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on two specific problems: the capture, in undamaged condition, of bridges over the Vistula; and the possible adverse effect of Navy mining in Danzig Bay on the element of surprise in the Army's attack against the bridge at Dirschau, southeast of Danzig. (C-120)

On 22 August 1939, Hitler called together at Obersalzberg the Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the lower ranking Commanding Generals (Oberbefehlshaber), and announced his decision to attack Poland near dawn on 26 August. Keitel was at this meeting. (L-3; 798-PS; 1014PS)

Three documents reporting this meeting have been uncovered: the text of one, L-3, overlaps the contents of the other two, 798-PS and 1014-PS; the latter two appear to be complementary, 798-PS being a record of a morning speech, and 1014-PS of an afternoon speech. Violent and abusive lanuguage appears in both L-3 and 798-PS. That Hitler made, at a minimum, the following points, appears from all of them:

1. The decision to attack Poland was made last spring. (L-3; 798-PS)

2. The aim of the war in Poland is to destroy the Polish armed forces, rather than to reach a fixed line. (L-3; 1014-PS)

3. The attack will start early Saturday morning, 26 August (L-3; 1014-PS)

4. A spurious cause for starting the war will be devised by German propaganda. It is a matter of indifference whether it is plausible or not. The world will not question the victor (L-3; 1014-PS). The text in L-3 further describes the pretext to be used to start the war: "I'll let a couple of companies, dressed in Polish uniforms, make an assault in Upper Silesia or in the Protectorate.”

A handwritten entry in the diary of Jodl, at that time Chief of the Operations Department of the OKW, confirms that the time for the attack on Poland had been fixed for 0430 on 26 August 1939. (1780-PS)

(4) Aggression against Norway and Denmark. On or about 12 September 1939 Hitler ordered the OKW to start preparations for the occupation of Norwegian bases early in 1940. (1546-PS)

The possibility of using Quisling was discussed with Hitler on 12 December 1939, in a conference at which Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl were present. Hitler agreed with Raeder's suggestion that, if he was favorably impressed with Quisling, the OKW should


(C-174; 1809-PS).

d con be authorized to prepare for the occupation either with Quisefte ling's assistance, or by force. (C-64)

barges for the invasion, and further preparations were to be conen directive for the invasion was issued by Hitler on 1 March 1940.

conduct of the war in the West that the invasion should be started soon, in order to protect the Ruhr and to provide air bases for use against England. A copy of this directive was distributed to

In October and November of 1939 a number of military orders was issued concerning the invasion of the Low Countries"Fall Gelb”. Questions of how far the troops should advance under the plan were clarified (C-62; 440-PS). Instructions were issued concerning the deployment of troops, communications systems, crossing of the borders, and the administration and pacification of the countries to be taken (2329-PS). Provisions were made for special operations by the 7th Flieger Division near the Belgian-French border. (C-10)

Between 7 November 1939 and 9 May 1940 seventeen orders were issued setting and postponing the day for starting operorders, dated 11 January 1940, shows that all the others were concerned with the action against the Low Countries, and that the 7th Flieger Division (see C-10) was involved. All these orders were signed either by Keitel or Jodl. (C-72)

The development of the plans, and the various questions which came up for consideration are shown in the entries in Jodl's pared justification for the attack as satisfactory, but Jodl thought against the Low Countries and the steps taken to put it into

In January of 1940 the Navy was ordered to concentrate ducted under the code name "Weserubung(C-63). The general

(5) Aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. At a conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939 it was determined that the occupation of the Low Countries was necessary to the successful conduct of the war against England. A small planning staff was formed at OKW with responsibility for further planning of the invasion, and complete secrecy was invoked. Keitel was at this meeting. (L-79) On 9 October 1939 it was stated in a general directive for the

One of the one point the Foreign Office did not regard the pre

His diary shows the existence of the plan

OKW. (L-52)

diary. At

it was sufficient.



(6) Aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia. On 12 November 1940 Hitler issued orders to the Army to prepare for the occupation of the Greek mainland (444-PS). On 13 December 1940 a Hitler order stated that the invasion of Greece was planned and would start as soon as the weather became favorable. The composition of combat teams and their routes of march were given. When the Greek operation was concluded, the mass of the troops involved were to be employed for a new task. This order was distributed to the OKW, as well as to the three armed services. (1541-PS)

On 11 January 1941 Hitler ordered preparation for armed intervention in Albania, to assist the Italians against Greece. The order was initialled by Keitel and Jodl (448-PS). On 20 January 1941 Jodl reported, in notes of a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, that Hitler stated that one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in Rumania was for use in his plan for the operation against Greece. This was four months prior to the attack. (C-134)

