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juridical security and political security. According to this view, legal security is defined as “a condition in which a state that observes the objective law need not fear that its rights as a subject of international law will be violated without redress”; while political security is defined as a condition in which a state “regardless of its conduct, need not fear a successful attack from without." The difference between legal and political security is that only the former is guaranteed by the law. The latter is brought about by the state itself by means which could also be applied if the state were not subjected to a legal order—in other words, if the state existed together with other states in a condition of anarchy. The question of whether so-called political security is achieved in a legal or in an illegal way is irrelevant. Hence, the so-called political security of a state is not collective security but rather a typical case of individual security. The political security of a state is the same kind of security which an individual human being tries to achieve without being protected by a legal order and which, as has been pointed out, is really not security at all.
It has been maintained that the security of an individual within a national community or state (national security) and the security of a state within an international community (international security) are two totally different problems and that there is no real analogy between them, because the first is a police problem, the latter a problem of social justice finding its protection in legislation.”However, as we shall see later, international security is as much a police problem as national security is, and the latter is no less a problem of social justice than the former. There is another argument that has been advanced to justify the view that there is an essential difference between national and international security, and that consequently the latter cannot be modeled exactly after the former. This argument has been formulated as follows: "The State requires of the individual, in case of need, the sacrifice of his life in the interest of the community. In this case individual security is strictly subordinated to collective security. Not so in the international field. Here collective security is the counterpart of individual security and cannot be in opposition to it. The collectivity cannot require a state to sacrifice itself completely in the interest of the collectivity.” This argument is based on an erroneous hypostatization of the personification called the "state." An international organization constituting a system of collective security cannot require a state to sacrifice its life because a state is not a living organism like an individual human being. However, there is no reason why an international organization should not require a member state to sacrifice the lives of its subjects in order to guarantee international security. Neither
the nature of the state—that is the national legal order constituting the community-nor the nature of the international legal order excludes such a request. As a matter of fact, an international security organization which provides for military sanctions necessarily imposes such an obligation upon the member states. If the proposition that a state sacrifices its life means only that a state which resorts to war against another state may cease to exist as a subject of international law by being defeated and by having its territory annexed by the victorious state, the possibility that a state may lose its life certainly exists if military sanctions are applied. Furthermore, there is no reason why states should not be required to run such a risk in the interest of international security. However, since military sanctions are always organized as collective actions, the risk practically does not exist if a system of international security operates in conformity with its constituent treaty. The statement that "collective security is the counterpart of individual security and cannot be in opposition to it,” amounts to a complete rejection of international security.?
If it is admitted, first, that the security of the state is the security of the individuals who are the members of the state, and, secondly, that the security of the state within an international community is collective security in the same sense as the security of the individuals within the national community (the state) because both are guaranteed by legal orders, a perfect analogy between them cannot be denied. In both cases, security is established by the specific reaction for which the legal order provides in case of certain harmful behavior by the members of the community. This behavior constitutes a violation of the order, and in both cases the most conspicuous violation is the illegal use of force. To be sure, there is a remarkable difference between the national and the international legal order, especially with respect to this reaction, that is the sanctions stipulated by these orders. However, if the normative order constituting an international community of states is considered to be international "law," and this means law in the same sense as the normative order constituting a state, it must be possible to show that the structure of both normative orders is, at least in principle, the same in all respects relevant to the security they afford; and this is possible.
2. SECURITY AND LAW
It is the purpose of any legal order to protect certain interests of the individuals subjected to it by providing for coercive acts as sanctions to be applied as reactions against violations of these inter
ests. In this way, the law tries to prevent such violations. The most important interest protected in this way by the law is man's interest in maintaining his life. Since this interest of the individual is endangered by the use of force on the part of other individuals, the sanctions of law are directed primarily but not exclusively against this use of force (the term “force” meaning physical force). By attaching a sanction to a certain behavior, especially to the use of force by one individual against another, the law forbids this behavior which, as the condition of a sanction, is to be considered as illegal, or, to use a term covering all possible violations of the law or legally protected interests: as a delict. The sanctions consist in the forcible deprivation of life, freedom or property of those responsible for the illegal use of force or other violations of the law. However, these sanctions, too, constitute a use of force. Hence the use of force is not absolutely forbidden by the law. It is even authorized as a sanction; and not all kinds of the use of force are forbidden. But there exists in the evolution of law a tendency to forbid not only the use of physical force destroying or endangering the life of human beings, but also other kinds of the use of force, to restrict, as far as possible, the use of force which has not the character of a sanction by attaching a sanction to it; so that, as a rule, the use of force is to be considered either as a delict, that is, the condition of a sanction, or as a sanction, that is, the reaction against a delict.
Consequently, there can be no law without force. For, by its very nature, the law is an organization of force. The law organizes the use of force in the relations of its subjects by determining the conditions under which definite individuals are authorized to use force. Force used under other conditions is to be considered as a delict. But in using force under the conditions determined by the law, which means in applying the sanction provided for by the legal order, the individuals determined by law execute the order and thus act as organs of this order, or what amounts to the same, as organs of the community constituted by the legal order. Hence the use of force—the legal, but not the illegal use of force-may be imputed to the legal community acting through its organs. If the use of force is legal only as a sanction, the legal order reserves the use of force to the legal community, in other words, the legal order establishes a force monopoly of the legal community.
If peace is defined as the absence of force, it is the essential function of the law to guarantee peace in the relations among the members of the community, the subjects of the law. In guaranteeing peace by protecting the members of the legal community against the use of force, the law-any legal order-guarantees its subjects security. Hence,
the prohibition of the use of force is an essential element of any system of collective, and that means, legal security. Legal security is identical with peace, or rather with that relative peace which a legal order can secure. It is a relative, not an absolute security. It is relative not only because the use of force is not absolutely forbidden, but also because no legal order can be so effective as to prevent the illegal use of force completely. A system of collective—and that means legal-security, the core of which is the prohibition of the use of force, is meaningful only if the possibility of an illegal use of force is presupposed. However, the legal order which prohibits the use of force may be more or less efficacious. The degree of its efficacy depends—in the first place on the degree of its centralization.
It follows that, by its very nature, the security afforded its subjects by a legal order is collective security because it is a security established by a social order. By regulating the mutual relations of individuals, every social order creates definite social relations among these individuals and thus brings about a certain collectivization constituting a community as a collective body. The collective character of the security established by a legal order manifests itself, firstly, in the fact that the use of force is forbidden by the legal order which is valid equally for all members of the community constituted by the order, and, secondly, in the fact that the reaction against an illegal use of force is a collective action. It is a collective action because it is an action performed by organs of the community and is therefore imputable to the community, even if the individuals concerned are not special organs, as is the case in both a primitive society under primitive law and the international community under general international law.8
In contradistinction to the law of a modern state (the national law), the law of a primitive society does not institute special organs for the creation and application of the law. There are no legislative organs. The general legal norms are created by custom—that is, by the habitual behavior of the individuals subjected to the law. There are no courts competent to ascertain the fact that the law has been violated and to determine the person responsible for the violation. There is no sheriff and no police to execute the law—that is, to apply the sanctions for which the law provides. All these functions are left to the subjects of the law. In case of a murder—that is, in case the members of a group (especially a family) are of the opinion that one of them has been the victim of an illegal use of force by a member of another group—the law authorizes the relatives of the victim to take revenge on the murderer and his relatives, to use force in killing them. In case of other delicts, incest for example, the law authorizes every