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strategic point of view, by its very nature a zone which may extend to a depth of several miles.

54. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the demilitarization of the Rhineland ran as follows: "Art. 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine. Art. 43. In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden. Art. 44. In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.” Example of provisions by which the prohibition of fortifications is imposed upon a defeated state, is Article 47 of the Peace Treaty with Italy, 10 February 1947, which runs as follows: "1. (a) The system of permanent Italian fortifications and military installations along the FrancoItalian frontier, and their armaments, shall be destroyed or removed. (b) This system is deemed to comprise only artillery and infantry fortifications whether in groups or separated, pillboxes of any type, protected accommodation for personnel, stores and ammunition, observation posts and military cableways, whatever may be their importance and actual condition of maintenance or state of construction, which are constructed of metal, masonry or concrete or excavated in the rock. 2. The destruction or removal, mentioned in paragraph 1 above, is limited to a distance of 20 kilometers from any point on the frontier as defined by the present Treaty, and shall be completed within one year from the coming into force of the Treaty. 3. Any reconstruction of the above-mentioned fortifications and installations is prohibited. 4. (a) The following construction to the east of the Franco-Italian frontier is prohibited: permanent fortifications where weapons capable of firing into French territory or territorial waters can be emplaced; permanent military installations capable of being used to conduct or direct fire into French territory or territorial waters; and permanent supply and storage facilities emplaced solely for the use of the abovementioned fortifications and installations. (b) This prohibition does not include other types of non-permanent fortifications or surface accommodations and installations which are designed to meet only requirements of an internal character and of local defence of the frontiers. 5. In a coastal area 15 kilometers deep, stretching from the Franco-Italian frontier to the meridian 9° 30' E., Italy shall not establish any new, nor expand any existing, naval bases or permanent naval installations. This does not prohibit minor alterations to, nor the maintenance in good repair of, existing naval installations provided that their overall capacity will not thereby be increased.” Other examples of demilitarization of defeated states in: Disarmament and Security, pp. 449 ff.

55. Marshall-Cornwall, op. cit., p. 175.

56. In April, 1923, with reference to the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Lord Robert Cecil submitted to the Temporary Mixed Commission on the Reduction of Armaments a memorandum which contained the following provisions :

"1. One of the principal difficulties in connection with the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, which is under the consideration of the Temporary Mixed Commission, consists in devising means for deciding at a moment of international crisis, when hostilities between two States may have begun, which State is the aggressor. It is proposed, in the draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee which the Commission is studying, that the Council should decide this point

and that, failing other evidence, that State should be considered the aggressor whose troops have violated the territory of another. 2. It is clear that decision on this point would be greatly facilitated if, on the frontier between the two States about to go to war, there existed a demilitarized frontier zone into which both of them had undertaken not to send their military forces. If, further, the supervision of such a zone were in the hands of a Commissioner or Commissioners appointed by the League of Nations, who could, if either State sent its forces into the zone, so report to the Council of the League, the decisions of the Council would be immensely facilitated. 3. The establishment of such demilitarized zones under League supervision might, in other ways, give definite and concrete security against the danger of sudden attack to the States on both sides of them. In the agreements under which such zones would be established, provisions might be inserted which would have the effect of rendering military concentrations, preparatory to attack, very difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. These provisions, although they would not render attack impossible, might cause such delay to the aggressor as to make the position of the State attacked much stronger than it otherwise would be. It is therefore perhaps worth while for the Temporary Mixed Commission to examine how such zones might be established. 4. It may be suggested that an agreement for the establishment of such a frontier zone might include some or all of the following stipulations: (a) The zone should be at least thirty miles in width. (b) In this zone, no military fortifications or works of any sort should be constructed. (c) The conscription or military training of the population of the zone should be forbidden. (d) No military camps or barracks should be situated in the zone. (e) No depots of military stores or ammunition should be allowed. (f) No manufacture of arms or munitions of any sort should be carried out-For ensuring that these obligations were effectively carried out in the whole zone, the Council of the League should appoint an impartial Commissioner or Commissioners who should reside in the zone and who should have the necessary rights of inspection and inquiry. Such Commissioners should be directly responsible to the Council and removable by them alone.” The memorandum contains also suggestions concerning the use of railways in the demilitarized zones and the organization of a permanent international police force to render more effective the provisions establishing the demilitarized zones.

