And if they disagree, as most countries do, with our position on tear gases and herbicides, then they might feel they would have to reject the reservation.

On the other hand, if we feel that we have to hold open this option, and we then say in the legislative history, before the Foreign Relations Committee and in the Senate, that this is our position, our position would not have the same reaction, I don't think.

The reaction would probably not be as adverse as if we made a formal reservation. I think it is also true that this would in a sense leave open the possibility for a later time-a later time in this administration, or in another administration-to say: "Well, the war is over. We no longer feel that we have to use tear gases and herbicides, and we will from this point onward interpret the protocol as prohibiting them." That would still be a possibility. It is not a perfect solution, either, but it is a possible one.

Mr. FULTON. I refer you to an assumption that you gentlemen have made, that the Senate might ratify the B, the bacteriological, but leave out the C, the chemical policy or the Executive might submit the proposal in that divided fashion. However, wouldn't that mean that if the Executive submitted only one, it would be taken to mean that the Executive opposed any convention on the other point?

Mr. BUNN. I think what Dr. Bennett was suggesting when he said separating the C from the B was not that you would ratify half the protocol, but to leave the protocol as is for the time being, and support the British proposal, which only deals with biological and not with

chemical.

Isn't that correct?

Dr. BENNETT. Yes, Mr. Fulton, I was not discussing the Geneva Protocol at that time. I was discussing really this British proposal, which would ban the existence of these weapons.

Mr. BUNN. So, under that system, you would then not resubmit the protocol, or if resubmitted just let it sit on the shelf, and then go to the British method. Is that what you mean?

Dr. BENNETT. No, I want to distinguish between a ban on the use of these weapons and a ban on the stockpiling or acquiring the

weapons.

To ban the existence of weapons.

Mr. FULTON. We are talking procedure now. How would you implement that with procedures?

Dr. BENNETT. Well, the decision whether to resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate is not one-I am glad to say-that I am called on to make.

My discussion went beyond the question that is contained specifically in this resolution that stimulated these discussions.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Would you yield?

Mr. FULTON. I will be happy to.

PROTOCOL RATIFICATION AND VIETNAM

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Bunn, wouldn't you also agree that should the Senate move ahead on this fairly soon, that it might be a helpful weapon in our negotiations to bring about a just settlement in Vietnam? It certainly wouldn't hurt.

Mr. BUNN. I think even more so that it might be helpful in terms of the domestic negotiations that are going on.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Well, that is true, too.

Mr. BUNN. I think one should realize that there are risks of the kind that Dr. Bennett has raised, and that if one holds open the option to use tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam, then any advantage one might have hoped to have gotten internationally or domestically may be pretty well drained away.

On the other hand, if one closes the options, you may hear from the other side of the political spectrum.

Mr. FULTON. I don't accept your presumption that negotiations are going to lead to a peace

Mr. BROOMFIELD. No; that is true, Jim. I thought in a long negotiation, it might be helpful in showing further good faith on the part of the United States to bring an end to this hostility.

Mr. FULTON. Well, I am questioning whether putting the proposal in that frame of reference, it makes the United States appear more in good faith.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Well, some of us are pretty desperate to get it over, and anything we can do to help it along, I think, as the President says, we have got to sometimes take a few risks.

We don't always agree, either, as you can see.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fulton?

Mr. FULTON. I want to compliment both witnesses on their statements, because they do point directions which both this subcommittee as well as our Foreign Affairs Committee, and the House of Representatives as well as the Senate, should give very careful attention. This discussion gives us an area of reference that has depth that I had not had before.

Thank you.

INTEREST IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have but one further question of Dr. Bennett. Recently in a House Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, Dr. D. M. MacArthur, Deputy Director of the Department of Defense Research and Engineering, expressed interest in a U.S. program leading to the production of a synthetic biological agent for which there would be no natural immunity.

Would you give the committee your views on such a program, its advisability and possible effects?

Dr. BENNETT. I would say that if we intend to continue a program that is aimed at the production of biological weapons, that the particular development referred to by Dr. MacArthur in that testimony, although I wouldn't agree with the way he described it, exactly, but after all, he is not a biologist, that I would say that if one continued to have a program where one was looking for more effective biological weapons, that that would certainly be one of the directions in which one should go. I tried in my testimony to indicate why I think that even the most effective biological weapon is not worth having, militarily.

EFFECTS OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS

Mr. ZABLOCKI. To end on a hopeful note, or on an optimistic note, I would like to ask both of you gentlemen your assessment of the inclusion in the recent military procurement authorization bill of certain restrictions in the area of CBW.

Would you share your opinion of these changes and their likely effects?

Mr. Bunn?

Mr. BUNN. I think they are very useful. I think that perhaps the most important one is the simple requirement of semiannual reports by the Department of Defense on research and development, testing, and procurement of lethal and nonlethal CB agents.

This will get the Congress informed, in this area, in a way that it hasn't been informed for a long time. I think in terms of civilian control and the appropriations process, that this is very important. I think that the scrutiny which has been given to our research and development in the nuclear area, through the things like the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and Senator Jackson and Chet Holifield and others, has been very thorough. There has been nothing like it, nothing comparable, in the CBW field, and this may be the beginning of a very significant effort by Congress to find out what is going on and to exercise a little more control.

I think the other provisions are also quite useful.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Would you agree, Dr. Bennett?

Dr. BENNETT. I think it is a very good beginning.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Now, further, the very fact that over 25 percent of the Members of the House of Representatives have sponsored or cosponsored these resolutions calling for the ratification of the Geneva Protocol is a further indication of a promising trend, toward possible early consideration of a new CBW policy.

Would you agree?

Mr. BUNN. Yes, sir.

NO RATIFICATION VERSUS RATIFICATION WITH RESERVATION

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Now, finally, if we could have your assessment, to further amplify the question asked by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. If you gentlemen were faced with a choice of getting Senate ratification of the protocol, but only with a reservation on the use of tear gases, or no ratification, which would you choose or prefer?

Mr. BUNN. Well, if you changed one word to "interpretation" on tear gases and not "reservation," and if you are not using "reservation" in the formal sense that there is a written statement that would have to be circulated to every other government, I would say that I would take the half a loaf of the ratification and an interpretation on tear gases and herbicides of the kind I described, rather than nothing at all.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Bennett?

Dr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answer to that question, because I don't know what the international effect would be of this half a loaf.

I would just suggest that there are many individuals who are in a better position than I to interpret what this reaction would be, favorable or unfavorable, internationally.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, if we would, in an interpretation of some kind, say “mea culpa," or we have been guilty, or we are ready to come halfway, or we are willing to, and will certainly review and reassess our position in the future, I don't believe the international ramification would be harmful to our position.

It wouldn't cause any future problems in any of our peace or disarmament talks, such as peace talks in Paris or the SALT talks in Finland.

I would hope that we could at least have a half a loaf by ratifying the protocol. As you said it would be a beginning toward controlling CB weapons.

Now, in conclusion, let me, on behalf of the members of the subcommittee, express our deep appreciation for the time that you have spent with us today.

I am hopeful that at an early date you will be called to give testimony before the other body on the Geneva protocol, because you are so effective.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. BUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it was, indeed, a pleasure. Dr. BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee stands adjourned until 10 a.m. on Tuesday, December 2, 1969, when we will resume hearings on the CBW resolutions and will hear from Dr. Joshua Lederberg, the Nobel Prize winning geneticist from Stanford University, and Mr. Han Swyter, formerly on the systems analysis staff of the Secretary of Defense.

(Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittee was recessed to reconvene on Tuesday, December 2, 1969, at 10 a.m.)