CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS FRIDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1969 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:17 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will please come to order. Today marks the final scheduled session of hearings by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments into international aspects of chemical-biological warfare. Today we are pleased to have as our witness a representative of the Department of Defense. He is Rear Adm. William E. Lemos, the Director of Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. With Admiral Lemos today as backup witnesses are: Mr. Benjamin Forman, Assistant General Counsel, International Affairs, Department of Defense; Col. George W. Connell, Jr., Deputy Director, CBR and Nuclear Operations, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army; Albert E. Hayward, Assistant Director, Chemical Technology, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; and Lt. Col. David W. Einsel, Jr., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our ground rules today are that we will operate at least initially in open session. If questions from the subcommittee touch on classified matters, we will ask the witnesses to withhold their answers. As soon as all unclassified answers have been given, we will clear the room of all visitors and go into executive session. Admiral Lemos, if you will begin. STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM E. LEMOS, DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANS AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS, OFFICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS Admiral LEMOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and the members of the committee, this briefing is in response to your request for information on the use of riot control agents and herbicides in Vietnam. It is my understanding that testimony on the scope of the Geneva Protocol and the ramifications of arms control measures in the chemical warfare and biological research fields was given on Thursday by representatives of the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The United States has consistently maintained that the use of riotcontrol agents and herbicides is not prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. Further, as a White House official explained following the President's statement on November 25 this year, the term, "incapacitating chemicals," does not include riot-control agents or herbicides. We define Incapacitating agents-as those producing symptoms that persist for hours or days after exposure to the agents has ceased. Riot-control agents--as those which are widely used by governments for domestic law enforcement purposes, and which produce transient effects that disappear within minutes of removal from exposure. THE USE OF RIOT-CONTROL AGENTS IN VIETNAM The first part of my discussion will address the use of riot-control agents in South Vietnam. I will discuss why and how this material is being employed. First, why. Simply stated, riot control agents are used to save lives-American lives, lives of our allies, civilian lives, and enemy lives. Unfortunately, much that we hear discounts the fact that riot-control agents have saved many American and Vietnamese lives. My purpose is to set the record straight by citing specific examples. The riot-control agent being used in South Vietnam is CS (orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile). This agent, a modern tear gas, causes such fast reaction for those exposed to it that some have complained that it must be somehow more dangerous than the older and better known tear gas, CN. Actually CS is not a gas; it is a solid which is used as a finely divided particulate or dust cloud. The fact is that CS is less likely to cause harm to those exposed to it than the other agent that has been classed as a riot control agent, CN. Up to 1964, riot control agents were developed and packaged as hand grenades which disseminated CN and CS as a smoke cloud for use in civil disturbances. Riot-control munitions of this type were then and still are used by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States and many other countries for riot control purposes. In Vietnam, in addition to their riot-control function, these agents were initially conceived as being useful primarily to prevent casualties in the clearing of tunnels, caves, and underground shelters. In such cases their use leads to fewer casualties and lesser loss of life than would the combat alternatives of other weapons. These other alternatives include the use of HE (high explosive) and flame. A key factor in the selection of riot-control agents (RCA) over these other alternatives is the reduction in casualties to civilians, frequently hostages, who often are intermingled with hostile military elements as a result of Viet Cong tactics. The Department of Defense with the concurrence of the Department of State obtained Presidential approval in November 1965 for the use of CS and CN in Vietnam. COMUSMACV delegated to his subordinate commanders authority to use these agents in military operations against the enemy. These commanders were authorized to further delegate this authority to the extent deemed suitable for insuring both timely employment and proper control. COMUSMACV stated that "consistent with tactical requirements, hazard to noncombatants will be reduced as much as possible." Further, COMUSMACV directed that these materials not be employed by U.S. elements in situations involving civil demonstrations, riots, or similar disturbances of concern to the civil government until clearance has been obtained from him. This was not because these agents were thought to be ineffective, but because such action was conceived to be the province of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. As the effectiveness of these riot-control agents in reducing casualties became increasingly evident in such situations as suppression of hostile firepower and clearance of fortified positions and underground facilities, American commanders at all levels began to see other ways in which the use of the riot-control agents, particularly the new agent CS, could save many American and allied lives. As a result its applicability to other types of operations spread among U.S. units in Vietnam. Since they save lives, riot-control agents have been treated as normal components of combat power. They add to a commander's flexibility and give him additional means of devising the best method of accomplishing his mission with minimum loss of life. It is difficult to deny a commander the authority to use riot-control agents when it is considered to be one of the most effective means available for saving lives. EXAMPLES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF CS I would like now to cite some specific examples which demonstrate the effectiveness of CS and the flexibility it has given our commanders in different combat situations. I. ATTACK OF OCCUPIED POSITIONS Commanders have found CS to be highly effective against occupied positions. Such operations fall into several categories: assault against point targets; assault