Senator STENNIS. We cannot thank you enough, but we do want to thank you again for each member of this committee and for our Nation. Mr. LANPHIER. Thank you, sir. Mr. DEMPSEY. Thank you, sir. Senator STENNIS. We will recess now to F-82. (Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the subcommittee was recessed to reconvene in F-82 of the United States Capitol Building the same day.) Senator STENNIS. All of you that are going to testify, in keeping with the practice of the committee, if you will stand and take the oath. Do you and each of you solemnly swear that your testimony here will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. COLLINS. I do. Mr. DOUGLAS. I do. Mr. ALISON. I do. Senator STENNIS. Mr. Collins, we understand you have a statement. here. You may read it, or you may put it in the record and explain the highlights. Mr. COLLINS. It is a very short statement, Senator. Senator STENNIS. You may read it and proceed in your own way. Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, don't you think it would be well to put this in the record? Senator STENNIS. This biography here as to Mr. Collins will go in the record at this place. (The biographical sketch referred to is as follows:) Whitley C. Collins has served as president and chief executive officer of Northrop Aircraft, Inc., since May 17, 1954. Mr. Collins served as vice president, general manager, and a director of the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. in 1929-31. A native of Des Moines, Iowa, he was graduated in 1921 with a bachelor of science degree from the Wharton School of Banking and Finance at the University of Pennsylvania and for the next 8 years was associated with the Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. in Chicago. In 1931 he formed Collins-Powell Co., of Beverly Hills, in which he is still a partner. He was vice president and a director of the Elastic Stop Nut Corp., of Union, N. J., from 1940 to 1946, and in 1931 was elected a director of the Menasco Manufacturing Co., serving in that capacity until 1951. He is also chairman of the board of Holga Metal Production Co., of Van Nuys, Calif., manufacturers of steel filing cabinets. He was instrumental in organizing the Radioplane Co. in 1938, and served continuously as its president and director until it was merged into the Northrop Co. in 1957. Mr. Collins is a member of the board of governors of the Aircraft Industries Association of America, Inc., and served as chairman of the board from July 1 through December 31, 1957. He will serve as president of the Los Angeles post of the American Ordnance Association for the year 1958. Mr. Collins served in World War I in Battery F of the 125th Field Artillery. He served in the United States, on the Mexican border, in England, and in France. Senator STENNIS. All right, Mr. Collins, you may proceed. TESTIMONY OF WHITLEY C. COLLINS, PRESIDENT, NORTHROP AIRCRAFT, INC., ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE DOUGLAS, VICE PRESIDENT OF ENGINEERING; T. V. JONES, VICE PRESIDENT FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, AND JOHN R. ALISON Mr. COLLINS. I am honored at your invitation to testify before this committee. I sincerely hope that I can offer information which will advance this investigation. I would like again to reiterate that Northrop Aircraft, Inc., is appreciative and encouraged by this committee's efforts to identify obstacles to our missile progress and to search out ways and means to accelerate programs in the future. The committee has heard much distinguished testimony concerning the enemy threat and the military posture we are to assume to meet this threat. It has heard testimony about the importance of the missiles of the future as well as the requirement for a force in being. Our position is that the country must have both. Because of budgetary limitations in the past, this country was hard pressed to maintain the minimum force in being we needed. There was very little remaining to advance our basic research or to exploit technical advances already understood, such as the ballistic missile. We are paying the price for that now. Today we must avoid making the same mistake in reverse. A still limited defense budget must not cause us to neglect our forces in being in the effort to recapture the technological lead. LONG-TERM PLAN REQUIRED We must have a stable plan, amply funded, which, on a long-term basis, will insure that we at all times have a proper balance between future development and current operational strength. To do this we must maintain a broad base of research which will give us the technical initiative so that we may choose the weapon systems of the future rather than react to the choices of others. Our greatest deterrent is our offensive strength-our weapons in being today with the organization and trained manpower to use them. This is our true military posture and has taken years to achieve. Weapons of the future have caught the public imagination. I believe in the necessity of rapid development of these weapons by the United States, but the deterrent power of our country today lies primarily in our Strategic Air Command and its fleet of manned intercontinental bombers. In the face of enemy advances, this force must be continuously strengthened until such time as ballistic missiles become reliable and are procured, and deployed in sufficient numbers to cause the enemy to recognize this as the deterrent. This takes time and money. Missiles, as we know them, have certain limitations. Until we have more knowledge of the potential of missiles for strategic warfare, the manned bomber will be the mainstay of a mixed bomber-missile force in which bombers and missiles will supplement each other. In the race for the conquest of space, we must not underrate the importance of this force. If we do not develop it to its limit, we could well lose the race for the future before it has begun. Emphasis on advanced developments should not be allowed to divert attention from the necessity for attaining proper strength for our force in being. Our company makes the Snark, the first intercontinental missile, which we view as part of this force in being, and a valuable supplement to the present manned bomber force. The history of the Snark missile points up to a fundamental factor in any development cycle. The objective of a research and development program is to prove the performance characteristics of the weapon to be produced. If the earliest possible operational date is to be achieved, it is essential that the decision to go into production be made just as soon as confidence is established in these performance characteristics. Our great obstruction is the difficulty of getting a firm decision to go ahead with production as soon as a reasonable level of performance has been demonstrated. There is no penalty to a Government agency for deferring such a decision, and when budgetary limitations are a prime consideration, there is even reward for deferment if it helps to stay within the budget, even though in the long run it increases program costs. Military witnesses have themselves testified that the mechanics of decision-making in the Department of Defense are complex. I feel that it is essential to shorten the decision process by reducing the number of reviewing agencies. At the same time it is imperative to delegate responsibility and provide the necessary means to carry out the assigned tasks. SNARK DEVELOPMENT JUSTIFIED ORDER IN 1955 For example, in late 1955 the Snark characteristics were sufficiently known to have permitted a production order. This would have resulted in operational missiles in the inventory today. However, in fairness to the Air Force, I must state that at that time budgetary limitations and the estimate of the enemy situation. were such that this decision was postponed pending further demonstration. I am sure that if the urgency for national defense, as pointed up by this committee, had existed then the Snark would be in the inventory now. