which the honorable manager made in regard to the forms of proceeding in this tribunal, that it is not to be governed by the iron and rigid rules of law, but that, seeking to attain justice, it is disposed to allow the largest liberty in the progress of the investigation, both to the honorable managers on the part of the House of Representatives and to the counsel in behalf of the President of the United States.

Impressed with the idea that this tribunal will discard in a great degree those forms and ceremonies which are known to the common law; that it does not stand upon demurrers; that it will not stand particularly upon the forms of evidence, or those technical rules which prevail in other courts, I have supposed that there was nothing improper in our making an appeal to this tribunal for time to answer the charges which have been preferred against the President of the United States; and that, instead of that being denied, much more liberality would be extended by the Senate of the nation sitting as a court of impeachment than we could even expect upon a trial in one of the courts of common law.

It is not my purpose, Mr. Chief Justice, to enter at this stage into a discussion of the charges which are preferred here, though it would seem to be invited by one or two of the observations which were made by the honorable manager, [Mr. BUTLER.] I do not propose at this stage of your proceedings to enter into any discussion of them. You are told, however, that it is right in a case of this kind to proceed with railroad speed; and that in consequence of the great improvements which have been made in the country we can proceed much more rapidly in the investigation of a case of this kind than such a case could be proceeded with a few years ago. Nevertheless, the charges which are made here are charges of the gravest importance. The questions which will have to be considered by this honorable body are questions of the deepest and profoundest interest. They are questions in which not only the Representatives of the people are concerned, but the people them selves have the deepest and most lasting interest in the result of this investigation. Questions are raised here in regard to differences of opinion between the Executive of the nation and the honorable House of Representatives as to their constitutional powers and as to the rights which they respectively claim. These are questions of the utmost gravity, and questions which in the view we entertain of them should receive the most deliberate consideration on the part of the Senate.

I trust that I shall be pardoned by the Chief Justice and the Senators in making an allusion to a statute which has long been in force in the State from which I come. I only do it for the purpose of making a brief argument by analogy to you and the honorable body whom I am addressing. We have a statute in the State of Tennessee, which has long been in force, which provides that when a bill of indictment is found against an individual, and he thinks, owing to excitement or any other cause, he may not have a fair trial at the first term of the court, his case shall be continued until the next term. The mode of proceeding at law-and no man, I presume, in the United States is more familiar with it than the Chief Justice whom I have the honor of addressing on this occasion-is not a mode of railroad speed. If there is anything under the heavens that gives to judicial proceedings a claim to the consideration and the approbation of mankind it is the fact that judges and courts hasten slowly in the investigation of cases that are presented to them. Nothing is done or presumed to be done in a state of excitement. Every moment is allowed for calm and mature deliberation. The courts are in the habit of investigating cases slowly, carefully, cautiously, and when they form their judgments and pronounce their opinions, and those opinions are published to the world, they meet the sanction of judicial minds and legal minds everywhere, and they meet the approbation and the confi

dence of the people before whom they are promulgated. If this is and ever has been one of the proudest characteristics, if I may so express myself, of the forms of judicial proceedings in our courts, how much more in an exalted and honorable body like this; how much more in an assembly composed of some of the wisest and greatest men in the United States, Senators revered and honored by their countrymen, Senators who from their position are presumed to be free from reproach, who from their position are presumed to be calm in their deliberations and in their investigations-how much more in such a body as this ought we to proceed cautiously and ought every opportunity to be given for a fair investigation?

Mr. Chief Justice, I need not tell you, nor need I tell many of the honorable Senators whom I address on this occasion, many of whom are lawyers, many of whom have been clothed in times past with the judicial ermine, that in the courts of law the vilest criminal who ever was arraigned in the United States has been given time for preparation, time for hearing. The Constitution of the country secures to the vilest man in the land the right not only to be heard himself, but to be heard by counsel; and no matter how great his crime, no matter how deep may be the malignity of the offense with which he is charged, he is tried according to the forms of law; he is allowed to have counsel; continuances are granted to him; if he is unable to obtain justice time is given to him, and all manner of preparation is allowed him.

If this is so in courts of common law, that are fettered and bound by the iron rules to which I have adverted, how much more in a great tribunal like this, that does not follow the precedents of law, but that is aiming and seeking alone to attain justice, ought we to be allowed ample time for preparation in reference to charges of the nature which we have here? How much more, sir, should such time be given us?

We are told that the President acted in regard to one of the matters which is charged against him by the House of Representatives on the 21st of February, and that by the 4th of March-if I did not mistake the statement of the honorable manager-the House of Representatives had presented this accusation against the President of the United States; and that, therefore, the President, who knew what he was doing, should be prepared for his defense. Mr. Chief Justice, is it necessary for me to remind you and honorable Senators that you can upon a page of foolscap paper prepare a bill of indictment against an individual which may require weeks in the investigation? Is it necessary for me to remind this honorable body that it is an easy thing to make charges, but that it is often a laborious and difficult thing to make a defense against those accusations?

