indoctrination, certainly not a period of any large group indoctrina

tion.

I would like to discuss in considerable detail the first period, or the softening-up period, because virtually all the deaths occurred during this time.

The military discipline and control of the prisoners and the intimate liaison between the prisoners vanished during this time. Suspicion of other persons within the prisoner group was created during this time.

Senator MCCARTHY. Did I understand you correctly to say that most of the deaths occurred during the first year?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir, with the exception of 1, 2, or 3 deaths, all of the deaths occurred prior to September 1951.

How was this softening-up period accomplished and what were the purposes of the softening-up period?

Senator MCCARTHY. Could I interrupt again? When you say practically all of the POW deaths occurred during the first year, do you mean in the camp in which you were imprisoned or do

over Korea?

you mean all Major ANDERSON. All over Korea, among all of the American prisoners of war in Korea.

Insofar as the softening-up period, the first year of captivity is concerned, the general living conditions were extremely poor. Food, as an example: The basic food which was given out by the captors was either corn or millet, occasionally kaoliang, which is an equally tasteless grain. Very little, almost nothing, in the line of vegetation was given out during this time, also almost nothing in the line of meat or protein substitute.

From the caloric standpoint the average caloric intake during this time was somewhere between 1,200 and 1,600 calories. To bring this into understandable perspective, if any of us were to stay at complete bed rest we would probably be able to maintain our weight at approximately 1,600 calories or a bit more than that. These men were active, primarily actively scrounging for food and heat.

As a result of the absence of adequate quantities of food, virtually all of the men who were prisoners during this time lost up to 40 or 50 percent of their body weight. There was much illness associated with malnutrition.

So far as clothing was concerned, a good number of the prisoners were captured during the summer of 1950 or during the fall of 1950 before winter clothing had been issued to our troops. No supplementary clothing for all practical purposes was given to the prisoners during the first intensely cold winter.

The housing also contributed to keeping the prisoners cold all the time. Men froze to death literally. The housing for the most part was these typical small Korean farm-houses constructed of mud with a thatched straw roof. The heating system was a floor vent system which allowed for 1 extremely hot room in the house and 2 or more freezing cold rooms.

These houses had been abandoned by the North Koreans and were in an extremely poor state of repair. On occasion an entire wall was missing.

These housing conditions took place during the winter of 1950 when the temperature got down to 30 and more degrees below zero.

Senator MCCARTHY. Could I interrupt you, Doctor. As I understand your testimony on this point, if I may summarize it, these men were housed in houses in which sometimes an entire wall would be out, they had nothing but summer clothes, and the temperature was 30 degrees below zero?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. You say a number of them froze to death under those circumstances?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir; that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, would you say any actually starved to death?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir; I think a fair number of men actually starved to death. A much larger percentage of deaths may not have been due directly to starvation but were certainly due indirectly to starvation.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, sometimes a combination of the two?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The cold and the hunger.

Major ANDERSON. Probably the majority of the men who died with pneumonia, for example, died as a result of both cold and hunger.

As far as individual and group sanitation was concerned, as Dr. Segal has pointed out in previous testimony, individual and group sanitation was glaringly absent. This was true in the face of extremely low outside temperatures. The inability to secure adequate heated or boiled water even for drinking, let alone for washing, the obvious difficulty of taking one's clothes off for purposes of delousing, the fact that if one were to merely wash his hands it would usually have to be accomplished, one, without soap, two, in water of just above freezing temperature-I think under these conditions it is somewhat understandable that individual sanitation was deficient.

Insofar as group sanitation was concerned, there was no adequate provision whatever for latrine facilities. What latrines were present were for the most part constructed for the size of one Korean family, whereas the number of individuals who would be living in that house as prisoners of war would be 60, 70, or 80 men. Therefore, group sanitation was lacking.

Insofar as medical care was concerned, I was allowed to practice under the auspices of the captors during the first eight months of my captivity. During this time I had considerable personal experience with the problem of attempting to fight the illness of the prisoner without proper, without, for practical purposes, any facilities. Compounds were designated as hospital compounds. I would like to describe one such compound for you.

