psychosocial consequences associated with the problem of chemical and biological weapons. The rapid action of the lethal chemical agents. . . . would preclude any large reduction of mortality by specific treatment. Possible protection by gas masks or shelters requires a highly disciplined and prepared population, a condition that is not fulfilled in most countries today, and it would pose serious economic and psychosocial problems if such a defence programme were to be implemented. The outstanding characteristics of biological weapons for potential use in warfare are the following: (a) The large variety of biological agents and the possible combinations available for such purposes. (b) The possibilities for manipulating currently circulating strains of microorganisms for warfare purposes, by producing antigenically modified or antibioticresistant types (tularaemia, plague, anthrax, influenza) that would by-pass available prophylactic or therapeutic procedures.1 (c) The unpredictability of the direct effects. A biological attack intended to be highly lethal might prove relatively ineffective, whereas an attack intended to be merely incapacitating might kill an unexpectedly large proportion of the target population. Also, certain agents (anthrax, coccidioidomycosis) could persist for long periods in a resistant spore form, which could be spread over very large distances by wind carriage in the course of time. (d) The unpredictability of secondary effects such as the likelihood of contagion and the danger that epidemics might be initiated. There is the additional danger that epidemics might occur unintentionally through escape of virulent strains being purposely sought in laboratories. (e) Although biological agents themselves are easy to produce, complex production and delivery systems are needed if even minimal reliance is to be placed on the outcome of an attack, except perhaps where the intention is simply to produce social disruption by a limited sabotage effort (e.g., smallpox). Of the above characteristics, (a) and (b) would favour the attacker, whereas (c) and (d) would reduce the value of biological weapons from a military point of view. B. Quantitative estimates (Tables 8, 9 and 10, Annex 3) 1. Assessments have been made of the primary effects of possible small-scale airborne attacks on cities of 0.5–5 million population in industrially developed and developing countries. The postulated mode of attack consisted of one or a few bombers dispersing specific chemical or biological agents along a 2-km line perpendicular to the direction of the wind. On the basis of the particular assumptions employed, the following conclusions have been reached : (a) Of the known chemical warfare agents, only the nerve gases, and possibly botulinal toxin, have a casualty-producing potential comparable to that of biological agents. (b) Under atmospheric conditions favourable to the attacker, an efficiently executed attack on a city with 4 tons of sarin (requiring some 15-20 tons of weapons) could cause tens of thousands of deaths in an area of about 2 km2. Even in unfavourable conditions there could be thousands of deaths. If 4 tons of VX were used in such an attack, the casualties would not be appreciably greater in unfavourable meteorological conditions, but in favourable conditions this small attack would affect an area of about 6 km2 and could cause anywhere between 50,000 and 180,000 deaths. (c) If a suitably stabilized botulinal toxin or a fine aerosol of VX (particles of 5μ diameter) were developed and 4 tons were employed, several hundreds of thousands of deaths could result because of the greater coverage possible with such agents-12 km2 for botulinal toxin and 40 km' for monodispersed VX aerosol. A larger total weight of weapons, perhaps 2-3 times that needed for the agents in (b) above, would have to be used to deliver these forms of botulinal toxin and VX. (d) If a biological agent such as anthrax were used, an attack on a city by even a single bomber disseminating 50 kg of the dried agent in a suitable aerosol form would affect an area far in excess of 20 km2 with 1 Mass immunizations would be of doubtful protective value because of the multiplicity of agents and strains that might be employed, quite apart from the adverse immunological side-reactions to be expected. tens to hundreds of thousands of deaths. A similar attack with any one of a number of other more labile biological agents could affect from 1 km2 to more than 20 km2, depending upon the agent used, with tens to hundreds of thousands of casualties and many thousands of deaths. 2. Limited sabotage of a communal water supply with the typhoid fever bacillus, LSD, or a stable botulinal toxin, could cause considerable disruption and deaths in a large city . . . affecting tens of thousands of people. 3. Sabotage-induced or open attacks, causing the secondary spread of epidemics of yellow fever, pneumonic plague, smallpox or influenza, might under certain conditions ultimately result in many millions of illnesses and deaths. . . . 4. The numbers of potential casualties and deaths recorded in this report represent the possibilities arising out of a very small and limited attack already well within the capabilities of a number of nations, with the possibility that an ever-increasing number of countries will acquire similar capabilities. With technologically advanced weapons and a larger scale of attack, achievable without too much difficulty by militarily advanced powers, the magnitude of destructiveness attendant upon the use of chemical and biological weapons would be considerably increased. 9. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND ITS MEMBER STATES According to Art. 2(c) of WHO's Constitution, WHO shall "... furnish appropriate technical assistance and, in emergencies, necessary aid upon the request or acceptance of Governments". The use of chemical and biological weapons would unquestionably result in extensive health and medical emergencies, including mass illnesses, deaths and epidemics, that WHO might be called upon to help overcome. An attempt to assess the magnitude of public health problems with respect to a minimal attack with selected examples of agents (tularaemia, plague, VX) is contained. . . . This limited assessment, supported by analyses made in other parts of this report and in the United Nations report, reveals the very large and essentially wasteful effort that would be involved in undertaking elaborate measures for defence against specific agents. Also, as pointed out . . . such measures could well add credibility to projected fears of annihilation in other