The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance submitted by the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations on 25 October 1923 to the Governments concerned contained the following article: "Article 9. In order to facilitate the application of the present treaty, any High Contracting Party may negotiate, through the agency of the Council, with one or more neighbouring countries for the establishment of demilitarized zones. The Council, with the co-operation of the representatives of the parties interested, acting as members within the terms of Article 4 of the Covenant, shall previously ensure that the establishment of the demilitarized zone asked for does not call for unilateral sacrifices from the military point of view on the part of the High Contracting Parties interested."

The General Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War, signed at Geneva, 26 September 1931, contains the following provisions : "Article 2. If, in circumstances which, in the Council's opinion, do not create a state of war between the Powers at issue which are parties to the present Convention, the forces of one of those Powers enter the territory or territorial waters of the other or a zone demilitarized in virtue of international agreements or fly over

them, the Council may prescribe measures to ensure their evacuation by those forces. The High Contracting Parties undertake to carry out without delay the measures so prescribed, without prejudice to the other powers vested in the Council under Article 11 of the Covenant. Article 3. If the circumstances referred to in Article 2 have arisen, or if, in the event of a threat of war, special conditions, and in particular the possibilities of contact between the forces of the parties to the dispute, render it necessary, the Council may fix lines which must not be passed by their land, naval, or air forces and, where necessary in order to avoid incidents, by their civil aircraft. The High Contracting Parties undertake to comply with the Council's recommendations in this matter. The lines referred to in the previous paragraph shall, if possible, be fixed by agreement with the parties at issue. Failing such agreement, the Council shall fix the lines with the consent of the party whose forces are affected, provided always that this does not involve the withdrawal of the forces further back than the exterior lines of the defense organizations existing on the frontier of the High Contracting Parties concerned at the time when the Council of the gue of Nations takes its decision, and that the lines do not involve the abandonment of any other work, position or line of communication essential to the security or the supplies of the party concerned. It shall, in every case, rest with the Council to determine the period within which the said lines shall be fixed under the conditions specified above. The High Contracting Parties further agree to give strict orders to the commanders of their forces, if the Council so recommends, to take all necessary precautions to avoid incidents."

57. This is the definition which was presented by the Technical Committee appointed by the National Defense Expenditure Commission established by the General Commission of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference on 25 February 1932. Cf. Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference. Series of League of Nations Publications. IX Disarmament, 1936, IX. 3 (here after referred to as: Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference) p. 96.

58. As to the question of the limitation of defense expenditures, the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions constituted on 29 November 1926 by Sub-Commission B of the Preparatory Commission for the League of Nations Disarmament Conference was of the opinion “that a limitation of armaments through limitations of expenditures only would be an inadequate basis for a convention. The Committee of Experts wondered whether the limitation of expenditure could not be regarded as a subsidiary measure forming a useful supplement to the direct method of disarmament. ..." Doc. A/AC.50/2,

p. 43.

The Draft Convention framed by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference contained only one Article referring to limitation of the material of land armament—namely Article 10—which ran as follows: "The annual expenditure of each High Contracting Party on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for land armaments shall be limited to the figures laid down for such Party, and in accordance with the conditions prescribed in the annex ... to this Article.” The Article embodied a decision taken by the Preparatory Commission to apply to land war material the principle of indirect or budgetary limitation. Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference, p. 58.

59. Certain members of the Committee of Experts preferred total limitation because it would involve less uncertainty than a limitation by categories. Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 43.

60. Cf. Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference, p. 97. The Draft Convention contains in Part II, Section III (Expenditure) the following pro

vision formulated by the Technical Committee of the National Defense Expenditure Commission : “Article 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to give full publicity periodically to their national defense expenditure on a basis of reciprocity and in the manner and by the dates stipulated in the following articles and in the Annex to this part of the Convention which includes a general definition and a conventional list of such expenditure.-Such publicity shall apply to all national defence expenditure, irrespective of the nature and origin of the resources out of which such expenditure is met.”

61. “The most important part of the system submitted (by the Technical Committee) for approval consisted of the Model Statement, in which all national defense expenditure would be entered in a uniform manner for all States. The scheme had been unanimously adopted by the Technical Committee as a framework in which both limitation and publicity might operate.” Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference, p. 98.