Reasoning from the analogy furnished by such proceedings at law, I earnestly maintain before this honorable body that suitable time should be given us to answer the charges which are made here. A large number of these charges-those of them connected with the President's action in reference to the Secretary of War-involve questions of the deepest importance, They involve an inquiry running back to the very foundation of the Government; they involve an examination of the precedents which have been set by different Administrations; they involve, in short, the most extensive range of inquiry. The two last charges that were presented by the House of Representatives, if I may be pardoned for using the expression in the view which I entertain of them, open Pandora's box, and will cause an investigation as to the great differences of opinion which have existed between the President and the House of Representatives, an inquiry which, so far as I can perceive, will be almost interminable in its char

acter.

Now, what do we ask for the President of the United States? The honorable manager corrected himself in the expression that he was

a criminal. What do we ask in behalf of the President of the United States, the highest officer in this land? Why, sir, we ask simply that he shall be allowed time for his defense. And upon whose judgment is he to rely in regard to that? He must, in great part, rely upon the judgment of his counsel, those to whom he has intrusted his defense. We, upon our professional responsibility, have asserted, in the presence of this Senate, in the face of the nation and of the whole world, that we believe it will require the number of days to prepare the President's answer which we stated to the Senate in the paper which we submitted to the Senate. Such is still our opinion. And when these grave charges are presented are they to be rushed through the Senate sitting as a judicial tribunal in hot haste and with railroad speed, without giving to the President of the United States the opportunity to answer them, that same opportunity which you would give to the meanest criminal that ever was arraigned before the bar of justice in any tribunal in this or in the country from which we borrowed our law?

I cannot believe, Mr. Chief Justice, that honorable Senators will hesitate for one moment in granting us all the time that may be necessary to prepare our defense, and that may be necessary to enable them to decide as judges carefully, deliberately, conscientiously, and with a view of their accountability, not only to their constituents, but their accountability to posterity who are to come after us, for the names of American Senators are dear not only to those who sent them here, but they are names which are to live after the scenes of to-day shall have passed away. I have no doubt that honorable Senators, in justice to themselves and in justice to the great land which they represent, will endeavor to conduct this investigation in a manner that will stamp the impress of honor and justice upon them and upon their proceedings not only now, but in all time to come, when they shall be cited after you and I and all of us shall have passed away from the stage of human action.

Mr. Chief Justice, this is an exalted tribunal. I say it in no spirit of compliment. I say it because I feel it. I feel that this is the most exalted tribunal that can be convened under the sun, a tribunal of Senators, honorable members, who are sent here to sit in judg ment upon one of the gravest and greatest accusations that ever was made in the land. And I may say, in answer to an observation of the honorable manager on the other side, that I, for one, as an American citizen, feel proud that we are assembled here to-day and assembled under the circumstances which have

brought us together. It is one of the first instances in the history of the world in which the ruler of a people has been presented by a portion of the Representatives of the people for trial before another branch of the law-making power sitting as a judicial tribunal. While that is so it is equally true that on the other hand the President, through his counsel, comes here and submits himself to the jurisdiction of this court, submits himself calmly, peaceably, and with a confident reliance on the justice of the honorable Senate who are to hear his cause.

I

Mr. Chief Justice, I sincerely hope that the resolution which has been offered will meet the approbation of the honorable Senate. hope that time will be given us, and that this proceeding, which in all time to come will be quoted as a precedent for others, will be conducted with that gravity, that dignity, that decorum which are fit and becoming in the Representatives of a free and a great people. Mr. CONKLING. I wish to submit an amendment to the proposition pending in the nature of a substitute:

Ordered, That, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate for cause shown, the trial of the pending impeachment shall proceed immediately after replication shall be filed.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The amendment submitted by the Senator from New York does

not appear to the Chair to be in order at present. The motion of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN] is that the Senate adopt the following order:

Ordered, That the trial of the articles of impeachment shall proceed on the 6th day of April next.

The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WILSON] moves to amend it by striking out the word "sixth" and inserting "first." That is the present motion.

Mr. WILSON. I propose to modify my amendment by saying Monday, the 30th of March.

Mr. CONKLING. Does the Chair decide that my proposition is not in order? The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair does not conceive it to be in order at present. Mr. CONKLING. Then I beg to modify in this way: I move to amend the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts by striking out the date which he inserts, whatever that date may be, and inserting in lieu thereof the words immediately after replication filed, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate."

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair conceives that the amendment offered by the Senator from New York is not in order.

