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Mr. ZABLOCKI. In order to help out answering my own question, it wouldn't hurt if the second resolve remain as it is to encourage continuous review?

Mr. MCCARTHY. No.

EFFECT OF NEW CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The military procurement authorization bill passed by Congress contains some new restrictions on the production of offensive CB weapons. What do you anticipate will be the effect of those provisions? For example, will they in any way restrict the use of CS in Vietnam? Do they contain any such restrictions?

Mr. McCARTHY. None. None whatsoever. These restrictions that we passed relate, for example to secrecy. One, they would require semiannual report to Congress. Also, they relate to testing, transportation, and disposal. The one I think you are referring to is a provision that prohibits the development of a projectile, the sole purpose of which is the dissemination of a chemical or biological agent. That really doesn't mean much, because you can put chemical or biological agents in almost anything we have got. We have ICBM's, hand grenades, howitzer shells, just about anything, that could be used to disperse these agents. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Then you contend the restrictions in the military procurement authorization will not really have any effect?

Mr. MCCARTHY. No, I think they will have a good effect, and I didn't mean to deprecate them. I think it is a good step forward, first of all, that for the first time the Congress has put any restraints on this, ever. It rips away the excessive secrecy. It puts safeguards on testing, which is very important, and this has come up over the past year and a half, transportation, that has come up, and disposal, so that I think these safeguards are very valuable, they are very much in the public interest, and I think that parting this curtain of secrecy is in the public interest, but they are limited.

THE PRIORITIES OF ACTION ON CBW

The basic questions revolve around these treaties, and what is our basic policy. For example, we say we abide by the Geneva Protocol, but we are conspicuous by failure to ratify it. Eighty-four nations have ratified it. We haven't.

Also basic to this is, I think, is the British convention recommending a total abolition of germ warfare.

Beyond that, I would hope a third international agreement could in time be developed, which would call for a verifiable ban on all chemical warfare. But unlike chemicals are biological warfare, where I wouldn't really regard as important the fact that another nation might have a biological capability, because I don't think we would use it even in retaliation, or that we should use it. Chemicals are something else, and I have felt that if we are going to have a total ban on chemical warfare, that we would have to have some system of verification

Now that is what I would see as a goal in the future, but I would say the first order of business should certainly be to ratify the Geneva Protocol, without reservations.

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Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I was glad to have you here, and I think this discussion has been productive, Mr. Chairman. It has given points of view that I think should be considered, and the witness has done well.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hays.

WHY WAS RATIFICATION OF PROTOCOL DELAYED?

Mr. HAYS. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman, except to say that I am in general agreement that this ought to be resubmitted, and I can't understand, No. 1, why it was sent back from the Senate when it was, and No. 2, why some President hasn't resubmitted it a long time ago.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Could I add something? My understanding of it was that there was intensive lobbying against this in 1926, when it came up. The national commander of the American Legion was also the lobbyist for the chemical industry. Senator Borah apparently felt he didn't have the votes. Senator Wadsworth from New York was a strong opponent, and a very influential Senator, apparently. His position was that if you had a weapon, and you got into a war, you would use it. He was wrong because while a million three hundred thousand persons were casualties from gas warfare in World War I, zero people were casualties in World War II-partly because of the Geneva Protocol. But we never ratified it.

Mr. HAYS. Well, I will disagree there. I think it was mainly because it wasn't an ultimate weapon, and there was no way that if you started it, to defend against it yourself. In other words, it became a thing that was probably as much of a handicap to us as it was an advantage. Mr. MCCARTHY. I agree.

