Wurm and compelled to surrender, swelling the list of captures to 200,000 prisoners and 1800 guns. In the meantime the right wing of the 4th Army had effected its retreat from the positions between the Pontebba and Plöcken passes, with the loss of 17,000 prisoners, who, with 80 guns, were rounded up in the mountains east of Tolmezzo, and surrendered after a stubborn defence.

Having passed to the right bank of the Tagliamento, the Italians enjoyed a few days' respite for reorganisation, while the enemy, delayed by broken bridges, damaged roads, and rivers swollen by the heavy rain which had fallen continuously since the operations began, were occupied in closing up the rear of their columns, and bringing up the artillery. It was evident from the first that the defence of the Tagliamento could not be prolonged, the collapse of the 2nd Army having laid open the passages of the upper reaches, which would also be turned by the enemy's advance down the Fella valley. To cause the Italians further disquietude, Austrian troops, on Nov. 3, made the first of a series of demonstrations in the zone of the Val Giudicaria, west of Lake Garda, on the route from Trent to the plain of Lombardy. The Tagliamento was ultimately turned by the capture of the crossings from Gemona to Pisano, the Italians retreating behind the Livenza on Nov. 6. About the same time the left wing of the 4th Army withdrew between the Plöcken Pass and the region of Agordo, falling back towards Belluno, on the Upper Piave.

The halt on the Livenza was of brief duration. Continuing the tactics which had proved so successful, the enemy pressed forward in the fringe of the mountains, occupied Magniano, and, on Nov. 7, captured Sacile after a stubborn fight, which was prolonged for the greater part of two days owing to the difficulty of bringing up artillery. The Italians, continuing their retreat, crossed the Piave on Nov. 9, and blew up the bridges. On the same day the Austrian demonstration in the Val Giudicaria was repeated.*

The line of the Piave was subject to the weakness which had made the other rivers untenable. Like the Tagliamento and the Livenza, it was liable to be turned

* At this stage the enemy claimed 250,000 prisoners and 2300 guns.

by hostile columns advancing from the mountain passes on the north, in conjunction with a frontal attack in the upper reaches. But in other respects the Italians were better situated than on the previous occasions. river offered a more formidable obstacle; and the enemy was no longer favoured by easy approaches in its rear from north to south. The mountain barrier between the Piave and the Adige, through which the Brenta affords the only easy route, presented difficulties to the movement of artillery and transport which would increase as the Italians fell back, destroying the communications; while the situation of the Italians in this respect would improve as they approached the plains. More important was the advantage gained by the concentration of the 4th Army, previously dispersed along the Alpine frontier, and its junction, on the left, with the 1st Army, which, having neither marched nor fought, was comparatively fresh. Moreover, the shortening of the front made it possible to withdraw the shattered fragments of the 2nd Army. Lastly, French and British forces, which had been despatched on the receipt of intelligence of the Italian disaster, were expected to come into line about the end of November. General Diaz, who had succeeded to the chief command, decided, therefore, to hold the Piave, which was the last line covering Venice, the evacuation of which was begun.

The enemy naturally determined to devote their efforts to forcing the Piave before the Allied reinforcements should arrive on the scene. A frontal attack on the lower reaches would have necessitated awaiting the arrival of the heavy artillery, delayed by the state of the communications-a consideration which, no doubt, partly influenced them in deciding to follow the outflanking method which had hitherto met with success. The bulk of the 11th Army, with its artillery complete, was already in contact with the Italians on the Asiago plateau; and the 10th Army, which was nearing Belluno, was at least as well equipped as the Italian 4th Army, which had lost much of its matériel in the retreat. Moreover, the flank attack promised more decisive results, as it would threaten the retreat of the 3rd Army from the Piave.

Attempts were made to gain a footing on the right

bank of the river at a few points in the plain, of which the chief was near Zenson, where, on Nov. 12, Austrian troops forced the passage, and established a small bridgehead in the loop of the river, the base of which is closed by a high bank, designed to check inundations, beyond which the enemy failed to advance. About the same time a small force made its way into the marshes opposite Grisolera, between the new and old channels, where some indecisive actions have taken place. Other attempts near San Dona, and in the vicinity of the Oderzo-Treviso railway, were ineffectual.