Mr. WILSON. For the purpose of bringing the motion made by the Senator from New York before the body I withdraw my amend. ment so that his amendment will be in order.

Mr. CONKLING. Then I offer my original proposition as a substitute for the proposition of the Senator from Ohio.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The amendment of the Senator from New York will be read. The CHIEF CLERK. The amendment is to strike out all after the word "ordered" in the proposition of Mr. SHERMAN and to insert in lieu thereof:

That, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate for cause shown, the trial of the pending impeachment shall proceed immediately after replication shall be filed.

Mr. Manager BINGHAM. Mr. President, I am instructed by the managers to say that the proposition just suggested by the honorable Senator from New York [Mr. CONKLING] is entirely satisfactory to the managers for the House, and to say further to the Senate that we believe it is in perfect accord with the precedents in this country. The Senate will doubtless remember that on the trial of Justice Chase, when a day was fixed for the answer, upon his own petition, verified by his affidavit, the Senate adopted an order which was substantially the order as suggested by the amend ment of the honorable gentleman from New York. I beg leave to read that order in the hearing of the Senate:

"Ordered, That the 4th day of February next shall be the day for receiving the answer and proceeding with the trial of the impeachment against Samuel Chase."

If nothing further had been said touching the original proposition we would have been content and satisfied to leave this question without further remark to the decision of the Senate; but in view of what has been said by the counsel for the accused we beg leave to respond that we are chargeable with no indecent haste when we ask that no unnecessary delay shall interpose between the people and the trial of a man who is charged with having violated the greatest trusts ever committed to a single person; trusts that involve the highest interests of the whole people; trusts that involve the peace of the whole country; trusts that involve in some sense the success of this last great experiment of representative government upon the earth.

We may be pardoned, farther, sir, for saying that it strikes us somewhat with surprise, without intending the slightest possible disrespect to any member of this body, that any proposi tion should be entertained for the continuance of a trial like this, when no formal application has been made by the accused himself. To be sure, a motion was interposed here to-day in the face of the written rule, order, and law of this body, for leave to file an answer at the end of forty days. The Senate has disposed of that

motion, and in a manner, we venture to say, satisfactory to the whole country, as it is certainly satisfactory to the representatives of the people at this bar. Now, sir, that being disposed of, the Senate having determined the day on which answer shall be filed, we submit, with all respect to the Senate, that it is but just to the people of this country that we shall await the incoming of the answer and the replication thereto by the representatives of the people, and then see and know what colorable excuse can be offered, either by the cccused President in his own person or through his representatives, why this trial should be delayed a single hour.

If he be innocent of the grave accusations prepared against him the truth will soon be ascertained by this enlightened body; and he has the right, if the fact so appear, to a speedy deliverance, and the country a right to a speedy determination of this important question. If, on the other hand, he be guilty of these grave and serious charges, what man is there within this body or outside of this body ready to say that he should one day or hour longer disgrace the high position which has been held hitherto by some of the noblest and most illustrious of the land?

The

We think that the executive power of this nation can only be reposed in the hands of men who are faithful to their great trust. people so think. They have made that issue with the President of the United States at this bar; and while we demand that there shall be no indecent haste, we, too, demand in the name of all the people, most respectfully, that there shall be no unnecessary delay, and no delay at all until good cause is shown for delay in the mode and manner hitherto observed in proceedings of this sort.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I ask that the resolution offered by the honorable member from Ohio shall be read. I did not hear it distinctly.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. It will be reported. The CHIEF CLERK. The order, as submitted by the Senator from Ohio, is as follows:

Ordered. That the trial of the articles of impeachment shall proceed on the 6th day of April next.

The Senator from New York [Mr. CoNKLING] moves to amend by striking out all after the word "ordered," and inserting :

That, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate for cause shown, the trial of the pending impeachment shall proceed immediately after replication shall be filed.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I rise for information. Is there any period within which the replication is to be filed? There is nothing on the face of that order limiting the time within which the replication may be filed. If the managers propose to make that a part of the order to file the replication on the day the answer may come in, or on any specific day after the coming in of the answer, it would not, perhaps, be liable to objection; but the ac cused may well be in ignorance of the time when the trial will begin under the order as it stands.

Mr. Manager BINGHAM. Will the hon. orable Senator allow me to suggest to him that we can only file the replication with the consent and after consultation with the House of Representatives; and therefore the answer to his suggestion is that as soon as answer be made here according to the usage and practice in cases of this sort we will respectfully demand a copy of the answer that we may lay it before the House and report to this body as soon as the House will order us its replication. I have no doubt it will be done within one or two days after the answer is filed.

