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INTRODUCTION

In November 1969 identical resolutions on chemical and biological warfare, sponsored or cosponsored by some 108 Members of Congress, were referred for consideration to the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. These resolutions called upon the President to (a) resubmit to the Senate for ratification the Geneva Protocol of 1925, (b) conduct an extensive intra-governmental review of CBW policies, and (c) reassert America's traditional "nofirst-use" policy on lethal chemical and biological agents.

Exactly 1 week after the subcommittee had opened hearings on the resolutions, the President in an historic statement on November 25 announced his intention to resubmit the protocol to the Senate. In addition, he unilaterally renounced all future use of biological weapons on the part of the United States and pledged to work for new agreements which would universally ban biological warfare.

Although the President's action had rendered the resolutions moot, the subcommittee continued its inquiry into international aspects of chemical and biological warfare. Its objectives were three: First, it sought to deepen congressional and public understanding of the considerations involved in Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Second, it attempted to shed additional light on other issues which had been raised both domestically and internationally on America's CBW policies, particularly the use of chemical agents such as tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam. Third, the subcommittee looked beyond the ratification of the protocol to the requirements for new international agreements to control the spread and use of chemical and, particularly, biological weapons.

In its efforts the subcommittee was fortunate to have the cooperation of a distinguished group of witnesses, including Members of Congress, private experts, representatives of interested organizations and spokesmen for the Departments of Defense and State, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Their testimony provides a significant body of information and opinion on chemical and biological warfare. In order to present as comprehensive a record as possible, an appendix of related documents also has been included.

This volume is being released now because of its timely relevance to the current national discussion of Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol and related CBW issues. Following further review of the information received during the hearing, the subcommittee intends, in the near future, to release a report of its analysis, findings, and recommendations.

JANUARY 29, 1970.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments.

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CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICIES AND

INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1969

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will please come to order.

The subcommittee today opens its hearings on U.S. policies regarding chemical-biological warfare. More specifically, we have under consideration a number of identical resolutions, sponsored or cosponsored by some 108 Members of Congress, calling on the President to resubmit to the Senate for ratification the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical-biological warfare.

(The text of the protocol follows:)

PROTOCOL PROHIBITING THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODs of Warfare, GENEVA, JUNE 17, 1925 The undersigned plenipotentiaries, in the name of their respective Govern

ments:

Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and

Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and

To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; Declare :

That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all signatory and acceding Powers, and will take effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic.

The present Protocol, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified as soon as possible. It shall bear to-day's date.

The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be addressed to the Government of the French Republic, which will at once notify the deposit of such ratification to each of the signatory and acceding Powers.

The instruments of ratification of and accession to the present Protocol will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic.

The present Protocol will come into force for each signatory Power as from the date of deposit of its ratification, and, from that moment, each Power will be bound as regards other Powers which have already deposited their ratification. In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol. Done at Geneva in a single copy, this seventeenth day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. These resolutions also call for complete review by the U.S. Government of its policies on chemical-biological weapons, and for reaffirmation of the no-first-use policy of our Nation.

Today we will hear testimony from Members of Congress who have a special interest in the very important subject of chemical-biological warfare. Our first witness is the Honorable Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota.

Congressman Fraser is a valued member of this subcommittee, who has contributed significantly to our work over the past 11 months. Mr. Fraser.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M, FRASER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation for the fact that you have scheduled these hearings. I think this is consistent with the initiative which you have shown as chairman of this subcommittee in moving into areas of vital national concern and areas which I think deserve the attention which you are giving them.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I thank my colleague for the observation. I want to also state that in no small measure your deep interest in calling to the attention of the chairman the necessity of going into these fields has contributed much to the activity of this subcommittee.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The hearings which we begin today were called because one-fourth of the House has requested the President to resubmit the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to the Senate for ratification. Undoubtedly, support for this resolution would increase dramatically were we to mount a campaign on its behalf. It is disturbing to me that successive administrations have let over 40 years lapse without requesting the advice and consent of the Senate to ratify this treaty, which we originated and signed in 1925.

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Until recently I had thought that our policy in this field was identical to the rule of the Geneva protocol: We would not be the first to use chemical or biological weapons in war. Over the past few years, however, it has become clear that policy with respect to the use of these weapons has changed. The United States initiated chemical warfare operations in Vietnam. It is reported that plans were made to use biological weapons against the Cuban people and that contingency plans exist for the first use of these weapons in many countries. Our research, stockpiles, and delivery capabilities have increased substantially during this decade.

Because the Pentagon has surrounded chemical and biological weapons with greater secrecy than it has imposed on nuclear weapons, Con

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