countries. The resultant reciprocal fears between nations might contribute in turn to a proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and an accelerated arms race, resulting in vastly increased danger of accidental or deliberate release of chemical and biological agents. Certain measures could, however, be taken within the framework of existing needs and resources that would redound to the benefit of health and preventive medical activities currently underway, and would not give rise to fears of this kind. These measures include the improvement of rapid detection and diagnostic facilities for air pollution and for communicable diseases, which would obviously be of value for health and laboratory services in general; improved medical management for natural disasters, including decontamination procedures; and the wider use of safety features in buildings (ventilation filters) and for communal water supply systems. . . . While such measures might act as a partial deterrent to irresponsible groups and might significantly reduce casualties from a very small attack or from the spreading effects of an attack on a neighboring country, they cannot be relied upon to afford major protection to a country subjected to a determined attack. As long as chemical and biological research directed specifically to military use is continued, it will be considered necessary by some countries to continue research towards detection of and protection against such agents. This research could in itself point to agents more destructive than those now existing. In view of the power of existing agents in conditions favourable to their use and the possibility of developing new and even more dangerous weapons, it is imperative to find ways of abolishing any presumed need for this militarily ori entated research as soon as possible. It is therefore clear that in the last analysis the best interests of all Member States and mankind in general will be served only through the rapid implementation of the resolutions on chemical and biological warfare adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the World Health Assembly... and through any additional steps that would help ensure outlawing the development and use in all circumstances of chemical and biological agents as weapons of war. Finally, there is the possibility that WHO might be called upon by the United Nations to help deal with allegations of use of chemical and biological weapons between nations and to assist in the limitation of chemical and biological weapons, and disarmament. The technical resources of WHO1 could contribute greatly to the resolution of many of the difficulties that are associated with these problems and are now being discussed within the framework of the United Nations. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Group expresses its thanks and appreciation to the many staff members of WHO who gave valuable help during the preparation of this report. Acknowledgement is also made to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, the Pugwash Organization, and the World Meteorological Organization for their collaboration and for suppyling much useful information. CONSULTANTS Professor O. V. Baroyan, Director, Gamaleja Institute of Epidemiology and Dr. K. Evang, Director-General, The Health Services of Norway, Oslo, Norway. Professor L. Huisman, Department of Civil Engineering, Technological University, Delft, Netherlands. Dr. J. H. Humphrey, Head, Division of Immunology, National Institute for Medical Research, London, England. Professor N. K. Jerne, Director, Paul Ehrlich Institute, Frankfurt am Main, Federal Republic of Germany. Professor J. Lederberg, Department of Genetics, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, Cal., USA. Professor A. M. Lwoff, Director, Institute of Scientific Research on Cancer, Villejuif, France. Professor O. Maaloe, Institute of Microbiology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Professor I. Malek, Institute of Microbiology, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czechoslovakia. Professor M. Meselson, The Biological Laboratories, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., USA. Dr. F. Pasquill, Meteorological Office, Bracknell, Berks., England. Mr. J. P. Perry Robinson, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden. Professor M. P. Schutzenberger, Faculty of Science, University of Paris, France. Professor V. W. Sidel, Department of Community Health, Albert Einstein College of Medicine; Chief, Division of Social Medicine, Montefiore Hospital and Medical Center, New York, USA. Dr. Berhane Teoume-Lessane, Co-Director, Imperial Central Laboratory and Research Institute, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Mr. F. W. J. Van Haaren, Head, Laboratories of the Municipal Water Works, Amsterdam, Netherlands. Secretary Dr. M. Kaplan, Special Assistant for Science, Office of the Director-General, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland. 1 An example of such technical resources is the collection of epidemiological information on communicable diseases that has been made by WHO for many years, through its serum banks and its surveillance programmes involving specific diseases. This information provides an invaluable background and potential for determining changes in communicable disease patterns, as well as for obtaining knowledge of diseases already existing in a community. Apart from its general epidemiological value, expansion in the accumulation of such data could be very useful for investigating any possible future allegations of use of biological weapons. APPENDIX E PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, SPONSORED BY THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES AND THE SALK INSTITUTE, JULY 25, 1969, HOUSE OF THE ACADEMY, BOSTON, MASS. FOREWORD Both the American Academy and the Salk Institute believe that the level of understanding of public issues is raised through non-partisan research, discussion, and analysis of questions of public policy. The resolution of such issues should be left, of course, to the public through its official representatives in Congress and the Administration. Accordingly, the Academy and the Institute are pleased to make available this transcript of a conference on chemical and biological warfare, held at the House of the Academy, July 25, 1969. Among those invited to the conference were a number of scholars representing various disciplines which are involved in research and development on chemical and biological weapons, international lawyers, political scientists, and students of military strategy and disarmament. We