Mr. JOHNSON. What I meant

Mr. CONKLING. I rise to a question of order. Reluctant as I am to make it, I ask for the enforcement of the eighteenth and twenty-third rules.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. No debate can be had. The Chair understood the Scnator from Maryland as simply asking for an explanation from the managers.

Mr. JOHNSON. President? The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Secretary wili read the rule.

What is the rule, Mr.

Mr. JOHNSON. The honorable member from New York is mistaken in supposing that I rose to debate the question. I only rose for the purpose of inquiring what the question was. I suppose that is allowable.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is the Senate ready for the question on the substitute proposed by the Senator from New York?

Mr. DRAKE. On that question I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered; and being taken resulted-yeas 40, nays 10; as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Harlan, Henderson, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Willey, Williams, Wilson and Yates-40.

NAYS-Messrs. Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Patterson of Tennessee, Saulsbury, and Vickers-10. ABSENT-Messrs. Cragin, Doolittle, Norton, and

Wade-4.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question recurs on the order as amended. The Clerk will report the order.

The Chief Clerk read it, as follows:

Ordered, That, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate for cause shown, the trial of the pending impeachment shall proceed immediately after replication shall be filed.

The order was agreed to.

Mr. HOWARD. If there be no motion for the court on behalf of the honorable managers of the House of Representatives, or on the part of the counsel for the accused, I move that the Senate sitting on the present impeachment adjourn to the 23d day of the present month, at one o'clock in the afternoon. I send an order to the Chair for that purpose. My motion is made subject to any action the managers may see fit to lay before us, or the counsel for the accused. I will not press it if they have anything to propose.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. Have the managers on the part of the House of Representa tives anything to propose?

Mr. Manager BINGHAM. Nothing further at present.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, Have the counsel for the accused anything to propose? Mr. CURTIS. Nothing. The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators, the motion is to adjourn the Senate sitting for the trial of this impeachment until the 23d of March.

The motion was agreed to.

MONDAY, March 23, 1868.

At one o'clock p. m. the Chief Justice of the United States entered the Senate Chamber, escorted by Mr. POMEROY, the chairman of the Senate committee heretofore appointed for that purpose, and took the chair.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant-atArms will open the court by proclamation.

The SERGEANT-AT-ARMS. Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye: all persons are commanded to keep silence while the Senate of the United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.

The managers of the impeachment on the part of the House of Representatives appeared at the door, and their presence was announced by the Sergeant-at-Arms.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Managers will take the seats assigned to them by the Senate.

The Managers accordingly took the seats provided for them in the area of the Senate to the left of the Presiding Officer.

The counsel for the President, Hon. Henry Stanbery, of Kentucky: Hon. B. R. Curtis, of Massachusetts; Hou. Thomas A. R. Nelson, of

Tennessee; William M. Evarts, Esq., of New York, and Hon. William S. Groesbeck, of Ohio, appeared and took the seats assigned to them, on the right of the Chair.

The Sergeant-at-Arms announced the presence of the House of Representatives; and the Committee of the Whole House, headed by Mr. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois, the chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and the Clerk of the House, entered the Chamber, and the members were conducted to the seats assigned them.

The Secretary called the name of Mr. DooLITTLE, who had not heretofore been sworn, and the oath prescribed by the rules was administered to him by the Chief Justice.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Secretary will read the minutes of the proceedings of the last sitting.

The Secretary read the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, March 13, of the Senate sitting for the trial of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on articles of impeachment.

On the Journal of those proceedings occur the following entries as to the proceedings of the Senate on that occasion, when it had retired for deliberation :

"The Senate, with the Chief Justice, having retired to their conference chamber, proceeded to consider the motion submitted by Mr. EDMUNDS; and, "After debate,

"On motion by Mr. DRAKE to amend the motion submitted by Mr. EDMUNDS, by striking out all after the word ordered,' and in lieu thereof inserting:

"That the respondent file answer to the articles of impeachment on or before Friday, the 20th day of March instant,'

"It was determined in the affirmative-yeas 28, nays 20.

On motion by Mr. DRAKE,

"The yeas and nays being desired by one fifth of the Senators present,

"Those who voted in the affirmative are

Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Drake, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Sherman, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Trumbull, Willey, Williams, Wilson, and Yates.

Those who voted in the negative are

Messrs. Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Edmunds, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Maine, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Saulsbury, Van Winkle, and Vickers.

"So the amendment of Mr. DRAKE to the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS was agreed to.

On the question to agree to the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS, as amended,

After debate,

On motion of Mr. TRUMBULL, that the Senate reconsider its vote agreeing to the amendment proposed by Mr. DRAKE to the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS, "It was determined in the affirmative-yeas 27, nays 23.

