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the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was
below the water line, for shelter. The ship was listing more
and more to port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over
and sank, and the only four men left alive on board were
thrown into the sea. I do not know where the other three
men had taken cover during this time, as I did not hear or
see them until they were in the water.
“I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our
lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble
on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge,
but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only 60
to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst
from the machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious,
I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine
ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on
to the bottom of the boat. The submarine had been firing

her guns for a full hour.(D-645) The affidavit goes on to describe the attempts of the Second Engineer and others to rescue themselves and to help each other; they were later picked up by another trawler. The affidavit continues :

“Whilst on board the 'Lady Madeleine' the Second Engineer
and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the
Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of
steel wire 212 inches long embedded in his body.
I had 14 shrapnel wounds."


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“This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the
whalers Sylvester (mined) and 'New Seville' (torpedoed),
and the Trawler 'Ocean Tide', which ran ashore.
“As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were

six killed, two missing, two injured.” (D-645). The next case is that of the ship Antonico, which was torpedoed, set afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the coast of French Guiana. The date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the order (D-630). A statement given by the Second Officer describes the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire (D-647):

* That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the 'Antonico' as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the 'Antonico' in order to avoid being dragged down by the same 'Antonico' and also because

she was the aggressor's target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the 'Antonico' lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned the defenseless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in

distance from the submarine.(D-647) The U-boat's log in that case is not available, but it may be surmised, in view of the order that nothing compromising should be included in entries in logs, that it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.

A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland, (D-646-A) in English, on 11 March 1943, stated:

“Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters-dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed

for Britain and America." (D-646-A) This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to seek to terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of steamers.

After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he presumably also succeeded to the equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich, which Raeder had held (2098-PS).

An official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty


sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those present, on the occasion of meetings between Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end (D-648). The certificate states:

I have compiled from them [captured documents) the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession of the British Admiralty, Lon

don.” Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of the numerous meetings listed. Among those who were also constantly present were Speer, Keitel, Jodi, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is clear that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all major decisions of policy.

(3) The Order to Kill Commandos. An internal memorandum of the Naval War Staff, written by the division dealing with International Law to another division, discusses the order of 18 October 1942, with regard to the shooting of Commandos (C-178).

Doubt appears to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the understanding of this order. Accordingly, in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested:

As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of commando units."

(C-178) Whether that conference took place or not is not known. The document is dated some 11 days after Doenitz had taken over command from Raeder.

But in July 1943, the Navy handed over to the SD Norwegian and British Navy personnel, whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order, for shooting. An affidavit by a British Barrister-at-Law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order states (D-649):

“The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July

1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of

[there follow the names of six personnel of the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one telegraphist of the British Navy, prisoners of war.].

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"There was evidence before the Court, which was not challenged by the Defense, that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo Boat. "The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture. "On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus, where they had arrived by 11 p.m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Leut. H. P. W. W. Fanger, a Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the west coast. Leut. Fanger reported to the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west coast. “The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD, Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer order of the 18th October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order

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dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded
from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not
to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured were to
be handed over to the SD. Admiral von Schrader told Blom-
berg that the crew of this Torpedo Boat were to be handed
over in accordance with the Fuehrer order, to the SD.”

The affidavit goes on to describe the interrogation by officials
of the SD. These officials took the same view as the Naval Intel-
ligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as pris-
oners of war. Nevertheless, the crew were taken out and shot by
an execution squad composed of members of the SD. The affidavit
concludes as follows:

"It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945,
an order from the Fuehrer Headquarters, signed by Keitel,
was transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The
substance of the order was that members of the crew of com-
mando raids who fell into German captivity were from that
date to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. This order
referred specifically to the Fuehrer order referred to above."

The date mentioned is important; it was time "in March or April,
1945," for these men to put their affairs in order.

(4) Reasons for Not Renouncing the Geneva Convention. The minutes of conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945 between Doenitz and Hitler read as follows:

“The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should
renounce the Geneva Convention

[the 1929 Pris-
oners of War Convention).

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“The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
to consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his

opinion as soon as possible." (C-158)
Doenitz then stated his opinion in the presence of Jodl and a rep-
resentative of Ribbentrop:

On the contrary, the disadvantages [of renounc-
ing the convention] outweigh the advantages. It would be
better to carry out the measures considered necessary with-
out warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer

world.” (C-158)
An extract from the minutes of another meeting between
Doenitz and Hitler, on 1 July 1944,—the extract is signed by

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