feel that the ensuing discussion was a penetrating and illuminating review of the important issues with regard to policy on chemical and biological weapons. The views expressed are the views of the participants, and neither organization endorses or supports any particular conclusion or policy recommendation, nor does either organization have any mechanism for endorsing the results of such a study. JOSEPH E. SLATER, President, The Salk Institute. JOHN VOSS, Executive Officer, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS Co-chairmen: Dr. Paul Doty, Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Harvard University, 12 Oxford Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; Dr. Matthew S. Meselson, Professor of Biology, Biological Laboratories, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. Mr. William Bader, Program Officer, European and International Affairs, Ford Foundation, 320 East 43rd Street, New York, New York 10017. Dr. Lincoln Bloomfield, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Room E53-435, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139. Professor George Bunn, Visiting Professor of Law, Law School, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706. Dr. John S. Dahler, Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Minnesota, 151 Chemical Engineering Building, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455. Professor John Edsall, Professor of Biological Chemistry, Biological Laboratories, Harvard University, 16 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. Dr. Bernard Feld, Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Room 26-425, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139. Dr. Arthur William Galston, Director, Marsh Botanical Gardens, Department of Biology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520. Mr. Irwin Gubman, Office of the General Counsel, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Room 5643 N S, Department of State Building, 2201 C Street, Washington, D.C. 20451. Mr. Michael Guhin, National Security Council, The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20506. Mr. John Henahan, Senior Programs Officer, The Salk Institute, P.O. Box 1809, San Diego, California 92112. Dr. Eugene Patrick Kennedy, Hamilton Kuhn Professor of Biological Chemistry, Harvard Medical School, 25 Shattuck Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02115. Dr. Salvador Luria, Sedgwick Professor of Biology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Room 56-423, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139. Professor Frank C. Newman, Professor of Law (University of CaliforniaBerkeley), 53 Acacia Lane, Orinda, California 94563. Dr. Stuart Rice, Professor of Chemistry, University of Chicago, Chicago. Illinois 60637. Dr. Alexander Rich, Professor of Biophysics, Department of Biology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Room 16-735, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139. Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Brookings Institution, Room 534, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036. Mr. Joseph E. Slater, President, The Salk Institute, P.O. Box 1809, San Diego, California 92112. Professor Louis Bruno Sohn, Bemis Professor of International Law (Harvard University), 866 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017. Mr. Han Swyter, 4600 South Four Mile Run Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22204. Mr. John Voss, Executive Officer, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dr. James D. Watson, Professor of Biology (Harvard University), Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory for Quantitative Biology, Cold Spring Harbor, New York 11724. Dr. Martin Weigert, The Salk Institute, P.O. Box 1809, San Diego, California 92112. The Honorable James Russell Wiggins, former United States Representative to the United Nations, Carlton Cove, Brooklin, Maine 04616. Conference Secretary: Alexandra Oleson, Staff Associate, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences. INTRODUCTION SLATER. It is a great pleasure to welcome the authority, responsibility, and activism represented at this meeting on the vital issue of chemical and biological warfare. The interest of The Salk Institute in this subject centers on our desire to identify specific areas where more research and work needs to be done and to develop briefings on these important matters for the leadership elements of our society. The pros and cons of issues can be brought forward and made the basis of an intelligent debate within the society. We also hope that the debate this group helps engender will result in some sound, concrete recommendations. This is a propitious time for an intensive study of chemical and biological warfare. There is now a better chance to see movement in this area realized in the next few months than at any time in many years. As a result of this meeting and of recommendations that emerge from it, a program should be developed to increase the debate around the country on this subject and also to get some experience for educational efforts, generally concerning the implications of modern biology on society. We should determine how and where biological knowledge can help solve some of the most pressing international social and humanistic problems we face. MESELSON. This meeting is the result of discussions among Joseph Slater, John Henahan, Paul Doty, John Voss and myself. We feel that it is an opportune time for a meeting on this subject. Several things have happened recently to make necessary some important policy choices about chemical and biological weapons. There is the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of December 5, 1966 which supports the Geneva Protocol and invites nations which have not yet ratified it to do so. There is the recently issued United Nations report on the effects of CB weapons. There is the United Kingdom Treaty presented two weeks ago at the ENDC that would prohibit the possession of germ weapons. And there is the review that has been ordered by the new Administration and the important fact that it is a new administration. There is clearly a great deal of congressional and public interest, stimulated not only by the dead sheep in Utah and by the plan to ship obsolete nerve gas bombs across the country, but also by a growing and genuine interest in the Congress and in the press regarding the aims of United States CBW policy, the importance of the Geneva Protocol and other basic matters. We are heading for a time perhaps before the year is up, when important choices will have to be made. |