ambition, or political considerations, led them to aim at Trieste. The disadvantages of the situation might have become apparent at an earlier stage had not the enemy been too much occupied on other fronts. The collapse of Russia has enabled the enemy to dispose of larger forces; but, whether owing to disinclination to commit themselves too deeply, or to the inadequacy of the railway communications, which, at this season, are liable to interruption by snow, they have not made the most of their apparent advantages. An extension of the Piave-Asiago front of operations to Lake Garda would offer obvious possibilities; but there is only one line of railway south of Franzenfeste (the junction of lines from Innsbruck and Tarvis), which is probably being worked to the limit of its capacity in supplying the forces already employed.

Palestine.

After the indecisive operations in the neighbourhood of Gaza on March 26, our troops withdrew behind the Wadi Gaza, while the Turks established themselves in a strongly entrenched line from the sea to Beersheba. Our left was subsequently thrown forward across the wadi in the coast sector, where, with the aid of the warships, some six miles of the enemy's advanced positions were captured. Except for some minor actions the hot weather passed without incident. In June Sir Edmund Allenby was transferred from the command of the 3rd Army in France to succeed Sir Archibald Murray as Commander-in-Chief. The Turks brought up considerable reinforcements, and our army was increased with a view to the resumption of the offensive.

It was General Allenby's design to fall upon the flanks of the Turkish positions in succession, with the object, presumably, of causing a dispersion of the enemy's reserves. His first objective was the entrenched position about Beersheba. After a night march on Oct. 30-31, the infantry attacked the defences from the west and south-west; while the mounted troops, making a wide turning movement through the desert, advanced from the east. The town was occupied in the evening, after a stubborn fight. On the night of Nov. 1-2, the western and south-western defences of Gaza, which had in the

meantime been subjected to a heavy bombardment, in which monitors took part, were attacked and carried. Five days later the southern defences were captured, and the town was enveloped on the east. The right wing, meanwhile, continued its advance north and northwest of Beersheba. The Turks, defeated on both flanks, began a general retreat to the Wadi Hesi, a portion of their left wing, which appears to have become isolated, taking the direction of Hebron.

The position on the Wadi Hesi was turned by the capture of Herbieh; and the retreating Turks were pursued rapidly in the Wadi Sukereir, behind which they endeavoured to take up a line covering Beit Jibrin and Hebron. They were driven back after a stiff fight on Nov. 12, and forced to retire behind the Wadi Surar. Having captured strongly-entrenched positions at Mesmiyeh, Katrah, and Mughar, our troops, on Nov. 13, occupied a front through Et Tineh, Katrah, and Jebnah, to the sea. The following day saw them in possession of the railway from the junction with the Jerusalem line as far as Naanah. Ramleh and Lydda were occupied on Nov. 15; and two days later Jaffa was entered without opposition, the Turks retiring to the Auja.

At this stage the northward movement was suspended, and operations were begun for the capture of Jerusalem. Mounted troops occupied Beitur el Tahta, and infantry advanced in the Judean highlands west of Jerusalem. The line was gradually drawn more closely round the city on the south-west, west, and north-west; and the eastward advance was continued from Beitur el Tahta towards the road to Shechem, which was strongly held by the enemy. By Nov. 26 our troops occupied a line extending northwards from Bitir at a distance of from four to six miles from the city. The Turks were in force on the heights in front; and the attack was deferred in order to await the development of a movement from the south. During the interval attacks were repulsed at numerous points of our front between Jerusalem and the mouth of the Auja.

Details are as yet wanting of the course of events on our right flank during the foregoing operations. After the capture of Beersheba it was of the first importance to operate against the enemy's main forces in the region