Mr. HAYS. Now I think we are in the same place, now, with nuclear weapons. When we first used it, it was the ultimate weapon. Nobody had it but us. But I think that is the reason we don't use it now, not because we have any great scruples about it.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Certainly the military men who have set down their views from World War II period indicated that they objected to the use of gas or germs on moral grounds; that was a big factor. I don't mean to imply that the Geneva Protocol was the sole reason, but it was a contributing factor. The treaty lay around for a number of years, and, as I understand it, when Senator Vandenberg was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, merely as a housekeeping measure, the protocol was sent back to the White House. That is why now your committee and the other body is unable to take it up now, although I understand the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has expressed himself as wanting to. Of course, what we have to do is persuade the President to send it back. Mr. HAYS. Well, as a former teacher of history, I would just comment that there was a lot of lobbying against almost anything back in the 1920's, especially anything that had to do with American participation in any kind of an international organization of any kind, shape, or form. I imagine this got caught in the rush.

PROBLEMS IN TACTICAL USE OF GAS

The other thing I think I would like to point out, if my memory serves me correctly, when the Germans first used gas in World War I, it turned out to be about as much of a weapon against them as it was against the people they tried to use it against, because they weren't prepared to defend against it, and they fired some over, and the wind changed, and they got most of it back, and so it just never got to be a very reliable weapon, one way or another, and I think it is something that everybody, just about, was glad to decide, "Well, we won't use it, because really, it is not a very good weapon anyway." Mr. MCCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. HAYS. I think maybe they might decide the same thing about biological warfare. At least, I would hope so.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser.

COMMENDATION OF REPRESENTATIVE MC CARTHY

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to express my very deep appreciation for the fine work you have been doing in this field in the last year. I think you have helped change public opinion, and created an awareness on the part of the public, as well as the Congress, of the urgency of this matter.

I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, when we will have some of the intelligence agencies, we could invite Mr. McCarthy to sit with us. I don't know what the rules are, but he could get a chance to find out what is going on.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I might say to the gentleman, if my memory serves me correctly, any Member of Congress is free to sit with the committee in open session, and executive session, I think, is limited to members. The hearings with the executive branch, State, and Defense, possibly CIA, to some extent will be in open, and then in executive session, so the executive session would probably be limited to members.

Mr. McCARTHY. Well, thank you, Mr. Fraser. I would like to sit in, very much, if I am invited by the chairman.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for having this hearing. As I say, it couldn't be more timely, because some of the crucial decisions on the basic policy are about to be made. I hope this committee can have a major influence in what I would hope would be the right direction.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. On behalf of the subcommittee, I want to thank the gentleman from New York for his thoughtful testimony, and his direct answers to the questions. We look forward to the information that you will supply for the record.

The subcommittee hearings on chemical-biological warfare stand adjourned until 9:30 a.m., Thursday, November 20, in this room, when we will hear Hon. George Bunn and Dr. Ivan L. Bennett. We are hoping to have the session with the executive branch prior to the Christmas holidays, either the second or third week in December. The subcommittee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconrene at 9:30 a.m., Thursday, November 20, 1969.)

CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICIES AND

INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1969

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:45 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will please come to order.

Today is the second in a series of hearings by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments on U.S. policy concerning chemical-biological warfare.

Our more specific interest is in resolutions which have been sponsored or cosponsored by some 108 Members of Congress. These identical resolutions would express the sense of Congress asking the President to resubmit to the Senate for ratification on the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical-biological weapons.

On Tuesday, the subcommittee heard testimony from interested Members of Congress. Today we will hear two distinguished private citizens with expert knowledge in the field of CBW.

First, we will hear from Prof. George Bunn, visiting professor of law at the University of Wisconsin School of Law, Madison, Wis., and the General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from the Agency's creation in 1961 until last year. We are also pleased to have with us Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Jr., the director of the New York University Medical Center in New York City.

Dr. Bennett is a former Deputy Director of the President's Office of Science and Technology and recently served as a consultant expert on the U.N. Secretary General's report on chemical and biological weapons, issued last July.

We are indeed grateful to both of you gentlemen for appearing here early today, in order that the subcommittee can conclude its hearings in time before the House goes into session to continue the consideration of the foreign aid bill.

Because Professor Bunn's testimony deals with historical aspects of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol, we will hear from him first.

Then, Dr. Bennett will discuss the recent U.N. report, its findings and its ramifications for U.S. policies on CBW.

Mr. Bunn, if you will begin, please.

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