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thus essentially economic security. Since only a socialist economic system can afford this guarantee, only under socialism can collective security be achieved, and achieved to such a degree that no coercion is necessary to maintain the order. When the causes of a violation of the order are removed, there is no reason for using force as a reaction against such violations. The social order of perfect socialism, which is called communism, is not a coercive order which means that it is not a legal order. A communist society of the future would be a stateless and lawless society. The collective security of communism would not be legal security.
This is a utopian scheme because its presupposition that violations of a social order are caused only or mainly by its economic insufficiency is contrary to all our social experiences. Even in a capitalist society, ambition and sexual desire are motives of violence which are no less effective than hunger, and it is more than likely that they would play an even greater part in a society in which economic motives for illegal conduct were removed. It is therefore an illusion to believe that, even if it could secure the satisfaction of all economic needs, a social order could prevent all its violations (i. e., every possible breach of peace by an illegal use of force) and thus make the legal use of force, as a sanction, superfluous. Hence, this concept of absolute security is an illusion, the illusion of a social order without force. It is necessary to be aware of this illusion because in the theory of international security there is a strong tendency to consider economic circumstances as the main causes of war and hence to assume that preventing war by removing its economic causes is more important than attempting to prevent war by providing for repressive sanctions to be imposed by internationally organized enforcement actions. If the development of collective security under national law can teach us anything with respect to the development of collective security under international law—and there is good reason to assume that the latter will not be essentially different from the former—it is that there is a danger implied in overestimating the economic factors of social life and in underestimating the necessity for a coercive order, that is, in underestimating the necessity for repressive enforcement measures for the maintenance of
peace, which means underestimating the necessity for a legal system of collective security.
6. THE CENTRALIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE AS A
As has been noted, the centralization of the second stage of the procedure by which the law is applied to a concrete violation, the
execution of the sanction (i. e., the use of force as a reaction against the delict) either may or may not be preceded by the centralization of the first stage, the ascertainment of the delict and the determination of the party or parties responsible for it. Furthermore, the second stage may be carried out in different ways each constituting a different degree of centralization. Even without instituting special judicial or quasijudicial organs for the first stage of the procedure, the legal order may authorize not only the subject directly injured by a delict but also the other members of the community to execute the sanctions—that is, to apply the enforcement measures provided for by the law. This means that in case the legal order is violated, all the members of the community have the right to assist the victim in his legitimate reaction against the violation of his rights--that is, against the illegal use of force which, in the narrower sense of the term, means only the illegal use of physical force, or, in the wider sense, means any violation of legally protected interests. Even the most primitive legal order must be interpreted as establishing this right. Under such a legal order, several subjects may enter an agreement for the purpose of mutual assistance. This agreement may impose an obligation upon the parties to the agreement to assist each other against an illegal use of force either on the part of subjects not parties to the agreement or on the part of members of the particular community constituted by the agreement. However, the legal order constituting the total community may impose such an obligation upon all its members, and even the most primitive legal orders do so, to protect the community against aggression from outside the community, especially against warlike enforcement action taken by a hostile community. Defense of an entire community against external aggression by another community requires organization, and organization means centralization, for example, the establishment of a special organ to direct defense, the appointment of a military leader, etc. Military leaders were probably the first central organs and military organizations for either defensive or aggressive purposes the first attempts at centralization in the process of social evolution. In the past, the centralization of the use of force by one community in its war against another community undertaken to guarantee external security preceded the centralization of the use of force within the community guaranteeing internal security.
The extent of the obligation imposed upon the members of a total or partial community to come to the assistance of the victim of an illegal use of force committed within this community may differ. The members of the community may be obliged to assist the victim only by means short of the use of physical force, or they may be obliged to give assistance by employing all appropriate means in
cluding the use of physical force. Whether the members of the community are only authorized or whether they are obliged to participate in the defense of the immediate victim, and whether their assistance is or is not limited to certain measures, the defense has a collective character. It is collective and no longer merely individual or selfdefense. To speak of collective self-defense, a term used in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, is misleading. The member of a community who, without being injured himself, comes to the assistance of the victim of an illegal use of force (in either the narrower or wider sense of the term) does not defend himself, he defends another. Only if the individual is identified with the other members of the group to which he belongs can the defense of one member by the others be called collective self-defense. However, such identification, if admissible at all, is justified only within a group in which the members are so closely connected that their thinking and feeling have a thoroughly collectivistic character. This is the case within a primitive family or tribe but not within an international community like the United Nations. Collective defense against an illegal use of force constitutes collective security. However, it is a very low degree of security as long as neither the first nor the second stage of the application of the law is centralized—that is, as long as neither special organs for the peaceful settlement of conflicts nor special organs for the legal use of force provided for as sanctions are established-and the principle of self-help prevails.
