EDSALL. I would like to strongly support Mr. Wiggin's proposal. It has obvious emotional appeal but it also I think can be defended with very powerful rational arguments in view of the extreme uncertainty of the consequences of the use of biological weapons and the great hazards involved. I think we would have a good many military men strongly with us in supporting a proposal like that. Going along with it, I certainly agree we should urge the opening up of Fort Dietrick and other centers where secret research of that sort is going on. And I do think we should make every effort to prevent the Administration from bringing up the Protocol for ratification if it is brought up with reservations regarding tear gas. If we can get them to hold off, it would be much better to have no action at all than to have it approved with that reservation for reasons Matt has so well presented. I would also like to strongly second Arthur Galston's statement about the importance of the herbicide question which we should certainly keep as a major item. Voss. As I have been listening to this discussion, it seems to me that there are at least two and perhaps three separable issues. One of them is what happens immediately in terms of the White House Review and in terms of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol. In looking at the material that has been sent around, and reading Matt's testimony, it seems to me that there is a clear need for some kind of a white paper, a position paper, which would make some of these issues much clearer than they have been made and serve as the kind of document that newspapers and editors could use. But at another level there is a more substantial issue. I suspect that even if the best scenario takes place within the next twelve months that CBW will still be a major kind of issue that will not disappear after the Senate ratifies a treaty or the White House issues an announcement. There are some very substantial issues that need clarification on the model of the Daedalus issue on Arms Control that came out about ten years ago and served as a way of getting good ideas into communication and into currency. It is not an easy subject, it may be relatively easy to pull together the pros and cons at one level for certain kinds of policy reviews and for the public, but on another level we ought to take a longer look at some of the broader issues. I would therefore urge that the Academy and this group look to the possibility of a thorough examination of this complex issue. At a third level, and I am not sure whether I am right about this, it seems to me that perhaps we have been dealing with yesterday's technology. As Bernie Feld has said, advances, particularly in biology, will constantly create new problems particularly on the level of biological warfare and perhaps even chemical warfare, and therefore what we are talking about is a special instance of the larger problem of some of the consequences of technology in society. May I add that the Academy was pleased to serve as co-sponsor of this conference. We trust that the results of the meeting will find a wide audience. SOHN. There was one issue that I think was not sufficiently raised today and that is the question of whether the testing of biological weapons can be detected. I have the feeling that once you come to Congress with a proposal on this subject they will want to know whether, if we refrain, the others will follow and if the others don't, can we at least know about it, even if we can't do anything about it. I think the work that Matt has been doing with the Pugwash Committee on the subject shows that there is some hope of finding ways of monitoring not production itself, but testing, especially large scale testing, and I don't think the military is crazy enough to use this kind of weapon unless they have tested it somewhat. This is a crucial point. Monitoring might be possible and perhaps more studies could be done on that particular aspect. In trying to persuade Congress on the subject, the fact that you know you can do something about one crucial area would be very important. LURIA. Just two quick points. I do think that if by any chance there were a decision by the President not to use tear gas in Vietnam that would probably be the most effective way of limiting its irrational use by police forces in this country, but I don't think one should attempt to tie up the domestic use of tear gas with other issues. The second point is in connection with what was said before about the Chemical Society. I think there is a very good chance of support for any deescalation in this direction judging from my own experience in the American Society of Microbiology where there has been a complete change of mood in the last two years. Things that would not have come up without being ruled out of order two or three years ago are now greatly encouraged. I saw, for example, how Matt was received when he spoke at the annual meeting this year. I think there is a change of mood mainly because I think the general public influences the profession. SLATER. I have one sentence or so about the question of timing. We heard a minute ago that there is pressure for some kind of decision or action in the fall. That is all very well and good, provided the decision finds a climate of understanding and acceptance in the country and around the world. But if the wrong decision is made (or what looks like a hurried decision or a decision made by a very small group without proper consideration), I think, given the mood of the country, one might see some very unfortunate consequences. If there were a wellinformed group working in this area, and if there were a genuine debate in the next months, there would be a lot better chance that what decisions were made would be sounder and less divisive within the country as a whole. In other words, just getting decisions qua decisions because of the increasing pressure doesn't strike me, in the last analysis, as the argument which should prevail. Rather, what require attention are the questions that are asked, how well the issues are understood, and how thoughtfully the debate is received. A simple paper and some sort of primer should be prepared with some urgency. This conference certainly has been educational for those of us who aren't experts in this area. I am deeply grateful to Matt and Paul for pulling such a good group together. I think it has been an extraordinarily productive day. 38-044-70-33 Source: Reproduced from "The Silent Weapons" by Robin Clarke, published by David McKay Co. Used permission of the author and publisher. Source: Reproduced from "The Silent Weapons," by Robin Clarke, published by David McKay Co. Used by permission of the author and publisher. Unsatisfactory.. Antibiotics(?)... Low... One of the most stable agents. Affects both man and domestic animals. Unlikely to be effective via water systems. Very rare and little-known Only pneumatic (respiratory) Might be useful as an incapaci- Birds act as reservoir o Generally, immunity too wide- Naturally a subtropical disease; Very high infectivity. Unlikely BW agent; poor Highly stable; suitable agent if a Acts more quickly than any |