To help increase the effectiveness of the sanctions, in early July we worked within the NATO Alliance to establish a NATO sanctions monitoring mission for the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean in the Adriatic Sea. The action was taken in parallel with the Western European Union, which decided on a complementary mission. Coordinated NATOWEU monitoring began in mid-July.

The president has directed that we continue to tighten the economic sanctions on Serbia. He has proposed that the international community place monitors in neighboring states to help those states ensure strict compliance with the sanctions.

NATO is studying how it might respond to a request from the United Nations Security Council to assist in sanctions enforcement, involving perhaps its non-NATO partners in the North Atlantic Coordination Council.

The United States will also participate in a European Community-led conference in London on Aug. 26-28 hosted by (British) Prime Minister (John) Major. The purpose of this conference will be to develop further our strategy for dealing with the underlying crisis and its tragic humanitarian consequences.

Use of Military Force

There has been much discussion about the use of military forces in the Bosnian crisis.

The issue is not whether military forces will be used. We have already used these forces in this crisis. We have used military aircraft and air crews to take humanitarian assistance into Sarajevo under fire. We have used naval ships and crews in the Adriatic to support U.N. trade sanctions. A carrier battle group comprised of USS Saratoga plus three escorts and the amphibious landing ship (USS) Iwo (jima) with a Marine expeditionary unit embarked have recently operated in the Adriatic. A U.S. frigate is also deployed as part of NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. We are also going to the U.N. to get authority to use all measures necessary, including military force, to ensure humanitar

"Our nation has learned to weigh the national interests at stake against the potential for loss of life and the availability of other means to protest its interests. We have learned to insist on clearly stated objectives that are

realistically attainable and with a clear understanding of who the enemy is and what constitutes victory. These considerations suggest we should be very reluctant to go beyond the commitment of military power already made to the Bosnian crisis."

ian relief gets through to those in need. The president has said he is prepared to commit air and naval assets to this effort.

The issue is whether to commit additional military forces and particularly ground combat forces. As we could see from Desert Storm/ Desert Shield, there is no issue as to the courage or capability of our military forces. Rather, the issue is the wisdom of making such a commitment. It is a matter of judgment.

Our nation has learned to be careful about committing its military forces and risking the lives of the men and woman who serve the nation in uniform. Our nation has learned to weigh the national interests at stake against the potential for loss of life and the availability of other means to protest its interests. We have learned to insist on clearly stated objectives that are realistically attainable and with a clear understanding of who the enemy is and what constitutes victory.

These considerations suggest we should be very reluctant to go beyond the commitment of military power already made to the Bosnian crisis. The current conflict arises in the context of a blood feud whose roots go back centuries and that has resulted in some of the most brutal communal violence in the history of Europe. As President (George) Bush has pointed out: "Blood feuds are difficult to resolve, and any lasting solution will only be found with the active cooperation and

participation of the parties them

selves. Those who understand the nature of this conflict understand that an enduring solution cannot be imposed by force from outside on unwilling participants."

If we try to impose such a solution by military means, it would mean a very large force that would have to use violence to stop violence. While we might be able to suppress the level of fighting among the combatants, our own forces could become the objects of attack and a guerrilla war that could have no end. We would have, in essence, an occupation force continually at risk. If our forces then withdrew, the underlying dispute and its attendant violence would most likely flare again. The precedent is Lebanon, not Kuwait.

That we should be reluctant to seek military solutions does not mean that we have no strategy for dealing with the Bosnian crisis. The international community has developed a strategy, and the United States is an important part of it. That strategy, if successful, will protect U.S. interests in the crisis. It is accompanied by a humanitarian effort aimed at helping to alleviate the human suffering that is the result of the underlying conflict. It involves what the administration believes is a prudent use of military power.

Published for internal information use by the American Forces Information Service, a field activity of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C. This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission.

While tensions with Iraq now dominate our attention, the future role of Iran is just as important for long-term stability in the Persian Gulf.

Ideologically hostile to the West and increasingly powerful militarily, Iran is destined to be a central regional player. As its leaders come to terms with the new postCold War realities of the gulf region, the key question is the ultimate nature of Iran's aspirations. Will Iran, acting on its traditional nationalistic aspirations, seek to dominate the Persian Gulf, or will it cooperate with other states to enhance mutual and regional security?

The direction Tehran chooses will to a large extent determine the character of U.S.-Iranian relations. The United States would like to establish good relations with Iran. But despite recent shifts toward pragmatism in its foreign policy, Iran continues to pursue policies, such as state sponsorship of terrorism and development of weapons of mass destruction, that preclude better ties with the United States. Only if Iran becomes a normal state

two years, the Department of Defense has reassessed U.S. regional interests and recalibrated U.S. military forces to meet today's potential threats. Our findings confirmed the validity of the policy themes announced by President (George) Bush on Aug. 2, 1990, ironically the same day that Iraq invaded Kuwait.