The main operations began on Nov. 10 with the capture of Asiago by the Austrians; and for more than a fortnight there was continuous fighting between that town and the Brenta, which resulted in the Italians being pressed back from Monte Longara and Monte Lisser to a line of heights defined by Mounts Sisemol, Tondarecar, and Badenecche, the front striking the Brenta near San Marino. Meanwhile Krobatin, marching down the Upper Piave valley, where he rounded up 14,000 prisoners in the region of Agordo, found the Italians, on Nov. 12, in position on the heights south of the line Feltre-Fonzaso. Our Allies fell back, fighting stubbornly, and repelling several attacks on the rivercrossing near Quero, which it was essential to hold until the rest of the army should come into line. On Nov. 18 they reached the line Monfenera-Tomba-Col dell' OrsoPertica-Col della Berretta-San Marino, forming a united front with the 1st Army. After five days' fierce fighting from Asiago to the Piave the Austrians suspended their attacks, and confined themselves to bombarding the Italian positions, while assembling reinforcements. During these operations the Val Giudicaria was the scene of a third demonstration on Nov. 13.

The positions thus successfully defended were not without disadvantages. The Col dell' Orso formed a pronounced salient in the Piave-Brenta line; but, being connected by a ridge with Monte Grappa, which is only 300 feet higher, and having an extensive range of fire over the surrounding country, it was important to deny it to the enemy. In the Asiago region the line of defence formed a still more pronounced salient, with its apex at Monte Tondarecar; but, as this summit

commanded the adjoining peaks, the rectification of the front would have entailed the abandonment of the entire range of heights.

So soon as the Austrians were ready, they directed their efforts against these two localities. After a fourth demonstration in the Giudicaria zone on Dec. 3, they launched, next day, two concerted attacks in the Asiago region; one from the north-west against Monte Sisemol and the heights immediately adjoining it, the other embracing Monte Badenecche and the eastern slopes of Monte Tondarecar. The former failed; but in the latter quarter the enemy broke through, and, advancing in a westerly direction, obliged the Italians to relinquish the entire salient and to withdraw to a new line passing across the Foza spur, and south of Sisemol. The troops left to cover the withdrawal fought gallantly to the last, and many were cut off. Vienna claimed 16,000 prisoners and sixty guns. The scene was then changed to the Piave-Brenta front, where, on Dec. 11 and the following days, Krobatin launched determined attacks in various sectors, his main objective being the Col dell' Orso salient, which, however, withstood all his efforts. On the flanks he was more successful. The Italians were pressed back to the southern slopes of Monfenera and Monte Tomba; and a determined attempt to force a way down the Brenta valley resulted, by Dec. 14, in the capture of the Pertica, Berretta, and Caprile heights, and the occupation of San Marino. This obliged our Allies to make a corresponding retirement on the right bank to a line from the mouth of the Gadena to the Sasso Rosso summit. On Dec. 18 the Italians lost Monte Asolone, but recaptured it two days later. Baffled in their attempts to break through between the Brenta and the Piave, the Austrians turned again to the Asiago plateau, where, on Dec. 23, they attacked south of the Frenzela valley, and gained the summits of Val Bella and Col dell' Rosso. The Italians recaptured these heights two days later, but, being unable to hold them under the concentrated fire of the hostile artillery, they had again to retire to more sheltered positions on the southern slopes.

In the meantime the Allied forces under Sir Herbert Plumer and General Fayolle had taken up their assigned

positions on Dec. 5, the British in the Montello sector, with the French, on their left, covering the junction of the river and mountain fronts. The close of the year was marked by two successful operations. On Dec. 30 General Fayolle stormed the enemy's positions between Monte Tomba and the Piave, taking 1400 prisoners and seven guns; and the Italians, on the night of the 31st, captured the bridge-head at Zenson, and drove the Austrians across the river.

It is possible that the success achieved by the enemy surpassed his expectations. Strategical plans are governed by the result of battles, and no set plan can go beyond the first encounter with the enemy. The most that strategy can do at the outset is to set the armies in motion in the direction which will enable them to derive the greatest advantage from a success in the first encounter. After the tactical decision strategy again steps in, and arranges that the next engagement shall take place under similarly favourable conditions. It has been seen that the enemy's first move was well conceived. An initial success might have been expected to give them possession of the Upper Isonzo, and, probably, of the river-line as far as Gorizia. The hold of the Italians on the Carso positions would have been shaken, and the situation would have lent itself to further development. There would have been a prospect of recovering the territory lost by the Austrians, which, in itself, would have been an important achievement. It would probably have sufficed to divert the attention of the Allies from France. But, whether the enemy aimed at more ambitious projects, or not, it is clear that their original dispositions were well adapted to take advantage of the débâcle of the 2nd Italian Army, and to lead up to advantageous situations at each stage of the advance.

The strategical aspect of the Venetian frontier was discussed in the Quarterly Review' for July 1915, and it is unnecessary to revert to the subject in detail. It was shown how disadvantageous the situation of the Italians would be if they should elect to take the offensive on the Isonzo front, with the Austrians occupying the Trentino in rear, and the line of the Carnic Alps on their flank. It was surmised that they would set themselves first to gain possession of the Trentino; but