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Mr. WEIL. It certainly has some role. What it is is beyond me to determine. I am not a constitutional lawyer. I have some familiarity with constitutional law, though I am not a member of the bar.

The Constitution evolves. At the time the Constitution was drafted there were no such things as wars of liberation, the kind of thing we are faced with today-nuclear war, as I say in my statement.

I think the Constitution allows the President to wage war, and I don't think the Congress is letting either Mr. Johnson or Mr. Nixon wage the war as it should be waged. I have heard it said that this war very easily could have been won in 5 days of combat.

THE USEFULNESS OF DECLARATIONS OF WAR

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you advocate that the Congress should declare war in the case of Vietnam so the President, under his constitutional powers, can wage war?

Mr. WEIL. I cannot answer that, Mr. Chairman, as directly as you would like to have me do so. I have to qualify my answer. We don't have to have declarations of war any more. That is the point. The Constitution has evolved according to all the decisions of the Supreme Court, many of which are greatly criticized, as a matter of fact, in which the original strict construction has been extended to a point where the Court itself has been severely criticized for overextension.

We clearly have a realistic situation and we can't indulge in legalisms and pedantry where the national survival is involved. If ever there is a need to extend the Constitution, as the Supreme Court has done in so many instances and properly for social and economic reasons that were not foreseen in 1789-I think that when it comes to saving our necks, we can stretch a point here and there. And we have to use good judgment.

There is a recent article, Mr. Chairman, in the Foreign Affairs magazine, the most recent issue in which a lawyer points out that what is needed here is not pedantry and legalisms but good judgment. What is this judgment, Mr. Chairman, but a military question.

I know that there is a great reluctance to trust the military at the present time. I think many of the mistakes of the military have been the result of political pressure. I myself feel, as Alastair Buchan, director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in England who said The only influential public servants, who spend their lifetime in the service of the United States are the military-but the United States still has a very amateur public and political service for a power of its appalling responsibilities. If war is too serious to be left to the generals, the formulation, negotiation, and implementation of foreign policy is too serious to be left to the intellectuals.

I was in the army twice; volunteered twice. The army is a horrible institution, but it's like doctors and lawyers and women, you can't live with them and you can't live without them.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have never heard that comparison.

Mr. WEIL. What can you do? You have to go by the best judgment of the best people that you can get.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I hope you are not implying we can't live without war.

Mr. WEIL. Oh, of course we can live without war. Let the other fellow start living without it. We are not starting anything. We didn't start this war. This war started many years ago. I know from my own personal experience. I have lived in France a great deal and I knew most of the top drawer people, military and political, who had the Indochinese situation at their fingertips. This thing was started in

1945.

One of my best friends was the Governor of Indochina at the time and darned near got blown up. In fact I almost was, myself. That is another story. I won't go into that.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Nor do I want to dwell on your comparison of war and the military with marriage. There are some marriage counselors who say a marriage is not successful without a few quarrels. You have to have these kiss and makeup episodes. War, on the other hand, is hardly desirable.

THE OPINION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

In effect, you do take a position, as your point IV states, that the President should have an absolute free hand in Indochina. Should he be free to undertake an invasion, for example, of North Vietnam, or even China without congressional approval, if he determines it necessary to save Indochina and our national security?

Mr. WEIL. If that is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that there is no other way, yes. There are many other ways, Mr. Chairman. For example, as I point out in my book-and this is nothing novela line across the 17th Parallel, Road 9, from the Mekong to the sea would end the war in a matter of a week. That does not necessarily involve bringing China or Russia into it. The Russians can't get there. They are 2,500 miles away. The Chinese have no logistic capabilities. They just simply could not bring a sufficient force to bear at that point, the point of discussion. They just couldn't. There are no roads. They are building a road. It can be interdicted. It's a poor road. They can't bring heavy material. I am convinced that Colonel Rhinehart, whom I quote in my book, is absolutely right when he says they just couldn't get there in combat ready condition.

