Art. 15.-THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

The Western Front.

DURING the first three days of October the Germans persisted, but without success, in their efforts to drive our troops from the positions won, on Sept. 26, between the Menin road and the crest of the ridge north of Polygon Wood. On Oct. 4 our offensive was resumed on a front of about eight miles, from a point south of the Menin road to the Ypres-Staden railway, anticipating by a few minutes a hostile attack between Polygon Wood and Zonnebeke by five divisions, which were thrown back in disorder, and suffered heavy loss. The operations were hindered by unfavourable weather, rain falling heavily throughout the day, and low clouds, driven before a westerly gale, making flying almost impossible. In spite of these adverse conditions all the appointed objectives were gained before midday, and six counterattacks were repulsed during the afternoon. The progress made on this occasion, and in the principal stages of the subsequent fighting, is indicated on the accompanying map. In this brief outline it is only possible to notice the most prominent features of a series of engagements which, in the methods of attack and defence, the nature of the German positions, and the desperate nature of the fighting, did not differ from the earlier phases of the great battle.

With regard to the general design of the operations, we may accept the view of military writers in the German press that the intention was to capture the commanding position known as the Passchendaele ridge, and to squeeze the enemy out of the low-lying area between it and the Yser Canal, as the first step in an advance against the submarine bases on the coast. It will be observed from the map that the ridge in question trends in a north-westerly direction beyond Westroosebeke, enclosing on the north and east the forest of Houthulst, and terminating in the rearward defences of Dixmude. The ground south of the forest, over which our troops had to advance in order to cover the left flank of the attacks on the ridge, is intersected by several streams, which, swollen by the excessive rainfall, spread

over the valleys, and formed successive barriers of lakes and marshes. It was in this region, strongly defended by redoubts and pill-boxes,' that the severest fighting took place; for not only was movement slow and toilsome, but the prompt adaptation of captured positions for defence against counter-attack was impracticable in the prevailing quagmire. It was the resistance encountered on the western slopes, rather than on the ridge itself, that hindered the advance in the direction of Westroosebeke.

Houthulst Forest forms the principal defence of the low-lying area between the ridge and the canal. Covered in front by marshes, defended by concreted works and nests of machine-guns, and supported by the cross-fire of artillery placed on the higher ground between Terrest and Westroosebeke, it has proved a formidable position to attack. In a combined operation on Oct 22, French and British troops carried the southern defences on a front of nearly a mile and a half, and established themselves well within the boundary. On Oct. 26 and 28 General Anthoine's troops, in conjunction with Belgian detachments, which made their way across the inundations, made a remarkable flank movement between the forest and the canal, capturing an extensive system of entrenchments, and occupying the whole of the Merckem peninsula. This success, followed by raids and artillery activity in the Dixmude sector, caused the Germans some uneasiness; and it is evident from the Berlin communiqués that they were anticipating an attack in that quarter, when attention was diverted to Italy by the progress of the Austro-German invasion.

The anxiety with which the Germans regarded the approach of the Allied forces to their defensive centre in Houthulst Forest manifested itself in a succession of fierce counter-attacks, which were directed chiefly against the sector embracing the Staden railway, and the junction of the French and British lines near the south-west corner of the forest. The Germans would naturally consider the latter a weak point; but the close cooperation which existed between the Allied troops made all their efforts abortive. The Passchendaele sector was an equally tender spot; but here also the enemy's attempts to recover lost ground had no other result than to impose

a severe strain on the endurance of our troops, and to retard their progress. After the fall of Passchendaele village (Nov. 6) the Germans abstained from further counter-attacks in the Flanders zone of operations, contenting themselves with subjecting our positions, especially those in the Passchendaele sector, to continuous bombardment.

On Nov. 20 the scene of action shifted to the Cambrai front, where troops of the 3rd Army took the offensive between the Scheldt and the Canal du Nord, in conjunction with subsidiary attacks, of the nature of diversions, east of Epéhy, and between Bullecourt and Fontaine lez Croisilles. The concentration of the striking force was effected with remarkable secrecy; and, although the activity of their patrols and raiding parties indicates that the Germans were apprehensive of an attack some days before its delivery, it is evident from the sequel that they had no suspicion of the novel form it would take. According to the correspondent of the 'Hamburger Fremdenblatt,' airmen, during the previous week, had reported a continuous southward movement of troops, but had been unable to determine their destination, dull, foggy weather having interfered with observation. As to the time of the attack the Germans were in complete ignorance; for General Byng dispensed with the usual preparatory bombardment, and the general quietude of the night before the battle probably led them to expect an uneventful day.

The positions attacked, which formed part of the Hindenburg system, comprised three lines of exceptional strength. The main trench of the advanced line was deep and narrow, with numerous strong points and snipers' posts. The second, or main line, situated from 500 to 1000 yards in rear, consisted of a trench some ten feet deep, with a width designed to stop tanks, and provided with numerous trench-mortar emplacements and dug-outs. The third, or support line, was placed a similar distance in rear of the main line, and was of similar construction; and a deep tunnel, running parallel to and behind it, provided at once free communication and secure cover for reserves. In front of each line were broad belts of entanglement, formed of steel wire half an inch thick, with barbs an inch long; and between the