**On motion of Mr. DRAKE,

"The yeas and nays being desired by one fifth of the Senators present,

"Those who voted in the affirmative are

"Messrs. Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Cattell, Corbett, Davis, Dixon, Edmunds, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, and Willey.

"Those who voted in the negative are"Messrs. Cameron, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Drake, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, and Yates.

"So the Senate reconsidered its vote agreeing to the amendment of Mr. DRAKE to the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS; and,

The question recurring on the amendment of Mr. DRAKE,

"On motion of Mr. TRUMBULL to amend the amendment of Mr. DRAKE, by striking out the words 'Friday, the 20th,' and inserting the words 'Monday, the 231.

It was determined in the affirmative; and, "On the question to agree to the amendment, as amended on the motion of Mr. TRUMBULL,

"It was determined in the affirmative. "The question again recurring on the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS, as amended on the motion of Mr. DRAKE, as amended by Mr. TRUMBULL, in the following words:

Ordered, That the respondent file answer to the articles of impeachment on or before Monday, the 23d day of March instant,'

"It was determined in the affirmative. "Thereupon,

"The Senate returned to its Chamber."

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise to make the same question to the Court which I made in the Senate, and I think that now is the appropriate time before the court has de

cided to take up the case. I therefore submit to the Court a motion in writing.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Secretary will read the motion.

The Secretary read as follows:

Mr. DAVIS, a member of the Senate and of the Court of Impeachment, from the State of Kentucky, moves the court to make this order:

The Constitution having vested the Senate with the sole power to try the articles of impeachment of the President of the United States preferred by the House of Representatives, and having also declared that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State chosen by the Legislatures thereof;" and the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas having, each by its Legislature, chosen two Senators who have been and continue to be excluded by the Senate from their seats, respectively, without any judgment by the Senate against them personally and individually on the points of their elections, returns, and qualifications, it is

Ordered, That a Court of Impeachment for the trial of the President cannot be legally and constitutionally formed while the Senators from the States aforesaid are thus excluded from the Senate; and this case is continued until the Senators from these States are permitted to take their seats in the Senate, subject to all constitutional exceptions to their elections, returns, and qualifications severally.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. PresidentThe CHIEF JUSTICE. The rule does not admit of debate.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. President, I object to the receiving of the paper as not in order. Mr. CONNESS. Mr. President, I desire

to submit a motion, which will cover the case, perhaps. I move that the paper be not received, upon which I call for the yeas and nays.

Mr. HOWE. Mr. President, I rise to submit a question of order.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. HOWE. I submit if the motion offered by the Senator from Kentucky be in order.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The motion comes before the Senate in the shape of an order submitted by a member of the Senate and of the Court of Impeachment. The twenty-third rule requires that "all the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, subject, however, to the operation of rule seven.

The seventh rule requires the Presiding Officer of the Senate to "submit to the Senate, without a division, all questions of evidence and incidental questions; but the same shall, on the demand of one fifth of the members present, be decided by yeas and nays." By amendment this rule has been applied to orders and decisions proposed by a member of the Senate under the twenty-third rule. The Chair rules, therefore, that the motion of the Senator from Kentucky is in order.

Mr. CONNESS. Mr. President

The CHIEF JUSTICE. No debate is allowed.

Mr. CONNESS. Is the motion submitted by me in order in connection with it?

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The chair thinks not.

Several SENATORS. Let us have a square

vote.

Other SENATORS. Let us have the yeas and nays on the order proposed.

The yeas and nays were ordered; and being taken, resulted-yeas 2, nays 49; as follows: YEAS-Messrs. Davis and McCreery-2.

NAYS-Messrs. Anthony, Buckalew, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Dixon, Doolittle, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Harlan, Henderson, Hendricks, Howard, Howe, Johnson, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Norton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Patterson of Tennessee, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey, Williams, Wilson, and Yates-49.

ABSENT-Messrs. Bayard, Saulsbury, and Wade

-3.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. On the motion to adopt the order of the Senator from Kentucky, the yeas are 2, and the nays 49. The motion is lost.

Are the counsel for the President ready to file their answer.

Mr. STANBERY. Mr. Chief Justice, in obedience to the order of the honorable court,

made at the last session, that the answer of the President should be filed to-day, we have it ready. The counsel, abandoning all other engagements, some of us quitting our courts, our cases, and our clients, have devoted every hour to the performance of this duty. The labor has been incessant and exhaustive. We have devoted, as I say, not only every hour ordinarily devoted to labor, but many required for necessary rest and recreation have been consumed in this work. It is a matter, Mr. Chief Justice, of profound regret to us that the honorable court did not allow us more time. Nevertheless we hope that the answer will be found in all respects sufficient within the law. Such as it is, we are now ready to read and file it.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The counsel will read the answer of the President.

