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not constitute a “regional” arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter, Article 54, providing that "the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation" under the treaty, does not apply. This may explain the tendency to interpret Chapter VIII of the Charter in a restrictive sense, so that treaties such as the North Atlantic Treaty do not fall under the provisions of this Chapter.

Julius Stone, op. cit., pp. 247 ff., considers as an essential element of a regional organization that some relation to a "region" must be implied in the arrangement, "but what it is is obscure." He expressly rejects the view that the treaty constituting a regional security organization may provide for collective measures "against attack from another region.” The state against which the enforcement action is directed may not be a contracting party to the constituent treaty, but it must be "within the region” if the organization constituted by the treaty is to be considered as a "regional" organization within the meaning of Articles 52-54 of the Charter. That the state must be "within the region" can only mean that its territory must be within the region determined by the constituent treaty. Stone justifies his interpretation first, by stating that “this is the natural meaning of the phrase 'appropriate for regional action' in Article 52 [not 53, as misprinted], paragraph 1.” However, an action may be regional-in the "natural" meaning of this term-not only when the state against which it is directed is within the area determined in the constituent treaty but also when the action is restricted to this area insofar as it is conditioned by an act of aggression which has taken place within this area, even by a state whose territory is not within this area. This may be the case when the attack takes place on the open sea on vessels of one of the contracting parties, a case expressly referred to in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Secondly, Stone says “if an arrangement for common action of one region against a threat to peace from another region were within the articles, the provision of Article 53, paragraph 1, that the Security Council may use regional arrangements as agencies for enforcement under its authority, would mean that the Council would invoke the military aid of one regional alliance against another region.” Although Stone admits that "such a situation is conceivable,” he asserts that "it certainly seems inconsistent with the 'Purposes and Principles of the United Nations' as Article 52, paragraph 1, requires. It would arise as a stage in the breakdown of the Charter, not of its application.” If the Security Council may authorize an enforcement action to be taken by a regional organization against an aggressor state which is within the region, without violating the provisions of the Charter concerning the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, it is not understandable why the Security Council could not, without violating these provisions, authorize an enforcement action to be taken by a regional organization against an aggressor state which is not "within the region." All the more so as no provision of Chapter VIII restricts enforcement action by a regional organization to actions directed against states within the region. Article 53 expressly refers to enforcement actions "taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies” against former enemy states, whether these states are or are not "within the region.” Since the Charter does not restrict enforcement actions to be taken by a regional organization to actions against a state "within the region," the Security Council may, in applying Article 53, paragraph 1 of the Charter, authorize a regional organization to take an enforcement action against a state which is not "within the region.” Such an authorization would be quite "natural" if in case of a conflict between a state member of a regional

organization and a state which is not within the region, the Security Council considered an enforcement action involving the use of armed force to be directed against the state which is not within the region as adequate, but still has not yet at its disposal the armed forces referred to in Article 43, whereas the regional organization disposes of such an armed force. There is no reason to assume that such a situation "would arise as a stage in the breakdown of the Charter, not of its application."

The provision of Article 53, paragraph 1, that enforcement action may be taken by a regional organization only with the authorization of the Security Council, must be interpreted as restricted by Article 51. If a state, member of a regional organization, is the victim of an armed attack by a state which is not "within the region," the regional organization, in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, may take a collective enforcement action against the aggressor until the Security Council intervenes. The latter may if it considers this action adequate, applying Article 53, paragraph 1, authorize the regional organization to continue its action. In this way Article 53, paragraph 1 may be interpreted as complementing the provision of Article 39 concerning action to be taken by the Security Council in case of a threat to or breach of the peace.

