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the preparation of objective reports on the carrying out of the convention for the limitation of armaments, on the basis of periodic uniform statistical returns by governments on their armaments, whether subject to limitation or not. The reports prepared on the basis of those returns were to be discussed by a commission to be set up by the Conference. The delegations of Chile, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States objected that that proposal would raise the question of supervision or control. In their declaration concerning supervision of armaments by an international organization, those delegations, except Spain, pointed out that “most unfortunate results, both political and technical, would follow from these inquiries." They continued: “It is impossible to disregard the possibility that, in certain circumstances, one country might bring a charge against another in order to obtain, unjustifiably, information about the secret defensive organizations of the country accused. Moreover, the delegations of Chile, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States are entirely unable to accept for their own governments anything in the nature of itinerant inquisitorial commissions." Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 46.

The Draft Convention framed by the Preparatory Commission contained in Part IV three articles concerning information to be annually communicated in respect to effectives. Article 30 provided for information to be exchanged through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in regard to the average daily number of effectives reached during the course of the preceding year in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organized on a military basis of each of the contracting parties, to be accompanied by an explanatory note showing the elements on which the figures supplied were based. Article 31 provided for information to be exchanged as to the number of units compulsorily receiving preparatory military training during the preceding year. Article 32 provided for an exchange of information at the end of the year concerning the provisions of the respective laws of the contracting parties relating to the total number of days comprised in the first period of service of effectives recruited hy conscription and the total duration in days of the ensuing periods. Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference, p. 42.

67. At the first meeting of Committee 2 of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the representative of the United States submitted a Working Paper (DC/C.2/1) containing proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments on a continuing basis. Under the heading “C. Inspection" the following statements are made:

“The system of disclosure and verification is an integral part of the system of safeguards which must be established to ensure observance of the overall programme of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country. It will not be adequate to provide merely for the verification of disclosed information. In addition, provision must be made for determining the adequacy of the disclosed information, through broad general powers of 'on-thespot' inspection, through access to statistical data permitting independent confirmation of required reports and through aerial surveys. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essential to the verification procedure in order completely to determine the adequacy of disclosed information. It will be obvious that aerial reconnaissance furnishes the easiest method of determining the existence of large undisclosed facilities and installations. Aerial Survey will be essential in all stages of the disclosure and verification procedure. It is contemplated that 'on-the-spot' inspection will take place

in all stages as a part of the verification procedure. Its use, however, will be less extensive in the first than in the later stages because of the greater ease of verification through other methods of the items disclosed in the first stage. It will of course be necessary at each stage to regulate inspection in such a way as to prevent disclosure of information which is to be withheld from disclosure and verification during the particular stage. Certain principles governing limitations on the right of 'on-the-spot' inspections in early stages are set forth in Annex I and II. Each State at the commencement of each stage should submit to the Commission a general description of the nature and location of facilities falling within the terms of reference for that stage. Access to such locations, reasonably sufficient to verify the information disclosed, should be granted to inspectors. Inspection in each stage should proceed in accordance with a previously accepted plan. It is essential to an effective system of verification that the international inspectors, in addition to examining declared installations and facilities, be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire national territory in order that the Commission may determine within reasonable limits the accuracy and adequacy of the information disclosed. Accordingly, each State should be required during each stage of the process of disclosure and verification to permit the international inspectors such freedom of movement and to give them access to such installations and facilities, records and data as may reasonably be required, including the right to inspect physical dimensions of all facilities and installations wherever situated. Each State should facilitate the activities of the international inspectors and furnish to them such assistance as they may reasonably require. Procedure should be set up in order to permit a determination by the Commission of the necessity for inspection of any facilities or installations access to which is denied to the inspectors and where in the judgment of the inspectors such inspection is required. The inspectors should report to the Commission any information indicating a major violation of any provisions of the treaties or agreements respecting disclosure and verification. In the event of a Commission determination confirmed by the Security Council, by the affirmative vote of any seven members, of such a major violation during any stage and the failure of the State guilty of violation to repair the same within a reasonable specified period, other States should be free to suspend the operations of the disclosure and verification system.” Second Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, pp. 25, 26.

