in warfare which would seem to be within the proscription of the Geneva Protocol. Mr. KASTENMEIER. And indeed, if I may say, I think goes beyond what heretofore has been our own policy. In 1944 or 1945, the Chiefs of Staff at that time considered its use against the Japanese rice crops and decided that the national policy proscribed its use and they did not use it against the rice crops of Japan. But we do find it is being used in this war. So there has been a new interpretation of our policy permitting its use. It has been a lowering of our standards. ROLE IN CREATION OF ACDA Mr. FRASER. Well, I hope that the Senate action on the protocol is undertaken in such a way that we will not have established a formal reservation of qualification to the ratification of the protocol. I might add that I know you are one of those who very early were pushing for the establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That is right; isn't it? That is before I came to Congress. Mr. KASTEN MEIER. Yes. In 1960, a number in the House and in the Senate had a prototype; a peace agency, or I think as then Senator John Kennedy proposed, had an Institute for Arms Control. And in 1961 this was again introduced and the chairman of this subcommittee and the chairman of the full committee of the Foreign Affairs Committee were instrumental, along with many others, in getting it passed in September of 1961. And the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created. But its seeds were a couple of years earlier than that. Mr. FRASER. I have been impressed with the importance of that Agency as we moved into the nuclear era. Of course we were in it at the time the Agency was created. The need for rationality in discussing strategic forces and the maintenance of some kind of reason in this field cannot be overstated. This leads me to have considerably more confidence in our Government, knowing that the Arms Control Agency is there; it provides a point of view which is separate from that of the Pentagon. I want to congratulate the gentleman on this statement. I think it is first rate. IMPLICATIONS OF DOD CORRESPONDENCE Mr. ZABLOCKI. I can ask another question on picloram: you presented in your testimony the correspondence from the Department of Defense. About the letter from Dr. Foster, you pointed out that you were not reassured by the vague promises contained in the response that there wasn't grave ecological risks involved, and that Dr. Foster's reassurance that some future assistance would be given to Vietnam to undo the damage did not satisfy you. In my opinion, that letter implied at least that picloram had been used in Vietnam and that there was some damage, not necessarily limited to areas other than rice paddies. Mr. KASTEN MEIER. I think that is true. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is my interpretation correct? Mr. KASTEN MEIER. Yes. The Defense Department uses it extensively. One, of course, has to appreciate the restraint in the language and read between the lines, but the language is: "To date we have found no reason to believe that serious or irreversible psychological or chemical harm has been done to South Vietnam or its people by the use of herbicides." The Departments of Defense and State have stated their intention to conduct extensive surveys and to assist in lumbering, agriculture, and other activities when combat conditions permit, which indicates that they recognize that some assistance will be required to undo the harm. Mr. ZABLOCKI. So there was damage. FUTURE USE OF CBW FACILITIES My final question is: Earlier, if you recall, the members of the committee will recall, there was a very unique suggestion for the future use of Fort Detrick and Pine Bluff. The suggestion was that these facilities be used for research and development but to have some defensive research on chemical and biological agents, but not under the military. Have you any suggestion or ways in which the biological warfare facilities at Fort Detrick and Pine Bluff might be beneficially used? Mr. KASTENMEIER. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not; although I do think that insofar as they are laboratories, they can be converted to study, particularly in the biological field, under the programs of the National Institutes of Health or the Public Health Service, the Surgeon General, against diseases and illnesses that are caused by bacteria and whether in a hostile fashion or otherwise. I think they could still be used for this purpose. HOW THE USE OF GAS BEGAN IN VIETNAM Mr. FULTON. You have made a statement that I was going to refer to on page 5 of your statement, Bob: "what was, as far as we know, originally a low-level military decision to first use gas in Vietnam is now accepted policy by our Government." Could you supply for the record when you think this became our U.S. Government policy; what actions back that up, when there is no direct statement at any particular point of time to this effect? With the chairman's permission, just supply it for the record. Mr. KASTENMEIER. May I submit for the record, an exchange of correspondence I had with the Secretary of the Army in 1965 relating to this, some of the background material we have? It was my understanding that at the time the use as such had not been cleared at the White House or the very highest levels, the State Department or Pentagon, but was considered at some point a low level and put into instructions to area commanders. And I was dismayed that the person responding to this in March 1965 was the Secretary of State, after the fact and supporting the area commanders. I thought it was really gratuitous for the Secretary of State, in a sense, to involve himself approvingly, and after the fact. This did give approval at a high level. And, as I say, I think thereafter established it as national policy, although I do have some correspondence, I think, touching on this point that I could make available. Mr. FULTON. With the chairman's permission could we have the staff member then help document this policy with the witness so that we have a point of time where we can see how this policy develops? I think it would be very good historically to have this reflected in the record. I believe the witness pointed out that the policy has been developing over a long period and how it developed I think is a very good example of how events make policy. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, I hope I can document this. This goes back a number of years. Mr. ZABLOCKI. It would be most helpful if your correspondence would shed some light on this particular situation. Apparently gas was approved at a low level for a limited use and then was escalated and used beyond the purpose agreed upon. There was, indeed, no formal Government policy accepted by tacit approval or by formal decree that it could be used for the purpose of flushing out and killing. Mr. FULTON. I would request our professional committee staff member from the point of view for the Government should likewise supply for the record how this policy was developed, because this is the same way Vietnam developed. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I might say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania_we will have a representative of the Army Chemical Corps here on December 16 in open session for a statement, and for classified questioning in closed session, so we can go into the matter in depth." Mr. FULTON. May I say, Mr. Chairman, I agree with the witness and with you that we must ban chemical-biological warfare; secondly, that when we are looking into a subject like this, I think it would be better in the context of what has happened to have information for the record rather than being in a tug of war, either in secret or open session, with the Chemical Warfare Division of the Army. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I agree with the gentleman and I intentionally didn't comment on his earlier philosophical discussion of war because my own personal view is that if we can only reinstate the constitutional provision that only Congress can declare war, we might have the answer. But let's not discuss that this morning. I want to again thank my colleague from Wisconsin for an excellent statement and a fine presentation and we are deeply grateful for taking so much of your time. I might also advise the gentleman that the Library of Congress is now doing a study for the subcommittee on this very matter. We will go into it in depth. Thank you, Bob. The subcommittee will next hear the remaining witnesses scheduled for today. We will hear from Dr. Judith S. Bellin, of New York, representing Women Strike for Peace. She will be followed by Mrs. Patricia A. Samuel, of Washington, D.C., who will present a statement on behalf of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; and Dr. E. James Lieberman, representing the Scientists' Committee on Chemical and Biological Warfare. 1 This material was provided in the testimony of Rear Adm. William Lemos, spokesman for the Department of Defense; see p. 224. LETTER BY THE HONORABLE CHARLES CONRAD I would also like to bring to your attention at this time a copy of a letter to President Nixon which the subcommittee has received from the speaker of the California Assembly, the Honorable Charles Conrad. Mr. Conrad was not able to appear personally today, but has asked that his letter be made part of the record and that it be distributed at this time. Copies may be found on the press table and, without objection, the letter will be placed in the record at this point. (The letter referred to follows:) ASSEMBLY, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, RICHARD M. NIXON, President of the United States, White House, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You may perhaps recall conversations in which I mentioned my interest and concern over our capabilities in the field of chemical and biological warfare. For nearly a decade I have tried to help initiate honest and balanced debate so that any decision would be based on fact rather than propaganda. Now, with your announcement of November 25, it would seem that the die has been cast. Those who oppose our involvement in Vietnam never cease talking of their "moral" compunction to demonstrate their beliefs. I feel the same necessity, as this debate ends, to at least place in the record my feeling that we have chartered a dangerous course, a mistake this nation may not live to regret. With these opening remarks may I respectfully submit the following points in answer to your pronouncement of November 25, 1969. 