The third argument set forth by Stone runs as follows: "The disputes, the pacific settlement of which parties to regional arrangements are to assume, and the Security Council is to encourage them to assume, are specified by Article 52, paragraphs 2 and 3, to be 'local' only. It would be strange to limit the delegation of the settlement function to intra-regional disputes, without a similar limit on delegated peace enforcement.” By “local disputes" Article 52, paragraph 2 can only mean disputes between parties to the treaty constituting the regional organization. For this treaty can impose only upon the contracting parties the obligation to settle their disputes in a definite way, prescribed by the treaty. A state which is “within the region,” but not a contracting party, cannot be bound by it. Hence "local” cannot mean “intra-regional.” That a treaty constituting a regional organization regulates only the settlement of disputes between the members of the organization, but does not limit enforcement actions to be taken by the organization to actions against an aggressor which is a mem. ber of the organization, is not strange at all. For also an enforcement action to be directed against an aggressor which is not a member of the organizationwhether it is or is not within the region-may be provided for by the stipulation of obligations imposed upon the member states. The provision concerning "local disputes" does not support Stone's statement: "The real question is not whether the State against which enforcement action is directed is within the arrangement; it is rather whether it is within the region.Finally, Stone states that only if his interpretation of the term "regional" is accepted the absurdity could be avoided to apply Article 54 to organizations constituted by treaties providing for military action against external aggression. "If an alliance for defence against a Permanent Member from outside the region were a 'regional arrangement,' even military staff plans would have to be disclosed in advance to the potential aggressor; and the potential aggressor's own consent obtained before he could be resisted. On the present view these absurdities are avoided, and such outwardly orientated arrangements must justify themselves as preparation for measures of self-defence, reportable only after they are taken, under Article 51.” If security organizations protecting their members against aggression on the part of states not members of the organization or not being within the re gion are not considered to be "regional,” then, indeed, Article 54 does not apply to them. That its non-application to the organizations concerned is desirable,

can certainly not be denied. But from this fact does not follow that the organizations concerned are not regional within the meaning of the Charter. Such an interpretation can be based neither on the wording, nor on the intention of those who drafted the provisions, of Articles 51-54.

8. Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Charter contains such a provision.

9. In 1922 the Assembly of the League of Nations did not share this opinion. On 27 September it adopted a resolution (XV) which runs as follows: “The Assembly, whilst declaring that the reduction of armaments contemplated by Article 8 of the Covenant cannot achieve its full effect for world peace unless it be general, desires to emphasize the importance of regional agreements for the purpose of reducing armaments-agreements which, if necessary, might even go beyond the measures decided upon in respect of general reduction; and requests the Council to ask the Temporary Mixed Commission to take into consideration, during its subsequent work, the possibility of recommending the conclusion of similar agreements to States which might be concerned."

A regional agreement for the purpose of reducing armaments was the Convention signed on 7 February 1923 by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. It is characteristic that among the derogations expressly recognized by the treaty were “impending invasion by another state" (Article I), and "threatened attack by a foreign state" (Article IV).


Absolute or relative security, 7, 10 f., 23
Acts of state, 123 f.
Aggression, 10, 24, 27 f., 29 f., 35 f., 37, 40, 55, 58 ff., 60 f., 63 ff., 65 ff., 67 ff., 69 ff., 73 ff.

75 ff., 78 ff., 80 ff., 83 ff., 85 ff., 88 f., 90 ff., 93 ff., 98 f., 115, 118
armed attack as, 60 f., 88
including or not including the use of armed force, 63 ff.
as unprovoked attack, 86
definition of, 60, 66 ff., 69 ff., 73 ff., 78 ff., 83 ff., 87, 93 ff., 89 f.

and determination of the aggressor, 83 ff.

general, enumerative or mixed, 78 ff., 98 f.
direct and indirect, 61, 63 ff., 80, 82, 89
economic, 65, 81 f.
elimination of the problem of, 67 ff., 90 ff.
external and internal, 24, 29 f., 61, 64, 115, 118
ideological, 65, 81 f.
intention of, 63, 85, 88, 93, 94
under general international law, 35 f., 37
legal or political concept, 75 ff.
major or minor, 66
military and legal concept of, 58 f.
revolution as internal aggression, 64, 88

and self-defense, 27 f., 59 ff., 68, 86, 118
Aggressive or defensive war, 35 f., 58 f., 89, 90 f., 110, 202

weapons, 202, 219
Aggressor, definition of the, 79 ff.
determination of the, 67 f., 70, 72 f., 75, 120, 121 f., 146 f.

by an international court, 121 f.
Alliances, 39 ff., 259 f., 262 ff.

and regional security organizations, 39 ff., 259 f., 262 ff.
Armaments, see also Disarmament

abolition of, 203 f.
aggressive and defensive, 202
bacterial and chemical, prohibition of, 201, 203 f., 221 f.
as cause of war, 199
control of, 26, 232. See also Disarmament, control of
conventional and atomic, 201, 219
definition (elements of), 199 ff.
differentiation of, 120
expenditure, 202, 206 f.
internationalization, 204
land, sea and air, 202 f.
nuclear, 201 f., 203 f., 210, 220 f., 224

control of, 204, 208, 210, 220 f., 224
peacetime and wartime, 199 f., 202 f., 206, 219
quantity and quality of, 202
reduction and limitation of, 118 f., 120, 197 ff., 203, 206 f., 231 f.
derogations, 207, 231 f.


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