Mr. ZABLOCKI. At the moment, therefore, you do not see any stumbling block which is causing a delay in resubmitting the protocol?

Mr. PICKERING. As I pointed out earlier, I think this is a task which required a great deal of care and a great deal of consultation among government departments to judge just what the reservation might be and those types of things.

I have every hope that within the next day or two the papers will go forward to the White House for Presidential consideration.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In a day or two?

Mr. PICKERING. Yes. I have every hope this will take place and that things will move on. Certainly it has not been because of lack of interest on the part of the government departments, or of the White House in getting them.

ACDA PARTICIPATION IN CBW CONTROL DECISIONS

Mr. FURNAS. Mr. Chairman, I might say that the Arms Control Agency participates in every stage and level of this national security policymaking process that we have been describing here today from the meetings of the National Security Council itself down to the interdepartmental Political-Military Group which Mr. Pickering has described. We participated fully in this review which has just been completed and which the President's decision marks the beginning of the next step.

We also have bilateral relations and cooperation across the whole level and range of subjects with both the Department of State and the Department of Defense. We in no sense feel left out of this.

I am sure Ambassador Smith regards it his first responsibility to be constantly alert to opportunities to move ahead in the arms control field. We are all aware of the challenges as well as the difficulties. We are grateful when committees like yours and distinguished citizens like Congressman McCarthy take an interest in these subjects. We continue to look at these problems and we will be planning ahead.

I think it is safe to say that every staff meeting that Gerard Smith holds is a session where people try to see what can be done and should be done in this area.

We also have a rather extensive research program, looking ahead. due to the future; since 1964 we have spent on an average of $200,000 a year on chemical and biological verification problems and our programs for the next 2 fiscal years call for similar expenses.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The civilian element predominates in this particular area and on your committee?

Mr. PICKERING. I think that is true with respect to arms control, but the military has a role and they are not excluded either. It is a cooperative effort, Mr. Chairman.

THE "MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX"

Mr. ZABLOCKI. There is a repeated charge that this Government of ours is being run by an industrial-military complex; that we will soon, if we do not already, have a military totalitarian type of government. After hearing your testimony, one could conclude that this is not at all true.

Mr. PICKERING. There is a fine balance in the national security con

siderations between the military and the nonmilitary and that is reflected in the work of the interdepartmental group and I think it is reflected in all of our considerations of disarmament and arms control

measures.

Mr. FURNAS. The fact that the State Department chairs the committee Mr. Pickering has described, and we in other agencies are full participants, I think are safeguards against the kind of things you are talking about.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN INCAPACITATING AND RIOT-CONTROL AGENTS

Mr. FRASER. The distinction between incapacitating agents and riot control agents is a perfectly well-understood distinction?

Mr. PICKERING. I think it is a distinction which we understand. I think it is a distinction which is reflected in, again, the international reports on the subject. There are others who understand-I think contrary to our understanding again-that incapacitating agents include riot control agents and I would not want to be on record at this point in saying that there are no differences of opinion on this.

Mr. FRASER. At least for the purposes of our Government
Mr. PICKERING. For our purpose-

Mr. FRASER. It is well understood.

Mr. PICKERING. We will understand the distinction between the two. Mr. FRASER. You said a few minutes ago that the President's statement that the United States would follow a "no first use of incapacitating agents" policy was a very important policy statement to make. I thought the United States had always had that position, stated and restated by various Presidents throughout the years.

Mr. PICKERING. It is my impression-again subject to correctionthat this was clearing up again something that was not terribly clear at this point; that what was clear was the statement with respect to lethal agents, and the incapacitating agents were on the borderline and that the President's statement clarifies this to the extent that it required clarification and made it completely clear.

INCAPACITATING AGENTS WITHIN PROTOCOL

Mr. FRASER. Let me be certain about this: Incapacitating agents as we understand them would come within the protocol?

Mr. PICKERING. That is right.

A

Mr. FRASER. Are you saying it was uncertain as to whether or not we would observe the protocol although we had not ratified it?

Mr. PICKERING. Our feeling is that incapacitating agents would come under the prohibitions of the protocol. I think there were discussions prior to the President's statement, perhaps, that indicated there was an area of unclarity here.

Mr. FRASER. The unclarity which other nations would limit at best to riot control agents the United States, or some people in our Government, thought might extend even further to the category of incapacitating agents.

Mr. PICKERING. I think that is a fair statement.

Mr. FRASER. You were apparently prepared to take a rather broad view of the exclusions which some would find in the protocol. At least some people would.

BW PLANNED FOR CUBA INVASION?

Mr. FRASER. It has been said the United States was prepared to use biological agents with regard to the invasion of Cuba. Can you tell us whether or not that is true?

Mr. PICKERING. I just have no knowledge of that.

Mr. FRASER. Has anyone here any information on that question? (No response.)

Mr. PICKERING. I have seen the discussions of this subject in the press.

Mr. MCCARTHY. I would say the Senate Foreign Relations Committe is familiar with the incidents alluded to and there are people in the Government who know what the record is, present and past. I know the information is available in your records.

Mr. FRASER. The reason I ask this is that to a modest degree at least I have the impression that you are called upon, post facto, to defend whatever position has been developed in our military planning. That is, I don't feel that the limits are clearly established in the first instance by careful examination of our responsibilities in the international community. There is some looseness here which make it possible to first make military plans which only later are you called upon to defend.

Mr. PICKERING. I think that going back to the President's decision, if there was looseness before, this tends to pin it down. I think this is now national policy reflecting on the military and us alike.

INTRAGOVERNMENTAL DEBATE ON TOXINS

Mr. FRASER. Yes, but the pinning down seems not to be very tight because we have this ambiguity about toxins, for example.

I will have to tell you that having lived through this business of National Government and reading press accounts of it for 7 years, on the whole I find the press considerably more credible. I don't make disparagements of any individual, but I know how the bureaucracy is forced to react and respond. I find responsible newspapers on the whole tell what they honestly think they have discovered.

I believe there is a genuine argument going on about toxins. How this comes out with respect to the President's policy statement is in question.

Mr. PICKERING. At this point the subject has got to be explored in terms of the implementation of the President's statement. I don't think one can say the subject has developed to the point where there is a genuine recommendation.

Mr. FURNAS. I would add to that, if there is an issue here, and no one is clear yet that there is an issue here, it certainly has not been joined, as has been suggested by the news stories we have seen in the last 2 days. That is my honest opinion.

Mr. PICKERING. We have seen cases where they prematurely predict an area of dispute which does not at the time exist. In the course of implementation of what the President has to say, if I can use that word, such a dispute may or may not turn up, depending upon what happens in this process.

ROLE OF DOD IN CBW DECISION

Mr. FRASER. I hope that you people assert yourselves. I am very pleased with the decision of the President, and it is my understanding that this position generally was taken against the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't believe that that was wrong, and I believe that in this area the President made a very sound judgment.

Mr. PICKERING. Secretary Laird did play an extremely important role in the decisions that were taken and the policy decisions that resulted, and I think any statement disparaging the military in this regard should take full cognizance of the fact that he did take a role of leadership in the study.

Mr. FRASER. The military has a role to play and a responsibility. The civilian leadership enters into it with other larger considerations. I hope that whole operation gets coordinated.

Mr. PICKERING. I certainly concur. I definitely take the same attitude.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, gentlemen. Again, we appreciate your coming here and giving so much of your time.

Mr. Pickering, Mr. Furnas, we appreciate you and your associates being here this morning.

The subcommittee stands adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 a.m., when we hear the DOD.

(Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, December 19, 1969.)