THE SUBCOMMITTEE ADJOURNS Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, gentlemen, this has been most enlightening, and at the same time most frightening, testimony we have received. I want to, on behalf of the subcommittee, thank you for your statements, your testimony, and the direct answers you have given to our questions. Thank you very much, gentlemen. The subcommittee will meet next at 10 a.m. on December 9 in this room, when the witnesses will be Representative Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin and representatives of several organizations, including the Women Strike for Peace, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The subcommittee stands adjourned until December 9. (Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, December 9, 1969.) CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1969 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will please come to order. This morning the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, continues its hearings on international aspects of the U.S. chemical and biological warfare policies. Our first witness this morning will be my friend and colleague from Wisconsin, the Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier. Bob Kastenmeier has been widely recognized for his studies and statements on chemical-biological warfare. He was the first Member of Congress to take up the issue, over 10 years ago; is that right, Bob? Mr. KASTENMEIER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ZABLOCKI. That was in the late 1950's, when there was little interest in the country on such questions as the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or U.S. policies on the use of certain kinds of gases. Today, when there is nationwide concern about U.S. policies on CBW and when the President has taken significant actions toward the control of CBW weapons, Congressman Kastenmeier deserves a significant share of the credit. Bob, the subcommittee is pleased to hear your testimony on CBW, a subject in which you have so long been interested. You may begin. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN Mr. KASTEN MEIER. Thank you for the most gracious welcome. This is my first opportunity to appear before you in the years I have been in Congress, notwithstanding the fact you have been a very close (135) friend and my senior colleague from my own State, and I am most pleased to come here today and to state that I am also pleased to read the text of your resolution, House Resolution 733, recently introduced on the subject for the House of Representatives. Mr. Chairman, as you are well aware, there has been a most significant and welcome development directly affecting the legislative proposal under consideration since these hearings got underway. The President's announcement November 25 on our future chemical and biological warfare policy has uniformly been well received throughout the Nation and the world. I think this is an important step on the road to disarmament, and its timing at the commencement of the SALT talks is particularly appropriate. Our total renunciation of the use of biological warfare is a practical demonstration of a reversal in the trend toward harnessing our technological skills for more efficient means of destroying ourselves. I fully agree with the President's statement that "these steps should go a long way toward outlawing weapons whose use has been repugnant to the conscience of mankind. *** Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction. By the examples that we set today, we hope to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and understanding between all nations." I think that the Congress through the efforts and interest of individual members should share some of the credit for bringing about this important step in the pursuit of a safe and saner world. However, one very basic problem which the Senate will have to decide during its debate on ratification of the Geneva Protocol has been spotlighted by the administration's interpretation that it does not prohibit the use in war of tear gases and herbicides. I think it would be useful to the committee if I were to review some of the background to the President's statement on the use of chemical and biological weapons in order to show how far we have come in recent years, and also how much further we still have to go. FEARED WIDER CBW ROLE IN 1959 In September of 1959, after vainly seeking official reassurances with regard to our CBW policies, I introduced House Concurrent Resolution 433, a very short resolution, stating "that the Congress hereby reaffirms the long-standing policy of the United States that in the event of war the United States shall under no circumstances resort to the use of biological weapons or the use of poisonous or noxious gases unless they are first used by our enemies." That is the text of Resolution 433 in the year 1959. At that time. I was motivated by the fear that our military was seeking a wider future role for CBW weapons along with a change in our traditional policy of non-first-use. Through magazine articles, and other published reports, this became quite apparent 10 years ago. This apprehension was unfortunately realized in subsequent years by the extensive development and production of offensive chemical and biological agents, and by the widespread use of potent herbicides and very powerful tear and lung gases in Vietnam. Back in 1959 and 1960, the American public, the media, and the Congress were much less aware than today of our Nation's CBW plans, capabilities, and expenditures. Congressional hearings at that time, in the House Committee on Astronautics and Science, provided the first bare clues in this obscure area. My own resolution was assigned to the Foreign Affairs Committee, but no action was taken on it. However, during the interval, Presidential support of a kind for an official non-first-use policy was enunciated fortuitously at an Eisenhower press conference. On January 13, 1960, a reporter representing a Madison, Wis., newspaper brought up the subject citing my apprehension that the military was seeking the removal of restrictions on the initiation of CBW, and asked the President if this were true. The President replied: "I will say this: No such official suggestion has been made to me, and so far as my own instinct is concerned is to not start such a thing as that first." With the benefit of hindsight and the opportunity I have had these past 10 years to wince at the independent spirit of our armed services, it appears obvious that nothing less than a very specific order, in triplicate, would have sufficed to dampen the ardor of the Army in pursuing a freer hand in using offensive chemical and biological agents. An indication of this dedication actually misfired as public concern in this country largely has grown out of disclosures as to the extent and lethality of some of the agents stockpiled in such abundance, and I might add, unconcern for the public for whose defense these were manufactured. At the time of the President's brief statement, however, I welcomed even this informal reassurance that we were still following our traditional policy of self-restraint, and I did not consider a further restatement of policy as being a practical possibility, which had earlier been enunciated by President Roosevelt during World War II, at the time when we were in a war for national survival. Parenthetically, I might add, that while the possibility of using chemicals against the Japanese crops was discussed, it was decided that we would not do so because it was contrary to the President's policy and earlier forms of herbicides were not then used. My experience with the disarmament aspects of CBW, however, did lead me into the wider field of arms control later that year, particularly into the establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concerning which the chairman played such a major role in 1961. PROTESTED USE OF GAS IN VIETNAM The subsequent events in Vietnam illustrated the error of not having an unequivocal high-level declaration of policy in this area of CBW. They also provide an example of how events shape policy as our military took advantage of the lack of clarity in policy to employ gas, thus breaking the precedents of nonuse in World War II and Korea. This stealthy introduction of chemical warfare into Vietnam represents a lowering of the international barriers against CBW, and to my mind, could also be considered another appropriate example of why war is too important to be left to the generals. In March 1965, I addressed the House after the first reports of the use of gas in Vietnam in the course of military operations became known. I noted Defense Department confirmation that we had supplied South Vietnamese forces with three types of tear gases, including DM, which induces nausea and vomiting and which incapacitates its victims up to 2 hours. It was also established at the time that the actual introduction of gas was au |