THE UNITED STATES "GRAND STRATEGY" IN VIETNAM

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I don't think the people of the United States are about to prepare to give all the executive and legislative powers to the military. In your own definition, that the military are horrible, I don't think we should be even tempted to that extent. But let me try to better understand your position. You suggest that the United States is working out a "grand strategy" of fighting in Vietnam. Would you advise the subcommittee what that grand strategy is? Why cannot the American people be informed about it if the Russians and Chinese already know about it? Do you believe the President is acting constitutionally by carrying out this grand strategy without informing Congress and the American people about what he is doing? If you know the grand strategy, I hope you share your knowledge with us so we know what he is doing.

Mr. WEIL. I am very flattered by that statement, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read to you what the President said and what President Johnson said on the point. May I?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Certainly. Please do. It's not too long, is it? You are not going to read your book?

Mr. WEIL. No. No, sir. At his news conference on March 4, 1969, President Nixon stated, "I think the American people will support a President if they are told by the President why we are there, what the objectives are, what the cost would be if we took another course of action. He has to explain it to the American people and gain their support."

I maintain he hasn't done so. He has given us some pernicious abstractions as I said before, free elections, self determinations, commitments, and so on.

Let me read what Mr. Johnson said. I do not quote from him. I just simply say it is the most profound statement Mr. Johnson ever made and was made immediately following his departure from the White House when he wrote that new ways must be found to explain foreign policy to the American people and narrow the gap between top secret military intelligence and the public's grasp of foreign events as reported, and let me interpolate, as interpreted by the intellectual Communist complex of the media. This he did in the Reader's Digest of February 1969. That, as I said, was the raison d'etre for this little book.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I received a copy of your book from somebody. It may have been yourself, sir. I appreciate it and I looked it over with interest. In portions of it I found some area for agreement. Much of it I thought was extreme.

I would pursue the question of our grand strategy, but I have taken too much of our time.

Mr. Taft.

LINCHPIN OF GEOPOLITICAL APPROACH

Mr. TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Weil, to use your word, the linchpin of your geopolitical approach, as I understand it, is that we must maintain peninsular beachheads on the continent of Asia, because if we fail to do so and we decide later (I don't know exactly for what reason) it's necessary to bring United States or other land forces from outside the continent of Asia onto the continent of Asia that we would have no base for doing it because it would be subject to a nuclear reprisal which would make a landing of this type impossible. Is that correct?

Mr. WEIL. It's taking a chance. Sir, I see you have a map here. It's very interesting, but if you would look at the continent of Europe, you would see that it has some peninsular points of access. When Eisenhower landed he landed on this peninsula shown here. Of course Italy is entirely a peninsula. So is Spain. So is Denmark and Greece and even Turkey.

Look over here [indicating]. Where could you land? You have Korea. You have nothing up that way [indicating] toward the north. You have got this little peninsula here which is close by.

The whole point is you have got to have a wide area between the two. The only other peninsulas are down here. Here is Luichow and here is Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is far enough away.

There is another aspect I didn't bring out in my book or in my statement that I would like to point out. If we have a beachhead here in Korea, here in Southeast Asia, with a threat from Taiwan against Fukien province over here you are going to have the Chinese army split with inadequate logistic capabilities. They won't know which is their bow and which is their stern.

There is another point of view. Supposing the Russians and the Chinese get together. This is something I didn't bring out in my statement that I bring out in my book. Or supposing the Russians conquered China, which I think they could do today. They may not be able to do it 10 or 15 years from now. But supposing they blitzkrieg down this way toward the south [indicating]. Then where are we? That is my point.

Mr. TAFT. The answer to my question, I take it, is yes?

Mr. WEIL. Is what?

Mr. TAFT. Yes.

Mr. WEIL. I beg your pardon.

Mr. TAFT. Is the answer to my question yes?

Mr. WEIL. May I repeat it?

Mr. TAFT. I got kind of blitzkrieged in there. Did you understand my question?

Mr. WEIL. May I have the question?

USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. TAFT. The linchpin of your theory of geopolitics is that we must keep a peninsular base on the mainland of Asia, on which a landing could take place, and the reason that we must maintain this is that if we want to put U.S. land forces back in or other land forces back in, we must have such a base because if we don't have one and we attempt to establish a landing that this would be subject to a nuclear attack. Mr. WEIL. No, sir. There is just one word on which I would like to express myself. We do not need a base. I think that our Presidents have made clear that we do not request bases such as those we have. All we need is an independent country which has an interest in remaining independent and not aligned with our enemy or not subject to being overrun before we can get a foothold as at Pusan, Korea.

Mr. TAFT. I understand this, but the question that confuses me is this. Is it all based on the fact that if you have to make a landing in a hostile area, a nuclear attack would wipe it out. Can you tell me why, if there is a decision to use nuclear weapons under these circumstances, that is any different from your not having a landing point or having

one.

Why, if the Chinese made a decision to use nuclear weapons today against Camranh Bay and if they were able to deliver them (and we are making an assumption they are going to be able to deliver them against Camranh Bay and other points) Saigon, if you would like, why is that any different? I don't see the difference between whether you have a landing point or not, putting aside for the moment the question of whether you ever want to take United States or other major land forces on the continent of Asia.

Mr. WEIL. Sir, there is a difference between strategic nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons. We are prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons without involving strategic nuclear weapons. The dis

tinction between the two must be clearly kept in mind. A tactical nuclear defense, or a defense of long-range missiles, or even the missiles like the conventional or homing STYX missile that the Egyptians used against the Israeli destroyer Elath would be sufficient to keep a landing force from getting onto a beach, especially where you have a concentrated area in which just a few long-range missiles, whether they are nuclear or conventional, can absolutely disrupt the landing operation.

Mr. Taft, I don't want to stand here as a man who knows as much about this as the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if they would be allowed to tell you. I would say this, that if General Bradley would reverse himself on the quote that I gave you at the beginning of my presentation, I will reverse myself and say get the hell out of Vietnam tomorrow morning.

Mr. TAFT. I don't necessarily think General Bradley is wrong. But I think if there is a decision to use nuclear weapons what General Bradley has said might just as well apply to even the current situation in Southeast Asia.

Mr. WEIL. No, sir.

Mr. TAFT. Unless we are willing to use nuclear weapons and bring about a worldwide conflict.

Mr. WEIL. There is a tactical difference, because today we have landed. We don't have to use nuclear weapons. The only point at which we might have to use a tactical nuclear weapon is if the Russians try to break through the NATO defenses in Western Europe or if the Chinese try to break through the defended line that I think is absolutely indispensible at the 17th parallel. It's purely defensive and purely local and not the nuclear holocaust that has made all our people shiver unnecessarily.*

WHAT INTERESTS WOULD A LANDING PROMOTE ?

Mr. TAFT. Let's move from that question to just one other very general one. That relates to the same question. What purpose would we, geopolitically or otherwise, be attempting to promote in wanting to reland or go back in with major U.S. land forces or other free world. land forces into Asia if we do withdraw?

Mr. WEIL. Why distinguish between Asia and Europe, sir?

Mr. TAFT. I suppose we have treaty commitments in Europe which we still have which obligate us to make landings there.

Mr. WEIL. Are you urging fortress America, America first?

Mr. TAFT. I am certainly not. I think we have to get all the help that we can in the world today.

Mr. WEIL. That is the point.

Mr. TAFT. I am looking for that assistance. But I hardly think making deployment of U.S. land forces in Asia as a matter of policy in the future as one that is very likely to be followed. What would our objective be? What do you consider as our foreign policy objective in Asia?

Mr. WEIL. Our foreign policy objective in both?

Mr. TAFT. From a geopolitical point of view?

*Subsequently Mr. Well asked that a portion of his book be included in the record of the hearing to further explain his views. The material has been placed in the appendix on pp. 550-552.

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