities for their production will have been disposed of, atomic energy will be utilized for peaceful purposes only, and the international control authority will have assumed its full functions."
49. J. H. Marshall-Cornwall, Geographic Disarmament, A Study of Regional Demilitarization (London, 1935), pp. V, vi.
50. Cf. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, 7th Ed., Vol. II, p. 244; Marshall-Cornwall, op. cit., p. 49; John Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations, 1929, p. 111.
51. Marshall-Cornwall, op. cit., p. 49. 52. Marshall-Cornwall, op. cit., p. 50.
53. It has been asserted (cf. Paul de Lapradelle, La Frontiere, 1928, pp. 14 ff.; and Marshall-Cornwall, op. cit., p. 174) that an international frontier cannot be expressed by a line, that it is, from a fiscal and especially from a military