On 21 April 1955, Canada, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission a Joint Draft Resolution on the Principles of Control, in which the following principles were formulated : "A. The control organ shall have, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the treaty by all States, full responsibility for supervising and guaranteeing effective observance of all the provisions of the disarmament treaty including: 1. The limitations on levels of conventional armaments and over-all military man-power, and on over-all military expenditures, both atomic and non-atomic (paragraphs 6 (i) (a) and (b) of the four-Power draft resolution of 8 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/15/Rev.1]); 2. The major reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments (paragraphs 6 (ii) (a) and 6 (iii) (a) of the four-Power draft resolution of 8 March 1955) ; 3. The total prohibition of manufacture and use, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as well as conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials to peaceful uses (paragraphs 6 (ii) (b) and 6 (iii) (b) of the four-Power draft resolution of 8 March 1955); 4. The continued supervision of permitted atomic

energy installations and facilities; B. In order to enable it to carry out these responsibilities and functions, the control organ shall be accorded powers to be exercised in accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty and which shall include the following: 1. To determine, within the limits established by the disarmament treaty, the details of the methods and processes of supervising and guaranteeing the effective observance of the various phases of agreed limitations, reductions, and prohibitions, in order to ensure that the disarmament programme is carried out as rapidly as possible and with safety and equity for all; 2. To supervise and verify the disclosures of information required at each stage of the disarmament programme laid down in the four-Power draft resolution of 8 March 1955, with respect to all armaments and armed forces and related installations and facilities; 3. To ensure that installations, facilities, equipment, and materials, including stocks of nuclear materials, are disposed of or utilized in accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty; 4. To organize and conduct field and aerial surveys in connexion with the above functions and for the purpose of determining whether all installations and facilities have been disclosed; 5. To conduct such research as is necessary to keep itself in the forefront of nuclear knowledge and to enable it to be fully effective in eliminating the destructive uses of nuclear energy, so that such energy shall be used only for peaceful purposes; 6. To report and provide information to the Security Council, the General Assembly and the States signatories and to make recommendations concerning appropriate action by them in the event of violation of the disarmament treaty; 7. To take such measures provided for in the treaty as may be necessary to deal with violations of the disarmament treaty pending action by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the States signatories, and to call upon the party concerned and its agents to comply with such measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the party concerned ; C. In order to ensure that the international officials of the control organ are continuously in a position to fulfil their responsibilities, they will be granted the right: 1. To be stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the disarmament treaty; 2. Of unrestricted access to, egress from and travel within the territory of participating States, and unrestricted access to all installations and facilities as required by them for the effective performance of their responsibilities and functions; 3. Of unrestricted use of communication facilities necessary for the discharge of their responsibilities; 4. Of inviolability of person, premises, property and archives; D. The control organ shall remain in being in order to ensure that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are faithfully and permanently observed." Second Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, Annex 14.

On 21 July 1955, at the Geneva meetings of the Heads of Government of France, USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, the President of the United States made a statement in which he declared "that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of inspection and reporting,” and proposed “to give each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other. Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country-we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of

great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension." Doc. DC/SC. 1/28, 29 August 1955. Second Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. DC/71, 7 October 1955, Annex 17.

In its Resolution 914 (X), adopted at its 559th plenary meeting on 16 December 1955, the General Assembly “Recognizing ... that inspection and control of disarmament can best be achieved in an atmosphere which is free of fear and suspicion, 1. urges that the States concerned and particularly those on the SubCommittee of the Disarmament Commission . . . should, as initial steps, give priority to early agreement on an implementation of: (i) Such confidencebuilding measures as the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategic centers, (ii) All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible."

