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for the Navy in the Russian campaign. The first naval operational plan against Russia was characteristically Nazi. The entry for 15 June 1941 in the notes of the German Naval War Staff reads:

"On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations, use of arms against Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland warning area is permitted immediately; ruth

less destruction is to be aimed at." (C-170) Keitel provides a typically fraudulent pretext for this action in his letter dated 15 June 1941 (C-38):

"Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the
Baltic Sea.
“High Command of the Navy-OKM (SKL)
“Offensive action against submarine south of the line Memel-
southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats cannot be
definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by Ger-
man naval forces.
“The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces
believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines."

(C-38). This order was given on 15 June 1941, although the Nazi attack on Russia did not take place until 22 June 1941.

(7) Instigation of Japanese aggression. In the meantime, Raeder was urging Hitler, as early as 18 March 1941, to enlarge the scope of the world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore. Raeder's views at his audience with Hitler on 18 March were as follows:

"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as pos-
sible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable
(whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A.
for war against Japan; inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis
the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for
this action, but according to all declarations made by
Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany pro-
ceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concen-
trate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately.
If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions re-
garding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam,
Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as
possible." (C-152)

By 20 April 1941 Hitler had agreed with Raeder's proposition to induce the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. The entry in the notes of the German Naval War Staff, for 20 April 1941, reads :

"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme Commander asks about result of Matsuoka's visit, and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact. Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka, ‘that Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.' Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany, and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladisvostok, and to cause her to

attack Singapore.” (C-170). The real purpose of Hitler's words to Matsuoka is revealed in another description of their conversation:

At that time the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing. The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure

and to ensure surprise.(C-66) The Axis partners were not even honest with each other. This is typical of the jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.

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(1) Instigation of the Navy to Violate the Rules of Warfare. Raeder throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international rule or usage of war which conflicted with his intention of carrying through the Nazi program of conquest. Raeder has himself summarized his attitude in a long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German Naval War Staff and dated 15 October 1939, only a few weeks after the war started (UK-65). The memorandum, which concerns the intensification of the war at sea, reads in part as follows:

"I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against
Great Britain.
“Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military
means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military
success can be most confidently expected if we attack British
sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with
the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to

cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should
try to consider the requirements. It is desirable to base all
military measures taken on existing International Law;
however measures which are considered necessary from a
military point of view, provided a decisive success can be
expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they
are not covered by existing International Law. In prin-
ciple therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in
breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal con-
ception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of
naval warfare.
“The supreme War Council will have to decide what meas-
ures of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it
has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most
ruthless form, in fulfilment of military requirements, this
decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances and
under no circumstances may such a decision for the most
ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made,
be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral
powers; that is what happened in the World War to our
own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be
turned down. Even threats of further countries, including
the U.S. coming into the war, which can be expected with
certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to
a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked
upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the
earlier will it show results and the sooner will the war come
to an end. The economic effect of such military measures
on our own war economy must be fully recognized and com-
pensated through immediate re-orientation of German war
economy and the re-drafting of the respective agreements
with neutral states; for this, strong political and economic

pressure must be employed if necessary.” (UK-65) Those comments of Raeder are revealing and show that as an active member of the inner councils of the Nazi state up to 1943, Raeder must share responsibility for the many war crimes committed by his confederates and underlings in the course of their wars.

(2) The Navy's Crimes at Sea. Apart from this over-all responsibility of Raeder, certain war crimes were essentially initiated or ordered through the naval chain of command by Raeder himself.

(a) Attacks on neutral shipping. The minutes of a meeting

between Hitler and Raeder on 30 December 1939 read in part as follows:

"The Chief of Naval War Staff requests that full power be given to the Naval War Staff in making any intensification suited to the situation and to the means of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally agrees to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can be upheld, e.g., the Bristol

Channel." (C-27) At this time Greek ships also were neutral. This is another demonstration that Raeder was a man without principle.

This incitement to crime was a typical group effort, since a directive effectuating those naval views was issued on 30 December 1939 by the OKW, and signed by Jodl (C-12). This directive reads:

“On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of
Ob.d.M., the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces decided that:
(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England de-
clared by U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as
enemy vessels.
“(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attacked
without warning—where the impression of a mining inci-
dent can be created.
“Both measures are authorized to come into effect imme-

diately." (C-12)
A pencilled note at the foot of this directive reads:

"Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being seen. The denial of the sinking of these steamships in case the

expected protests are made must be possible.” (C-12) Another example of the callous attitude of Raeder's Navy towards neutral shipping is found in an entry in Jodl's diary for 16 June 1942 (1807-PS). This extract reads as follows:

“The operational staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defense measures are still incomplete; (b) because there is the possibility of achieving surprise; and (c) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting

Germany at sea.(1807-PS). This was a plan for a kind of Brazilian "Pearl Harbor," although war did not in fact break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22 August 1942.

Raeder also caused the Navy to participate in war crimes ordered by other conspirators. A single example will suffice.

(b) The order to shoot commandos. On 28 October 1942 the head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff promulgated to naval commands Hitler's order of 18 October 1942 requiring the shooting of commandos. The effect of this order was to deny the protection of the Geneva Convention to captured commandos. The document dated 28 October 1942 reads:

“Enclosed please find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation
of terror and sabotage units.
"This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla
leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.
"After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above
authorities must hand this order over to the next highest
section which is responsible for its confiscation and destruc-

tion.” (C-179). It will be difficult to conceive of clearer evidence than this, that Raeder appreciated the wrongfulness of Hitler's commando order.

One example will show that this order was executed by the German Navy during the period when Raeder was its Commander.

A certain commando operation of December 1942 had as its objective an attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbor. The Wehrmacht account of this incident states that six of the ten participants in that commando raid were arrested, and that all were shot on 23 March 1943 (UK-57). On this particular occasion the Navy under Raeder had implemented Hitler's order much more expeditiously. This fact appears in extracts from the war diary of Admiral Bachmann, who was the German Flag Officer in charge of Western France (C-176). The entry for 10 December 1942 reads:

"About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the Officer-in-charge of the Security Service in Paris, SS Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt to Flag Officer-in-charge's Flag Lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as interrogation had not been concluded. After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff the Security Service had been directed to get approval direct from Headquarters. "1820. Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security Service authorities at Fuehrer's headquarters to postpone the shooting for three days. Interrogations continued for the

time being." (C-176) The entry for the next day, 11 December 1942, reads:

"Shooting of the two prisoners was carried out by a unit

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