62. The principles of this draft agreement (DC/SC.1/27) are formulated as follows: “1. The purpose of the present agreement is to institute financial supervision of military expenditure, together with a system of penalties, for the purpose of encouraging disarmament. It provides for the allocation of the funds thus made available for the improvement of levels of living and the development of underdeveloped areas. 2. This form of financial supervision has an economic purpose. By ensuring the automatic transfer of part of the savings effected on military expenditure to orders for goods for peaceful purposes, the agreement averts the threat of an economic crisis which might be brought about by mass disarmament carried out within a short period of time. 3. The agreement provides certain advantages for States which, in a form recognized as accurate and complete by the supervisory body, submit evidence of the implementation of the budgetary reductions which they have agreed to make. States will agree to reduce their total military expenditure by a percentage that will increase from year to year, the increase in the percentage from one year to the next being based on the amount of the original defence budget. However, once evidence of the reductions has been accepted as being accurate and complete, this percentage will, for the current budgetary year, refer only to the actual amount of expenditure—that is to say, to a lower sum. 4. The amounts thus made available will be transferred to an international fund which will ensure that they are used in accordance with the criteria laid down by the agreement. 5. The computation, administration and distribution of these resources will be assured by an international fund for development and mutual assistance, hereinafter called 'the Fund'. 6. Upon the entry into force of the convention for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, the abolition of weapons of mass destruction and the setting up of a control, the percentage reductions in military expenditure envisaged in the agreement will be calculated in such a way as to correspond to the reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces and the abolition of weapons of mass destruction as provided for in connexion with each stage of the disarmament convention." Second Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, DC/71, Annex 16.

63. The Draft Convention contained the following provision in Part V, Section II (Derogations):

“Article 88. Should any of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, or should a change of circumstances constitute, in the opinion of any High Contracting Party, a menace to his national security, such party may suspend temporarily, in so far as he is concerned, any provision or provisions of the present Convention, other than those contained in Articles 30, 34 and 47 to 62, provided that: (a) such High Contracting Party shall immediately notify

the other High Contracting Parties, and at the same time the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of such temporary suspension and of the extent thereof; (b) in the event of the suspension's being based upon a change of circumstance, the High Contracting Party concerned shall, simultaneously with the said notification, communicate to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Permanent Disarmament Commission a full explanation of such change of circumstances.—Thereupon the other High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the situation thus presented. When the reasons for such temporary suspension have ceased to exist, the said High Contracting Party shall reduce his armaments to the level agreed upon in the Convention and shall make immediate notification to the other High Contracting Parties."

64. Sub-Commission A of the Preparatory Commission for the League of Nations Disarmament Conference “reported complete disagreement on the question of the supervision and control of armaments. The delegations of Chile, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States were of the opinion that any form of supervision or control of armaments by an international body is more calculated to foment evil and suspicion between States than to foster international confidence.' In their opinion, the execution of the provisions of any convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments 'must depend upon the good faith of nations scrupulously to carry out their great obligations.' The delegations of Chile, Italy, Japan and the United States were of the opinion that the inquiries contemplated would in general prove 'fruitless and illusory' and that, to be successful, such inquiries would have to be carried out under strict and definite rules which would involve serious commitments in regard to military secrecy on the part of the State subjected to the inquiry. The same delegations, except the United States, recalled the opinion expressed by the Permanent Advisory Commission that 'the undertakings contained in Article 8 are based on a belief in the pledged word and the Permanent Advisory Commission does not consider that it is either opportune or conducive to great efficiency to substitute mistrust for this belief.' The French delegation, together with a number of others, did not agree that inquiries would be 'illusory and ineffective. They recalled the precedent of the Opium Convention, which had introduced a system of supervision, and that of the Treaty for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes between American States, signed at Santiago de Chile on 3 May 1923. They also mentioned the League's right of investigation under the clauses of the Treaties of Peace relating to the disarmament of the defeated States, which showed that it was technically possible for armaments to be placed under supervision. They concluded that all States must be given a guarantee that the convention would be strictly observed, because, in the absence of such a guarantee, those States which regulated their armaments in strict accordance with the provisions of the convention would lack that adequate security upon which such limitation of armaments as were accepted should properly be based.' Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 45.

The Draft Constitution of International Organization, prepared by the Special Committee appointed in 1943 by Secretary of State Hull (cf. supra, p. 137), contained in Article 10 the following provisions : “6. Members of the International Organization undertake to keep the general level of their armaments at the lowest point consistent with the effective discharge of their respective obligations for maintaining international security, and consistent with their internal domestic security. They accordingly agree that the Council, acting on the advice of the General Security and Armaments Commission, and taking into account the special responsibilities for security assumed by some states,

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