Mr. CURTIS proceeded to read the answer to the close of that portion relative to the first article of impeachment.

Mr. STANBERY read that portion of the answer beginning with the reply to the second article to the close of the response to the ninth article.

Mr. EVARTS read the residue of the answer.
The answer is as follows:

Senate of the United States, sitting as a Court of Impeachment for the trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.

The answer of the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives of the United States.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE I.

For answer to the first article he says: that Edwin M. Stanton was appointed Secretary for the Department of War on the 15th day of January, A. D. 1862, by Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, during the first term of his Presidency, and was commissioned, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, to hold the said office during the pleasure of the President; that the office of Secretary for the Department of War was created by an act of the First Congress in its first session passed on the 7th day of August, A. D. 1789, and in and by that act it was provided and enacted that the said Secretary for the Department of War shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on and intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeably to the Constitution, relative to the subjects within the scope of the said Department; and furthermore, that the said Secretary shall conduct the business of the said Department in such a manner as the President of the United States shall, from time to time, order and instruct.

And this respondent, further answering, says that by force of the act aforesaid and by reason of his appointment aforesaid the said Stanton became the principal officer in one of the Executive Departments of the Government within the true intent and meaning of the second section of the second article of the Constitution of the United States, and according to the true intent and meaning of that provision of the Constitution of the United States; and, in accordance with the settled and uniform practice of each and every President of the United States, the said Stanton then became, and so long as he should continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War must continue to be, one of the advisers of the President of the United States, as well as the person intrusted to act for and represent the President in matters enjoined upon him or intrusted to him by the President touching the Department aforesaid, and for whose conduct in such capacity, subordinate to the President, the President is, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, made responsible. And this respondent, further answering, says he succeeded to the office of President of the United States upon, and by reason of, the death of Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, on the 15th day of April, 1865, and

the said Stanton was then holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War under and by reason of the appointment and commission aforesaid; and, not having been removed from the said office by this respondent, the said Stanton continued to hold the same under the appointment and commission aforesaid, at the pleasure of the President, until the time hereinafter particularly mentioned; and at no time received any appointment or commission save as above detailed.

And this respondent, further answering, says that on and prior to the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, this respondent, the President of the United States-responsible for the conduct of the Secretary for the Department of War, and having the constitutional right to resort to and rely upon the person holding that office for advice concerning the great and difficult public duties enjoined on the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States-became satisfied that he could not allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the office of Secretary for the Department of War without hazard of the public interest; that the relations between the said Stanton and the President no longer permitted the President to resort to him for advice, or to be, in the judgment of the President, safely responsible for his conduct of the affairs of the Department of War, as by law required, in accordance with the orders and instructions of the President; and thereupon, by force of the Constitution and laws of the United States, which devolve on the President the power and the duty to control the conduct of the business of that executive department of the Government, and by reason of the constitutional duty of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, this respondent did necessarily consider and did determine that the said Stanton ought no longer to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. And this respondent, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him as President of the United States, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to give effect to such his decision and determination, did, on the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, address to the said Stanton a note, of which the following is a true copy:

"SIR: Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted."

To which note the said Stanton made the following reply:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, August 5, 1867. SIR: Your note of this day has been received, stating that "public considerations of a high character constrain you" to say that my resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.'

In reply I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress, Very respectfully, yours, EDWIN M. STANTON.

This respondent, as President of the United States, was thereon of opinion that, having regard to the necessary official relations and duties of the Secretary for the Department of War to the President of the United States, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and having regard to the responsibility of the President for the conduct of the said Secretary, and having regard to the permanent executive authority of the office which the respondent holds under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was impossible, consistently with the public interests, to allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War; and it then became the official duty of the respondent, as President of the United States, to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by him, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was informed and verily believed that it was practically settled by the First Congress of the United States, and had been so considered and, uniformly and in great

numbers of instances, acted on by each Congress and President of the United States, in succession, from President Washington to, and including, President Lincoln, and from the First Congress to the Thirty-Ninth Congress, that the Constitution of the United States conferred on the President, as part of the execu tive power and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing the executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the President alone. This respondent had, in pursuance of the Constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the Executive Departments upon this question of constitutional executive power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the Constitution of the United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the President of the United States, and that, consequently, it could be lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress could not deprive him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of President of the United States, and because in that capacity he was both enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question, did, in good faith and with an earnest desire to arrive at the truth, come to the conclusion and opinion, and did make the same known to the honorable the Senate of the United States by a message dated on the 2d day of March, 1867, (a true copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked A,) that the power last mentioned was conferred and the duty of exercising it, in fit cases, was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and that the President could not be deprived of this power or relieved of this duty, nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole; and this has ever since remained and was the opinion of this respondent at the time when he was forced as aforesaid to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by this respondent, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of "an act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by a constitutional majority of both Houses of Congress, it was enacted as follows:

"That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act was passed, that the power to remove executive officers for cause might, by law, be taken from the President and vested in him and the Senate jointly; and although this respondent had arrived at and still retained the opinion above expressed and verily be lieved, as he still believes, that the said first section of the last-mentioned act was and is wholly inoperative and void by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States, yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the constitutional majority in each of the two Houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it to be proper to examine and decide whether the particular case of the said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's duty to act, was within or without the terms of that first section of the act; or, if within it, whether the President had not the power, ac

cording to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and having, in his capacity of President of the United States, so examined and considered, did form the opinion that the case of the said Stanton and his tenure of office were not affected by the first section of the last-named act.

And this respondent further answering, says, that although a case thus existed which, in his judgment as President of the United States, called for the exercise of the executive power to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and although this respondent was of opinion, as is above shown, that under the Constitution of the United States the power to remove the said Stanton from the said office was vested in the President of the United States; and although this respondent was also of the opinion, as is above shown, that the case of the said Stanton was not affected by the first section of the lastnamed act; and although each of the said opinions had been formed by this respondent upon an actual case, requiring him, in his capacity of President of the United States, to come to some judgment and determination thereon, yet this respondent, as President of the United States, desired and determined to avoid, if possible, any question of the construction and effect of the said first section of the last-named act, and also the broader question of the executive power conferred on the President of the United States, by the Constitution of the United States, to remove one of the principal officers of one of the Executive Departments for cause seeming to him sufficient; and this respondent also desired and deter mined that, if from causes over which he could exert no control, it should become absolutely necessary to raise and have, in some way, determined either or both of the said last-named questions, it was in accordance with the Constitution of the United States and was required of the President thereby, that questions of so much gravity and importance, upon which the legis lative and executive departments of the Government had disagreed, which involved powers considered by all branches of the Government, during its entire history down to the year 1867, to have been confided by the Constitution of the United States to the President, and to be necessary for the complete and proper execu. tion of his constitutional duties, should be in some proper way submitted to that judicial department of the Government, intrusted by the Constitution with the power, and subjected by it to the duty, not only of determining finally the construction and effect of all acts of Congress, but of comparing them with the Constitution of the United States and pronouncing them inoperative when found in conflict with that fundamental law which the people have enacted for the government of all their servants. And to these ends, first, that through the action of the Senate of the United States, the absolute duty of the President to substitute some fit person in place of Mr. Stanton as one of his advisers, and as a principal subordinate officer whose official conduct he was responsible for and had lawful right to control, might, if possible, be accomplished without the necessity of raising any one of the questions aforesaid; and, second, if this duty could not be so performed, then that these questions, or such of them as might necessarily arise, should be judicially determined in manner aforesaid, and for no other end or purpose this respondent, as President of the United States, on the 12th day of August, 1867, seven days after the reception of the letter of the said 'Stanton of the 5th of August, hereinbefore stated, did issue to the said Stanton the order following, namely:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 12, 1867. SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same.

You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all

records, books, papers, and other public property now in your custody and charge.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. To which said order the said Stanton made the following reply: WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON CITY, August 12, 1867. "SIR: Your note of this date has been received, informing me that by virtue of the powers vested in you, as President, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, I am suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same; and also directing me at once to transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in my custody and charge. Under a sense of public duty, I am compelled to deny your right, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate, and without legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary of War, or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as Secretary. But inasmuch as the General commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed ad interim, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force."

To the PRESIDENT.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that it is provided in and by the second section of "an act to regulatethe tenure of certain civil offices," that the President may suspend an officer from the performance of the duties of the office held by him, for certain causes therein designated, until the next meeting of the Senate and until the case shall be acted on by the Senate; that this respondent, as President of the United States, was advised and he verily believed and still believes, that the executive power of removal from office confided to him by the Constitution as aforesaid, includes the power of suspension from office at the pleasure of the President and this respondent, by the order aforesaid, did suspend the said Stanton from office, not until the next meeting of the Senate, or until the Senate should have acted upon the case, but by force of the power and authority vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, indefinitely and at the pleasure of the President, and the order, in form aforesaid, was made known to the Senate of the United States, on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be more fully hereinafter stated.