1. WE ARE SIGNING A TREATY THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO POLICE We should not ratify the Geneva Protocol or limit our capabilities in the field of chemical and biological warfare until the scientists advocating this policy can produce a specific method of inspection. In the past decade I have read literally scores of articles seeking to outlaw chemical and biological weapons. This includes such reports as the Pugwash Conference sponsored by Cyrus Eaton and attended by Linus Pauling and other scientists of his political persuasion. Not one of these articles has ever produced a workable method of inspection. Instead, we have been presented with such inane suggestions as the one mentioned by Congressman Richard D. McCarthy, recommending an "open inspection system," ," one in which "all biologists would report, by word of mouth, any suspected violations." Can any intelligent American actually believe a Soviet biologist, working for the Red Army, would attempt to sneak out of a closely guarded military base to report "by word of mouth" any Communist activity in this field? The simple truth is, inspection of chemical or biological agents is impossible. A beer factory or fertilizer plant could be converted to military use within hours. Chemicals used in every day commerce can be changed into lethal military agents almost overnight. Laboratories designed to produce vaccines to improve the health of a nation can covertly produce biological warfare agents. May I call to your attention the article in The Periscope Newsweek, December 1, 1969, entitled "Nerve Gas: Just Mix and Serve" which contained this statement "the Army hopes this development will enable it. . . to buy the components from commercial plants.” While this story contains some inaccuracies, it points out the fact that any nation can manufacture chemicals ostensibly for commercial purposes and transform them overnight into chemical weapons. In addition, chemical and biological weapons do not require military hardware, i.e., war planes, submarines, guided missiles, etc., to deliver them upon an enemy target. Thus the Soviet Union could propose complete disarmament together with inspection, and then at a later date utilize fishing vessels, commercial aircraft or saboteurs to attack us with chemical or biological agents. 2. GRAVE LEGAL QUESTIONS ARISE FROM YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE RATIFY THE GENEVA PROTOCOL, BUT WITH THE RESERVATION THAT THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO RIOT CONTROL CHEMICALS OR TO OUR DEFOLIATION PROGRAM I have not had the time to secure a legal opinion from the California Legislature's Legislative Counsel, but you, as an attorney at law, must recognize the problems that will arise. Suppose, for example, the Soviet Union proceeds to utilize incapacitators, explaining, that they have adopted this reservation. There are even those who would classify mustard as an incapacitator because, although it produced the greatest number of gas casualties in World War I, the mortality rate was only 2% and this could easily be reduced by manufacturing a diluted form of mustard. There is the additional question of what will happen if the United Nations refuses to accept this reservation? May I call to your attention the report of the Secretary General U-Thant titled "Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use," transmitted to the United Nations on 30 June 1969. On page xii of the Foreword Mr. U-Thant states: "2. To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harrassing agents) which now exist or which may be developed in the future;" Ratification may even hamper those in the field of law enforcement. Traditionally whenever tear gas is used to disperse a crowd, one of the agitators will claim "chemical warfare is being used in violation of the Geneva Protocol." Occasionally reference is made to the Nuremberg Trials. At best we will see a rash of lawsuits aimed at restricting the use of tear gas by law enforcement. 3. THE GENEVA PROTOCOL IS AN EXAMPLE OF HYPROCRISY AND CYNICISM UNWORTHY OF RATIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES World War I saw the development of a number of new weapons capable of inflicting great loss of life . . . the submarine, the airplane, the dirigible, the flamethrower and the tank, to mention but a few. The United States clearly demonstrated its willingness to support real disarmament then, as we did following World War II. But our allies were unwilling to deny themselves any of the aforementioned weapons of war. France, for example, destroyed the Washington Disarmament Conference by refusing to give up the submarine. Finally, with complete cynicism our allies voted to outlaw only chemical warfare because, at that time, Germany had the most advanced chemical industry. It is to the credit of the United States Senate of that day that they refused to sanction this hypocrisy and voted to return the measure to committee. In fact, for 70 years the United States has taken an intelligent and logical attitude toward chemical and biological warfare. At the Hague in 1899 a United States Naval Officer, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, said that it was illogical to say it was inhumane to asphyxiate a man with gas, but permissible to blow a hole in his ship casting hundreds of men into the sea to be choked to death by water. More pertinent to present conditions was the statement by General Amos Fries who told the Senate in 1925 "an outlaw nation would always use this weapon against us if it felt it could gain victory by so doing." That admonition is as true today as it was 44 years ago. 5. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE IS NOT QUALIFIED TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE FIELD OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE Just as I challenge any scientist to develop a system for inspection of chemical and biological warfare, so I challenge the ability of the medical profession to develop a "magic" antitoxin or toxins that would provide for protection against any biological weapon the Soviet Union might utilize. |