On 19 February 1941 an OKW order signed by Warlimont gave decisions for carrying out the Greek campaign, providing that pontoon building would commence on 26 February, and that the Danube would be crossed on 2 March. (C-59)

On 18 March 1941 Raeder, in the presence of Keitel and Jodi, asked for confirmation that the whole of Greece would have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement, and Hitler replied that complete occupation was a prerequisite to any settlement. (C-167)

At a meeting on 27 March 1941, attended by both Keitel and Jodl, Hitler outlined the proposed operations against Yugoslavia and Greece. The actual plan for military operations, Directive No. 25, was issued on the same day. (1746-PS)

(7) Aggression against the U.S.S.R. On 12 November 1940 Hitler issued a directive in which, among other things, it was stated that preparations for the East already verbally ordered should be continued, regardless of the outcome of current political discussions for the clarification of Russia's attitude. The directive was initialled by Jodl. (444-PS)

The original directive for preparation of the attack on Russia -case “Barbarossa"—was signed by Hitler on 18 December 1940 and initialled by Keitel and Jodi (446-PS). On 3 February 1941 Hitler held a meeting to discuss the intended invasion. Keitel and Jodl were both present (872-PS). On 1 March 1941 an OKW map was prepared to show the intended division of occupied

be delivered to the SD; and the Foreign Office was to be kept

are i Des

The letter was initialled by Jodl. (874-PS) ducted by one of Keitel's subordinates, General Thomas, Chief of the Wirtschaft Ruestungsamt in OKW. (2353PS)

By a Fuehrer order dated 20 April 1941 Rosenberg was appointed “Deputy for a Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern Territories". Jodl and Warlimont were apto the time of the invasion mentions Keitel and Jodl as having consulted and worked with him in those preparations. (1039-PS)

A memorandum written by General Thomas on 20 June 1941 states that Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler's policy on raw taining raw materials, than it did to make synthetic substitutes. against Military Personnel-Lynching of Allied Airmen. On 21 May 1944 Keitel received a note from WFST to the effect that Aitler had decided that enemy fliers who had been forced down

acts of terror". Keitel wrote on the note “Please arrange for order to be drafted. K”. (731-PS)

By 4 June 1944 Jodl and Warlimont were ready to go ahead tions of enemy fliers should be punishable by death; the Airmen's with formulating the plans. Reception Camp at Oberursel was to be told which fliers should

Russian territory. The distribution list shows that Keitel and
Jodl received copies. (1642-PS)

In March of 1941 Keitel wrote to Reich Minister Todt to give him detailed instructions about camouflaging the coming invasion.

On 13 March 1941 Keitel issued an operational supplement to Hitler's Barbarossa order (446-PS). This order defined the area of operations and established the relationship between political and military officers in those areas (447-PS). On 1 June 1941 there was issued, with Hitler's approval, a timetable for the invasion, showing the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This paper was signed by Keitel (C-39).' On 14 June 1941 an order was issued for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin by Army, Navy, and Air Commanders. (C-78)

While the foregoing preparations were being made, planning for the production of armaments and supplies was being con

Keitel's representatives with the Rosenberg office

A preliminary report by Rosenberg on his work up that it took less manpower to seize territories con

Crimes and Crimes against Humanity;—Crimes Shot without court-martial, if they had engaged in

Goering was to be asked what ac

pointed (865-PS).



(8) War

should be

advised. (737-PS)

At subsequent conferences Keitel and Jodl raised questions about the difficulty of establishing general rules in such a matter. The “Acts of Terror” were:

1. Low level attacks on civilians.
2. Shooting German fliers in parachutes.
3. Attacks on civilian passenger planes.

4. Attacks on Red Cross hospitals or trains. (735-PS) On 17 June 1944 Keitel wrote to the Foreign Office to ask their approval of the proposed measure and the agreed definition of “Acts of Terror” (730-PS). On the same day Keitel wrote to Goering to ask for his approval of the definitions of Acts of Terror", and also to ask that he give verbal instructions to the Commandant of the camp at Oberursel to hand over fliers guilty of such acts to the SD. Both Keitel and Jodl initialled this letter (729-PS). Goering replied that fliers not guilty of acts of terror must be protected, and suggested that such matters be handled by the courts. (732-PS)

A draft of a Foreign Office letter dated 20 June 1944 expresses misgivings about the Geneva Convention, and concern about the publicity that would be involved. (728-PS)

On 26 June 1944 Goering's adjutant telephoned the WFST to say that Goering agreed to the procedures suggested. (733-PS)

On 29 June Warlimont was informed that Ribbentrop had approved the Foreign Office draft (728-PS), but wished to obtain Hitler's approval before communicating his own final written approval to Keitel. (740-PS)



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