68. The Special Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War, set up on 22 September 1932 by the General Commission of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference, presented the results of its discussions in a report of which the following brief analysis is contained in the Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference, pp. 125 ff. :

“(a) General Obligations and Definition of Categories.--The Special Committee unanimously adopted texts stipulating that each contracting party would assume, in the territories under its jurisdiction, full responsibility for the supervision to be exercised over the manufacture of and trade in arms, with a view to ensuring the regular communication and accuracy of the information to be supplied under the Convention. Each of the contracting parties, for the purpose of securing publicity, undertook to forward to the Permanent Disarmament Commission the texts of all laws, regulations or other legal provisions enacted for the purpose of ensuring the execution of the Convention. The categories of arms, ammunition and implements of war proposed by the Special Committee did not secure unanimity. A Technical Committee on Categories, reporting to the Special Committee, submitted the results of its work as an attempt at solution of a purely technical character, accepted by its members with reservations as to the assent of their respective Governments. Five categories were proposed by the Special Committee comprising: (I) military armaments; (II) naval armaments; (III) air armaments; (IV) arms and ammunition capable of being used for both military and non-military purposes; and (V) aircraft other than those in category III.

(b) Manufacture.—Texts unanimously adopted by the Special Committee provided that the contracting parties should forbid in their respective territories the manufacture of arms and implements of war as set forth in categories I, II and III, unless the manufacturers had, in the case of private establishments, obtained a license to manufacture issued by the government. The license to manufacture was to be valid for a definite period, to be revocable at any time and to be renewable for further periods at the discretion of the Government concerned. Licenses to manufacture would give the name and address of the manufacture, or the name, head office and principal works of the firm, together with a designation of the articles by headings in categories I, II and III whose manufacture was authorized by the license. Further, it was unanimously agreed that the contracting parties should send to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, within three months from the entry into force of the Convention, a copy of the licenses to manufacture already issued to private establishments and,

within the thirty days following the end of each quarter, a return showing copies of all licenses to manufacture granted, amended, renewed or revoked during the previous quarter.-In regard to naval armaments, the Committee unanimously adopted texts under which the contracting parties undertook to forward to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, within thirty days of the layingdown of a war vessel in State or private shipyards within their jurisdiction, a return showing the date of the laying-down of the keel, the classification of the vessel, for whom the vessel was built, its standard displacement and principal dimensions and the calibre of its largest gun. They further undertook, within thirty days of the date of the completion of each war vassel, to send a return giving the date of completion, together with the foregoing particulars.The above provisions in regard to the regulation of the manufacture of arms represented the minimum position adopted in the Committee. Texts provisionally approved by the majority of the members of the Committee, on the basis of the United States text, provided for a stricter system of control and a more extended publicity. It was stipulated, for example, that the manufacture of articles appearing in categories I, II and III should not take place in private establishments unless the producer was in possession of bona fide orders, in each case duly notified in advance to the government, and further stipulated that licenses accorded to manufacturers should state that all orders received by them were to be communicated immediately to the Government which had granted the license. These provisions were not accepted by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan.-Further, the texts approved by the majority provided that the contracting parties should send to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, among other particulars, a return at the beginning of each financial year showing the quantities of articles in categories I, II and III wh manufacture or purchase was contemplated in the course of the year; a return showing the national defense expenditure proposed in respect of the manufacture and purchase of articles in categories I, II and III; a return within fifteen days of orders placed with State or private establishments for articles in categories I, III and V, with their description, number and type, the name of the Government on whose account the order was given, and the name and address of the private manufacturer a description of the State establishment; and, finally, a return within the month following the end of the civil year of manufactures completed during the year of articles in categories I to V. These provisions were not accepted by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan.—Texts going beyond these provisions in respect of the returns to be made to the Permanent Disarmament Commission were submitted by the delegations of France, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, Spain, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China.-An alternative text proposed by the United Kingdom, Italian and Japanese delegations provided that, within sixty days of the end of the quarter, a quarterly return of the total value under each heading of the categories of the articles whose manufacture had been completed during the previous quarter should be forwarded to the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

(c) Trade.-The texts of the provisions concerning the trade in arms and implements of war were adopted subject to declarations by the minority dele gations. Texts approved by the majority provided that the contracting parties should prohibit, in their territories, the export of articles in categories I to V inclusive, and the import of articles in categories I to III inclusive, without an export or import permit issued by the Government. The export permit was to contain a description of the articles, giving their number, aggregate weight and type, with the name and address of the exporter and a reference to the

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