The establishment of a judicial or quasi-judicial organ for the peaceful settlement of conflicts is a first attempt to overcome this. However, the decisive step in eliminating the principle of self-help is the institution of a central organ whose competence refers to the execution of the sanctions as reactions against violations of the legal order, or, what amounts to the same, against an illegal use of force in the widest sense of the term. This executive organ may or may not be a government, or it may or may not be subordinated to a government—that is, the community may or may not be so centralized that it has the character of a state. Even if the executive organ does not have the character of a government or is not placed under a government, it may be bound in the exercise of its function by the decisions of an independent tribunal, so that it may be able to take action only in case the tribunal has ascertained the existence of an illegal use of force, and only against a party which the tribunal has found responsible. However, an executive organ may have the power to decide these questions for itself, not in conformity with the existing law as a tribunal is supposed to decide, but by applying principles of political convenience. The organ may be competent only to make recommendations to the
members of the community concerning the exercise of their right, or the fulfillment of their obligation, to assist the victim of an illegal use of force. At a higher stage in the development of collective security, its decisions are binding upon the members of the community. As long as the executive organ does not have its own means to perform enforcement actions at its direct disposal, it can only direct the actions which the members of the community take to assist the victim of an illegal use of force either by making recommendations to the members of the community or by making decisions binding on the members of the community. In this case, the difference between this stage of collective security and the stage in which the principle of self-help still prevails is not very great. This is particularly true because the members of the community must remain armed in order to be able to exercise their right, or fulfill their obligation, to assist the victim of an illegal use of force. However, the executive organ may have a police force at its direct disposal. A police force is a body of armed individuals professionally trained and organized for the purpose of applying the enforcement measures provided for by the law as reactions against an illegal use of force by a member of the community. If the executive organ has such a force at its disposal, it can effect the disarmament of the members of the community, one of the most important conditions for an effective system of collective security. Only then is the complete centralization of the force monopoly of the community, and thus the highest degree of collective security, achieved. This stage has been reached only within the modern state.
It is important to note that the disarmament of the members of a national legal community is effected by the establishment of a police force rather than by express prohibitions concerning the possession of arms. Besides, such prohibitions are never absolute. Under the law of modern states, the legal possession of arms, or at least of certain arms, by private persons is normally possible if an individual obtains a special license granted by the administration. In certain military organizations, for example in the militia system of Switzerland, persons belonging to the reserve are obliged to keep their guns in their possession even during the period they are not in active service.
With the establishment of a police force at the disposal of a central organ accompanied by the disarmament or effective control of the armament of the members of a community, the centralization of the force monopoly of a community approaches its culmination. Nevertheless even at this stage the principle of self-help is not completely
eliminated. It is preserved in the right of self-defense which individuals have even under the law of the modern state, the order guaranteeing the highest possible degree of collective security. The right of self-defense is considered to be an application of the principle of self-preservation which is an inherent or innate right of man. According to the natural-law doctrine, the right of self-defense authorizes an individual to protect his life, person and sometimes his property by the use of physical force against an attempt by another individual to inflict injury on him by an illegal use of physical force. This right may include the use of physical force for the purpose of defending not only one's own life, person and property but also the life, person and property of each of the members of one's own family. It may be exercised not only in case of an actual but also in case of an imminent illegal use of physical force. However, it may be exercised only in case of necessity—that is, only if there is no other possibility of defending one's legitimate interest.
The right of self-defense presupposes that, in principle, the use of physical force is legally forbidden. Hence, the use of physical force in the exercise of self-defense constitutes an exception to this prohibition. Under a social order which does not contain such a prohibition, no right of self-defense, as the right to react by the use of physical force against an illegal use of physical force, can exist. Under a primitive legal order which does not centralize the employment of force, the right of self-defense is implied in the principle of self-help which is the reaction of an individual against any violation of his rights. Even under a legal order which establishes a centralized force monopoly, self-defense is the indispensable minimum of self-help. It is indispensable because a centralized security organization cannot function at the same time that an illegal use of force is attempted. Since self-defense is permitted only as a reaction against an illegal use of force, its exercise involves a certain risk if a legal authority must eventually confirm its lawfulness. If it is lawful, its exercise may be interpreted as a decentralized function of the legal community acting through the individual who enforces the law of the community by using force in defending himself.
There is a certain relationship between the right of self-defense and the delict of aggression. If the right of self-defense is the right to react by the use of physical force against an act of aggression as an illegal use of physical force, the right of self-defense and the delict of aggression are complementary: where there is an act of aggression there is a right of self-defense; and there is a right of self-defense only where there is an act of aggression. But within a system of col