Stanton from longer holding the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and at the same time avoiding, if possible, any question respecting the extent of the power of removal from executive office confided to the President by the Constitution of the United States, and any question respecting the construction and effect of the first section of the said "act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,' while he should not, by any act of his, abandon and relinquish, either a power which he believed the Constitution had conferred on the President of the United States, to enable him to perform the duties of his office, or a power designedly left to him by the first section of the act of Congress last aforesaid, this respondent did, on the 12th day of December, 1867, transmit to the Senate of the United States, a message, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked B, wherein he made known the orders aforesaid and the reasons which had induced the same, so far as this respondent then considered it material and necessary that the same should be set forth, and reiterated

his views concerning the constitutional power of removal vested in the President, and also expressed his views concerning the construction of the said first section of the last-mentioned act, as respected the power of the President to remove the said Stanton from the said

office of Secretary for the Department of War, well hoping that this respondent could thus perform what he then believed, and still believes, to be his imperative duty in reference to the said Stanton, without derogating from the powers which this respondent believed were confided to the President, by the Constitution and laws, and without the necessity of raising, judicially, any questions respecting the same.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that this hope not having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein contrary to the settled convictions of the President, formed as aforesaid, respecting the powers confided to him and the duties required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid, that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President that he could no longer advise with or trust or be responsible for the said Stanton, in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or else he was com

ment of the President, be lawful and necessary to raise, for a judicial decision, the questions affecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office, or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the said office if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the same; and to this end, and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo F. Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, in the said second article set forth.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that in and by the act of February 13, 1795, it was, among other things, provided and enacted that, in case of vacancy in the officepelled to take such steps as might, in the judgof Secretary for the Department of War, it shall be lawful for the President, in case he shall think it necessary, to authorize any person to perform the duties of that office until a successor be appointed or such vacancy filled, but not exceeding the term of six months; and this respondent, being advised and be lieving that such law was in full force and not repealed, by an order dated August 12, 1867, did authorize and empower Ulysses S. Grant, General of the armies of the United States, to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, in the form in which similar authority had theretofore been given, not until the next meeting of the Senate and until the Senate should act on the case, but at the pleasure of the President, subject only to the limitation of six months in the said last-mentioned act contained; and a copy of the lastnamed order was made known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be hereinafter more fully stated; and in pursuance of the design and intention aforesaid, if it should become necessary, to submit the said questions to a judicial || determination, this respondent, at or near the date of the last-mentioned order, did make known such his purpose to obtain a judicial decision of the said questions, or such of them as might be necessary.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that in further pursuance of his intention and design, if possible to perform what he judged to be his imperative duty, to prevent the said

And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each substantial allegation in the said first article, says: He denies that the said Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies that the said Stanton, on the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United States. He denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued with intent to violate the act entitled "An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices." He denies that the said order was a violation of the last-mentioned act. He denies that the said order was a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his oath of office. He denies that the said order was issued with

an intent to violate the Constitution of the United States or any law thereof, or this respondent's oath of office; and he respectfully, but earnestly, insists that not only was it issued by him in the performance of what he believed to be an imperative official duty, but in the performance of what this honorable court will consider was, in point of fact, an imperative official duty. And he denies that any and all substantive matters, in the said first article contained, in manner and form as the same are therein stated and set forth, do, by law, constitute a high misdemeanor in office, within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE II.

And for answer to the second article this respondent says that he admits he did issue

and deliver to said Lorenzo Thomas the said writing set forth in said second article, bearing date at Washington, District of Columbia, February 21, 1868, addressed to Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General United bia, and he further admits that the same was States Army, Washington, District of Colum

so issued without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, then in session, but he denies that he thereby violated the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or that he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or the provisions of any act of Congress; and this respondent refers to his answer to said first article for a full statement of the purposes and intentions with which said order was issued, and adopts the same as part of his answer to this article; and he further denies that there was then and there no vacancy in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or that he did then and there commit, or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, and this respondent maintains and will insist:

1. That at the date and delivery of said writ ing there was a vacancy existing in the office of Secretary for the Department of War.

2. That, notwithstanding the Senate of the United States was then in session, it was lawful and according to long and well established usage to empower and authorize the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

3. That, if the said act regulating the tenure of civil offices be held to be a valid law, no provision of the same was violated by the issuing of said order or by the designation of said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE III.

And for answer to said third article this respondent says that he abides by his answer to said first and second articles, in so far as the same are responsive to the allegations contained in the said third article, and, without here again repeating the same answer, prays the same be taken as an answer to this third article as fully as if here again set out at length; and as to the new allegation contained in said third article, that this respondent did appoint the said Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, this respondent denies that he gave any other authority to said Thomas than such as appears in said written authority set out in said article, by which he authorized and empowered said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim; and he denies that the same amounts to an appointment and insists that it is only a designation of an officer of that Department to act temporarily as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim until an appointment should be made. But, whether the said written authority amounts to an appointment or to a temporary authority or designation, this respondent denies that in any sense he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or that he thereby intended to give the said order the character or effect of an appointment in the constitutional or legal sense of that term. He further denies that there was no vacancy in said office of Secretary for the Department of War existing at the date of said written authority.