against area targets: clearing of bunkers, caves, and other structures; suppression of small arms fire around helicopter landing zones or downed aircraft; and reduction of enemy resistance to facilitate the taking of prisoners. In all of these situations, CS has proven effective in temporarily reducing the effectiveness of enemy-aimed fire, thereby reducing casualties and facilitating rescues. A favorite tactic of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army is to enter towns or villages and use the occupants as hostages. The normal employment of fire and maneuver against such an objective could result in numerous civilian casualties and considerable damage to their homes. The VC/NVA turn incidents such as this to propaganda use and tell the South Vietnamese people that the United States is there only to destroy them and their homes. MACV has directed that CS be considered for use in such situations in order to hold to an absolute minimum any danger of civilian casualties and property damage. For example, CS delivered by mortar has been used specifically to segregate the enemy located in portions of villages without creating unnecessary civilian casualties or damage to property in other parts of a village. One U.S. unit had been receiving heavy fire from a village. The division commander was reluctant to use high explosives in attacking the village as it would have caused unnecessary casualties and the village would have been destroyed. The enemy was located within a small area in the village. The decision was made to use CS while high explosive rounds were authorized only as a last resort and only on small targets. Four mortars delivered 80 rounds of CS on the village within 212 minutes. Ground troops then swept the area encountering only minor resistance. The village was taken without casualties or major damage. In another instance, our helicopters were receiving sporadic ground fire from a village in the An Lao Valley. Leaflets were dropped over the village telling the inhabitants to stop firing at aircraft. Fire continued from the village and additional leaflets were dropped telling the people that they should leave the village. CS was then dropped on the village and followed by a sweep with ground forces. Many VC were taken prisoner during the sweep without a shot being fired by either side. Another notable example occurred during the 1968 Tet offensive when CS was employed by the United States in support of Vietnamese Rangers heavily engaged against a large force of VC in a factory complex in the Cholon area of Saigon. The complex had been successfully defended against several separate assaults. Finally, in the early evening, CS was delivered by helicopter onto the target; the next morning a Ranger company penetrated the complex and found that the enemy had pulled out. In other cases, as occurred recently near Tay Ninh City, the enemy was so heavily entrenched that artillery and airpower could not dislodge him from his positions and his firing on friendly positions could not be stopped. In such cases, CS is effective in dislodging the enemy from his entrenchments. In one particular case, since the enemy did not cease firing on our forces, it was necessary to use both air and artillery firepower. Under other conditions, where the enemy ceases firing, the use of CS provides an open option to him to accept capture rather than the casualties caused by continued fighting. II. DEFENSE OF POSITION CS also has been used to save lives in a defensive role. For example, NVA units had initially overrun an outpost located between two hills on the approach to a U.S. battalion fire support base and then managed to occupy the first three bunkers encountered in the fire support base perimeter. Counterattack by the U.S. forces succeeded in driving the NVA from the bunkers. But the enemy then fell back to positions on the saddle and were protected from friendly fire by stumps and defilade. Attempts to dislodge the enemy with small arms and artillery failed. CS was used and the enemy became disoriented and confused, left their position, and ran. Six were captured immediately. The unit credited the CS with the successful defense of the base and for the capture of the six NVA. III. TUNNEL CLEARING Tunnel clearing is how the lifesaving use of CS by our forces in Vietnam began. You have probably read of the well-publicized Marine case, where 17 Vietcong, with some 400 noncombatants being held as hostages, were cleared from a tunnel complex by CS, with no one, I repeat no one, being killed or wounded on either side. All the VC were captured. Such results proved without doubt the role CS could play in both protecting American fighting men, and in reducing civilian casualties. In a similar instance, 43 armed Vietcong were captured with no friendly losses and only one enemy killed when he resisted. IV. BREAKING CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY Employment of CS is a very effective means for a small unit to use in reducing casualties while breaking contact with a superior force. A favorite NVA tactic is to ambush or otherwise engage a numerically inferior U.S. element. To counter this tactic small U.S. elements are instructed to deliver a heavy volume of fire and then attempt to break contact as quickly as possible. Often a small unit has difficulty in breaking the contact, and suffers severe casualties. The use of CS can help in breaking contact in such situations. In addition to disorganizing and confusing the enemy, the CS cloud also provides a partial smoke screen which can mask the withdrawal of the U.S. element. Numerous extractions by helicopter have been successfully completed without casualties using such techniques. Similar engagements without CS frequently have resulted in the loss or capture of the entire U.S. patrol. V. DEFENSE AGAINST AMBUSH CS may also be used in a counterambush role by vehicular convoys. Some units have fitted escort vehicles with sidemounted CS dispensers. These vehicles are then spaced at intervals throughout the convoy, and these dispensers are set to be activated on command if the convoy is ambushed allowing time for the convoy security elements to dismount and react before they are cut down by enemy fire. In very heavily jungled areas, reconnaissance by CS on suspected targets proves more effective than HE fires in assisting a friendly force to search a likely area. Trees provide effective shields for the enemy against fragments and whereas the HE frequently does not affect the enemy in dug-in positions, CS causes the enemy to move or at a minimum to cough, thus revealing his position and providing the advancing troops notice that they are approaching a possible ambush location. VI. RESCUING DOWNED AIRMEN One of the most dramatic uses of CS is that of assisting in the rescue of airmen who have been downed in enemy-controlled territory. Previously, tactical aircraft have tried to suppress enemy ground fire by strafing while the helicopter rescue operation was underway. This tactic was only partially successful and sometimes endangered our own forces in the area. Air rescue units can use CS to help in these operations. The CS is dropped, usually from helicopters, in the area |