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I have three of my associates with me who will assist me with any questions you might have. I would like to introduce them at this time. Mr. Douglas received his B. D. degree in civil engineering from the University of Arkansas in 1940, and has been active in aircraft. engineering for the past 17 years. He joined Northrop 5 years ago as assistant chief project engineer, and has recently been assistant general manager in charge of the Snark missile program. He is presently vice president of engineering. Mr. Jones obtained his degree in areonautical engineering at Stanford University in 1942. He has been in the aircraft industry for 17 years, including 3 years with the RAND Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Mr. Jones joined Northrop 5 years ago as deputy chief engineer, and now is vice president for development planning. Mr. John Alison graduated in engineering from the University of Florida, and entered the United States Air Force in 1936. He holds the commission of brigadier general in the Air Force Reserve. After World War II he served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Air, and has been with the Northrop Co. as vice president for 5 years. That is my statement. Senator STENNIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Collins, for a very helpful statement, indeed. We will get the value of your opinion on these very important matters, and we are interested, too, in learning more about the Snark and the present situation and its prospective future and I think we can get into that now, if counsel is ready. Mr. WEISL. Mr. Collins, we have heard about the Snark from time to time, but we did not have in our record any authoritative statement of just what the Snark's capabilities are and what its cost is and when it can become a part of our usable weapons systems. Could you give us a summary on those matters? Mr. COLLINS. I would like to have Mr. Jones, if the committee will permit, give about a 12-minute summary of it. Will you do that, Mr. Jones? Senator STENNIS. You don't have to stand. Mr. WEISL. Have you some charts with you? Mr. JONES. Yes. Mr. WEISL. Mr. Chairman, can they be seen here? Mr. JONES. First, what is the Snark? Very briefly, it is an unmanned bombing missile powered with the J-57 engine the same as in the B-52 and KC-135. It flies intercontinentally without refueling, being launched from a mobile launcher, arriving at any target in the [deleted] military complex. It contains a completely self-contained guidance system, which is unjammable, flies at high altitude, [deleted] or can penetrate at low altitude [deleted]. (Deleted.) Mr. JONES. Now as to how the Snark development has proceeded, very quickly here we have a chart which shows the final completion of research and development testing established in June 1956. We have first as an example up above the actual schedule flight dates. Down below we have the dates upon which the flights were completed. In this case it was scheduled in June of 1956. In July we had this flight, and then correspondingly in October of 1956, we were able to launch the two in October 1956, and so on through the complete R. and D. program. Research and development was completed, completion of our guidance test missiles. We completed this program ahead of schedule. Down below the operational missile testing has been going on, which is a demonstration of the complete system after research and development. The recent flights to Ascension Island that you have probably heard about were two of these operational demonstration tests. They have been completed ahead of schedule. Senator BUSH. You say two. Wasn't there only one in November? Mr. JONES. There was one that was launched on the 29th of October and another one was launched in December, December 12. Both were successful. Senator BUSH. Did they both fly the full range? Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; they both flew the full range, and both impacted in the target area, and also importantly, the 2 launches, the first 2 launches attempted by the Air Force, the 2 launches were also successful. (Deleted.) Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have a problem which I would like to mention to the Chair and to the rest of the committee. As you know, there are some hearings on the railroads and I come from a railroad State. At 6 o'clock I was meeting the president of the Missouri Pacific, and if I could have 5 to 7 minutes now, I would appreciate the Chair and the committee yielding to me. I would like to make some comments on this. Senator Busн. I am quite agreeable to that. Senator STENNIS. Proceed now, if you can. fine. That would suit us Senator SYMINGTON. I thank the Chair and I thank Senator Bush. First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say I am tremendously impressed with this weapon and have been for a long time. Last winter I went down and watched a countdown on it. The actual firing was canceled just before it was to go off because of weather, the weather was very bad and they wanted to recover it. It seems to me that it is almost incredible that after the President gave it the boost he did in his November talk, which I thought was logical and right, that production on it was cut from [deleted] to [deleted], according to Mr. Alison. Here is a unit which I think has tremendous possibilities. There never was any bomber force turned back in World War II by an enemy action, but there were a great many bombers turned back in World War II by weather; and if the weather was bad over the target, which it often is, and they knew we had a couple of hundred of these loaded up with a far greater deleted] load than any ballistic missile can carry [deleted]. They certainly would give consideration before they hit us. Then it has advantages like this dispersion we are now looking at, and although it is not possible for the Congress to tell the executive branch what to buy, I must say that I have been astounded at the lack of interest expressed in this missile by the administration up to this time. I have no questions to ask about it. I think I know more about this than I do about other missiles, Mr. Chairman, about the weapons. But I did want to make those comments for the record, and I would hope that in our general recognition of the danger which has resulted from sputnik that we include the Snark in production acceleration along with other weapons we plan to accelerate. Now there is 1 more point which I think is important. The logical successor to the B-52 and/or the B-47 is the B-58. We heard today how far away the missiles actually are, in another session. The logical successor to this unit, after we put over $700 million in it, has been canceled, the Navaho. In other words, in my opinion, the weakness of this missile-we might as well look at its weaknesses, is its speed, although its speed is greater than the B-52. The Navaho was the supersonic Snark, in effect, and we got a lot out of it because it was where we developed all the propulsion for the ballistic missiles except one. But now that we have canceled out, if |