In contrast to Cold War strategy, which focused on containing a global challenge by the Soviet Union, the new defense strategy concentrated on regional threats and placed primary importance on preventing potential aggressors from dominating regions of critical interest to the United States. In addition, the reassessment of U.S. policy confirmed the continuing importance of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East to the United States. These represent critical regions in which the United States retains important security interests and will pursue policies to ensure that no hostile, nondemocratic power is able to assert hegemony.

Iranian Intentions

Our ability to improve relations with Iran will depend on Iranian actions and intentions. From the U.S. perspective, Iran's record remains mixed. Although Tehran has taken steps that defuse tensions in the region, it also engages in activities that make improving our relations difficult.

Under President (Hashemi) Rafsanjani's leadership, Iran has sought to improve its relations with its neighbors and the West. Tehran supported the objectives of the U.S.-led coalition during the

Persian Gulf war, although some of its actions immediately after the war were not as constructive.

Under prodding from Iran, the last Western hostages in Lebanon were finally set free. Tehran continues to participate in the IranU.S. Claims Tribunal at the Hague and has encouraged increased trade with the United States. And the Iranians have adopted a seemingly constructive role in working to negotiate a settlement to the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Despite these positive developments, fundamental obstacles to better U.S.-Iranian relations still exist. Iran is pursuing programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems for such munitions. It continues to rely on terrorism, including the assassination of opposition figures, as an instrument of national policy. Tehran is a leading opponent of the current Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. It provides support to terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah and certain radical Palestinian groups, that are working to disrupt the talks now taking place. It is also in the middle of a five-year, $10 billion military acquisition program that will provide it with potentially destabilizing offensive capabilities. And despite the growing influence of so-called moderates in its leadership, Iran continues to have a deplorable human rights record.

To some extent, Iran's adoption of a more pragmatic foreign policy is not unexpected. Historically, the radical fervor of revolutionary government is eventually aban

doned in favor of more pragmatic behavior. This pattern has been evident in the willingness of Rafsanjani to adapt to four key realities that he faced at the end of the 1980s.

First, as a result of Iran's defeat at the hands of Saddam Hussein in 1988, Iran became a second-class regional military and economic power. Its economy in shambles, real per capita income has dropped to less than two-thirds of the prerevolution level. In response, Tehran has now placed top priority in the short term on economic reconstruction, as well as developing a long-term plan to rearm its military forces.

Second, with the declining fortunes of the former Soviet Union, Iran lost the primary external counterweight to U.S. and Western influence in the Middle East and has had to adapt to a world in which the United States is the only superpower.

Third, Rafsanjani recognized that Iranian policies were antagonizing virtually all of its neighbors. By adopting a more conciliatory approach by becoming a more normal actor on the world scene he hoped to eliminate some of the tensions that had turned most of Iran's neighbors into adversaries.

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Fourth, Iran found that its brand of revolutionary Islam did not attract the broad support in the region and the Muslim world that its proponents had expected. Iran was too Shi'i and too Persian to become a political center of gravity in the Middle East.

In essence, Rafsanjani and his supporters decided that they could not afford to adhere rigidly to the

tactics adopted in the wake of the revolution in 1979. Yet, while Iran's new foreign policy is more pragmatic than it was even a few years ago, its ultimate direction and aspirations remain unclear. The key issue is whether Iran will continue to pursue its traditional goal of dominating the Persian Gulf or whether its current pragmatic turn will evolve into a long-term accommodation with other gulf powers.

Influence-Building Strategy

At the moment, Iran still appears to be pursuing dominance in the gulf region. It has been pleased with the weakening of its Iraqi rival. At the same time, it seeks to minimize the influence of the United States and in fact would welcome the ejection of the U.S. presence from the region entirely. But many factors diminish the prospects of Iranian success. After Operations Earnest Will, Desert Shield/Storm and Provide Comfort, Tehran can harbor no illusions about U.S. willingness and capability to protect American interests

and those of our friends and allies in the region. In light of the hightech destruction of an isolated Iraq by the forces of the U.S.-led international coalition, a still militarily and economically weakened Iran should be acutely aware that it would receive no significant external help should it precipitate a new gulf crisis. Also, having absorbed the huge costs of the IranIraq war without external assistance or compensation, Iran is not in the position to undertake costly adventures.

Tehran has therefore sought to

build its influence by more cautious means. It will likely avoid any adventurous moves that would oblige the United States to increase its military presence in the region. It has worked to improve relations with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, though the level of distrust of Iran among GCC members remains high. And Iran has begun to look beyond the gulf in efforts to expand its influence. Among the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, Iran has worked to strengthen ties by supporting Islamic activities in these new countries and proposing expanded economic cooperation. Yet there are limits to what Iran can accomplish.

