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sible, and was given to von Neurath to use for coercion of the Czechs.
The declared basic policy of the Protectorate was to destroy the identity of the Czechs as a nation and to absorb their territory into the Reich. This is borne out by a memorandum signed by Lt. Gen. of Infantry Frederici (862-PS), which is headed "The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia". It is marked Top Secret and dated 15 October 1940. That was practically a year before von Neurath went on leave, as he puts it, on 27 September 1941. The memorandum discusses "Basic Political Principles in the Protectorate,” and copies went to Keitel and Jodl. The memorandum states:
“On 9 October of this year (1940] the office of the Reich pro-
tector held an official conference in which State Secretary SS
Lt. General K. H. Frank spoke about the following:
"Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the
central authorities of Berlin, have had difficulties about the
solution of the Czech problem.
"After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his
view about the various plans in a memorandum. In this,
three ways of solution were indicated:
"A. German infiltration of Moravia and reduction of the
Czech nationality to a residual Bohemia.
“This solution is considered as unsatisfactory, because the
Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue
“B. Many arguments can be brought up against the most
radical solution, namely, the deportation of all Czechs.
Therefore the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it
can not be carried out within a reasonable space of time.
“C. Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e. absorption of about half
of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of
importance by being valuable from a racial or other stand-
point. This will take place among other things, also by in-
creasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich ter-
ritory, with the exception of the Sudeten German border dis-
trict; in other words, by dispersing the closed Czech nation-
ality. The other half of the Czech nationality must be de-
prived of its power, eliminated and shipped out of the coun-
try by all sorts of methods. This applies particularly to the
racially mongoloid part, and to the major part of the intel-
lectual class. The latter can scarcely be converted ideologi-
cally, and would represent a burden by constantly making
claims for leadership over the other Czech classes, and thus
interfering with a rapid assimilation.
"Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are
to be handled roughly and should be eliminated.
"The above development naturally presupposes an increased
influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protec-
"After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen Solution C (as-
similation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech prob-
lem, and decided that while keeping up the autonomy of the
Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to
be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich
Protector for years to come. From the above no particular
conclusions are drawn by the Armed Forces. This is the di-
rection which has always been represented from here.
"In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was
sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces, dated 12 July 1939, entitled "The Czech Problem'."
(862-PS) That view of the Reich Protector was accepted and formed a basis of his policy. The result was a program of consolidating German control over Bohemia and Moravia by the systematic oppression of the Czechs through the abolishment of civil liberties, and the systematic undermining of the native political, economic, and cultural structure by a regime of terror. The only protection given by von Neurath was a protection to the perpetrators of innumerable crimes against the Czechs. (Proof of this aspect of von Neurath's responsibility was left for development by the Soviet prosecuting staff.)
Von Neurath received many honors and rewards as his worth. It even appears that Hitler showered more honors on von Neurath than on some of the leading Nazis who had been with the Party since the very beginning. His appointments as President of the newly created Secret Cabinet Council in 1938 was in itself a new and singular distinction. On 22 September 1940 Hitler awarded him the War Merit Cross, First Class, as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. He was also awarded the Golden Badge of the Party, and was promoted by Hitler personally from the rank of Gruppenfuehrer to Obergruppenfuehrer in the SS, on 21 June 1943. Von Neurath and Ribbentrop were the only two Ger
mans to be awarded the Adlerorden, a distinction normally reserved for foreigners. Von Neurath's seventieth birthday, 2 February 1943, was made the occasion for most of the German newspapers to praise his many years of service to the Nazi regime. This service, in the view of the prosecution, may be summed up in two ways:
(1) He was an internal fifth columnist among Conservative political circles in Germany. They had been anti-Nazi but were converted in part by seeing one of themselves, in the person of von Neurath, wholeheartedly with the Nazis.
(2) His previous reputation as a diplomat made public opinion abroad slow to believe that he would be a member of a cabinet which did not stand by its words and assurances. It was most important for Hitler that his own readiness to break every treaty or commitment should be concealed as long as possible, and for this purpose he found in von Neurath his handiest tool.
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH
tion of the document. The USA
series number, given in paren-
theses following the description of
the document, is the official exhibit
number assigned by the court.
Notes on a conference with Hitler
in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin,
5 November 1937, signed by Hit-
ler's adjutant, Hossbach, and
dated 10 November 1937. (USA
File of papers on Case Green (the
plan for the attack on Czechoslo-
vakia), kept by Schmundt, Hitler's
adjutant, April-October 1938.
Speech of the Fuehrer at a confer-
ence, 23 November 1939, to which
all Supreme Commanders were
ordered. (USA 23).
Letter from Rainer to Seyss-
Inquart, 22 August 1939 and re-
port from Gauleiter Rainer to
Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on events in
the NSDAP of Austria from 1933
to 11 March 1938. (USA 61)....
Memorandum by General Frider-
ici, Plenipotentiary of the Wehr-
macht to the Reich Protector of
Bohemia and Moravia, initialled
by Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont,
15 October 1940, concerning plan
to Germanize Czechoslovakia.
Treaty of Protection between Slo-
vakia and the Reich, signed in
Vienna 18 March and in Berlin
23 March 1939. 1939 Reichsge-
setzblatt, Part I, p. 606. (GB 135). IV
Law of 16 March 1935 reintroduc-
ing universal military conscription.
1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
p. 369. (Referred to but not offered
The Program of the NSDAP. Na-
tional Socialistic Yearbook, 1941,
p. 153. (USA 255, USA 324) IV
Affidavit of George S. Messer-
smith, 28 August 1945. (USA 57). IV
Extracts from Organizational Law
of the Greater German Reich by
Ernst Rudolf Huber. (GB 246)... IV
Excerpts from diary kept by Gen-
eral Jodl, January 1937 to August
1939. (USA 72).
Decree establishing a Secret Cabi-
net Council, 4 February 1938.
1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
p. 112. (GB 217)....
Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich
Chancellor concerning the Pro-
tectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
16 March 1939......
Top secret letter from Ministry
for Economy and Labor, Saxony,
to Reich Protector in Bohemia and
Moravia, enclosing copy of 1938
Secret Defense Law of 4 Septem-
ber 1938. (USA 36).
Report of von Papen to Hitler,
1 September 1936, concerning
Danube situation. (USA 67)...... IV
Letter from von Papen to Hitler,
17 May 1935, concerning intention