While the Central Asian states are hungry for foreign aid and investment, Iran has no appreciable surplus resources to donate to them. Also, the predominantly Sunni and Turkic character of the people of Central Asia significantly limits the appeal of the Iranian example, with Turkey likely to serve as a more attractive role model. Moreover, Tehran has reason to support stability in Central Asia. Iran's fear of ethnic divisiveness and unrest from the former Soviet Union infecting its own multiethnic society creates an Iranian interest in political stability to the north and tempers its approach toward the Central Asia republics. Iran, for example, has cultivated good relations with Armenia as it works to mediate the conflict with Azerbaijan. In addition, the desire to preserve positive relations with, and to continue conventional arms imports from, Russia may further dissuade Tehran from making trouble in Central Asia.

Iran's policies have had more success in Sudan. The influence of the Sudanese National Islamic Front represents the only success in Iran's decade-long search for other ruling elites that govern on the basis of Islamic principles. Khartoum, financially hard pressed and struggling with an insurgency in the south, has been receptive to Iranian offers of assistance, including oil supplies, military equipment and training, and other largesse. This link in turn has created a foothold

for Iran in Africa from which it can strengthen support for radical Islamic elements in Egypt, the Maghreb and the Saharan states.

Iran's rearmament programs and particularly its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction - represent the most troubling aspect of its long-term influencebuilding strategy.

Tehran already has a chemical weapons capability and is working to develop biological and nuclear weapons. At present, it possesses only a short-range chemical weapons delivery capability. But it is expected to deploy chemical warheads for its ballistic missiles in the next few years. Chemical agents more lethal than those currently available may also enter production. Iran's biological weapons program might be able to develop deployable weapons later in the decade.

In the nuclear field, Iran is concentrating on acquiring technologies needed to master the nuclear fuel cycle, though it will take years before Iran can build up the cadre of people needed to operate a credible nuclear program. Unlike Iraq, Iran is reluctant to send students abroad to receive scientific and technical training. However, it could boost its program by diverting disenchanted or enterprising scientists and technicians from the former Soviet Union.

Also, Iran is working to increase the range of its delivery systems. North Korea already has sold to Iran large numbers of Scud-B missiles and some longer-range Scud-Cs, as well as Scud missile production technology. China has also provided short-range ballistic missiles and additional ballistic missile production technology.

Rebuilding the Iranian armed forces after the shattering defeats of 1988 has been a high priority. Since the early 1980s, Iran relied on the former Soviet Union as the main source of arms imports. Moscow in recent years provided modern combat aircraft - including MiG-29 fighters and Su-24 strike aircraft surface-to-air missiles, tanks and several submarines. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Iranians struck arms deals with both Russia and Ukraine. They have also

diversified their sources, purchasing weapons from China, North Korea, Eastern Europe and other countries. In 1991, Tehran imported $1.5 billion in arms, as well as acquiring control of more than 100 Iraqi aircraft flown to Iran by Iraqi pilots during the Persian Gulf war.

Despite the extensive purchases of new equipment, the Iranians have not yet replaced all the weapons lost during the war with Iraq. Nevertheless, some of the systems acquired by Iran reflect a more aggressive strategic posture. The Su-24s, which are the Soviet equivalent of U.S. F-111s, provide Iran with deep-strike capabilities, extending its reach, for example, to targets far into Saudi territory. From a regional perspective, these aircraft - if armed with chemical bombs

Given the continuing struggle for power within the Iranian leadership, it is questionable whether an internal consensus has existed on a formal national security strategy and on a timeline for its implementation. Iran's conventional rearmament and strategic weapons programs will take years to bring to fruition.

A long-term strategic assessment depends on the success of Tehran's economic recovery program, a critical requirement for any assertion of regional dominance. Iran remains substantially dependent on its exports of oil, and despite the emphasis placed on promoting economic growth, its economy continues to falter. In addition, a demographic time bomb threatens Iran's potential prosperity. In the 1980s, Iran's population grew 3.5 percent per year. While experts predicted only a few years ago that Iran's population would not reach 100 million before 2025, present projections indicate that it will do so by 2010, at which point Iran will be the world's 12th most populous country.

Tehran has not been able to sustain the investment needed to support its increasing population. Economic growth rates have lagged behind Iran's high population growth rates, causing living standards to decline precipitously. To exacerbate problems, expenditures on education and health have declined substantially. If these trends continue, Iran will become more like its South Asian neighbors to the east than the oil-rich, peoplepoor Arab oil sheikdoms to its west. Although economic weakness reduces the ability of Iran to become a regional hegemon, it may not reduce the threat that Iran might come to pose. A powerful military