It was an abandoned temple. It was of wood construction. The average distance between boards in this wood construction was about half-inch. A half-inch of cold air came in between each two boards. in the sides and floor and roof of this temple building. The hospital patients were quartered on the floor of this hospital building with a straw mattress affair which was used. They were housed, more or less stacked side by side in this hospital building. There were no provisions for help insofar as getting these men back and forth to the latrine, for example. Therefore, this building soon became a

stinky mess. It was for practical purposes a death house, not a hospital.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, Doctor, were you provided with medicine for the men that you were permitted to treat? If so, in what quantities?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir; I am going to cover that point now. Insofar as medications were concerned, we were given sporadically on a day-to-day basis a few sulfonamides. On one occasion we were given enough penicillin to adequately treat one individual. We were told to use this penicillin on 300 individuals who at that time were suffering from pneumonia.

The CHAIRMAN. It was adequate to take care of just one patient? Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had 300 patients suffering from pneumonia? Major ANDERSON. Right. The sulfonamides were given out more or less along the same line. The total dosage of any sulfonamide which the captor would allow at any given time for the treatment of one patient with pneumonia was 6 grams. This, translated to understandable figures, when we were using sulfonamides in this country to treat pneumonia, 6 grams would be the average dose for the first day. We would treat the pneumonia for approximately 7 days.

Senator MCCARTHY. May I ask a question at this point. How about anesthetics? When you operated did you have an anesthetic or did you have to operate without them?

Major ANDERSON. Some operations were carried out without anesthesia. In my own case I did one amputation of a finger without anesthesia, an unfrozen finger. Many amputations of frozen extremities were carried out without anesthesia. The surgical equipment which was available and the anesthesia equipment which was available were available briefly from time to time. The most ether I saw during the time I was practicing was approximately 2 ounces in a vial. This we used on one individual, and it was not enough for him. Insofar as other anesthetic agents were concerned we had approximately a half dozen vials of pentothal, an intravenous anesthetic agent. Insofar as doing any surgery was concerned, if it were done it was done again in a mud hut with no means of adequately preparing for the sanitation of the wound. On one occasion where an amputation of a leg was carried out the total surgical equipment available consisted of one rather badly used and old scalpel, two hermostats, or blood vessel clamps, one small-sized butcher-shop saw which was used as a bone saw, and one wood rasp which was used as a bone rasp.

Getting back to the medication for one moment, the medications which were available were never available in sufficient quantity to be of any significant importance in curing illness.

Going back one step further, the basic problem in curing the illness of the American prisoners of war in Korea had to do with lack of proper food, lack of proper clothing, lack of proper housing and heating. Without medication the death rate would have been far, far smaller if there had been any attempt on the part of the captor to adequately feed and clothe the men.

The CHAIRMAN. You spoke a few moments ago about having, I believe, 300 pneumonia patients at one time. Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

79951-56- -8

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those survived? You may not have the figure.

Major ANDERSON. I don't have the exact figures. I am reasonably certain that not over 10 survived. I can think of only about half a dozen at this moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Possibly 10 survived. If you had had the medication and other facilities comparable to what we provided for their prisoners of war, how many of those lives might have been saved? Major ANDERSON. In the first place, if we had had proper facilities, if we had had comparable facilities, the chances are slight that we would have had 300 cases of penumonia at one time. We should have had perhaps 3 or 4 cases of pneumonia.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Major ANDERSON. We should have had no deaths if they were properly cared for. These were healthy young soldiers. Their native resistance to disease should have been good. Therefore, we should have had no deaths out of this group.

The CHAIRMAN. If they had provided comparable facilities as we provided and if they were given comparable medical attention and service as we did for their prisoners, first you say if they had been given proper food and clothing and housing, there probably would have been only 2 or 3 cases of pneumonia rather than 300, and in the second place if they had provided the medical facilities comparable to that which we furnished there would have been no deaths.

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Whereas practically all died or some half dozen to a dozen survived.

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir; that is true.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed.

Major ANDERSON. After the spring of 1951 the American physicians were prohibited from practicing medicine. They were sent back to the prison compounds with the statement that "After all, you are here to learn." When questioned about this by one of my colleagues, one of the English speaking Chinese said, "Your education in the past has been very inadequate. You have been taught only how to cure. the present time we will teach you whom to cure.

At

Senator MCCARTHY. If I may interrupt to go back a step, Mr. Chairman, you referred to 300 pneumonia cases, that was merely in your camp, and I assume there were like number in other camps.

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir; that was in one camp at one time. Senator MCCARTHY. So you can multiply that many times over if you wanted to get the full picture?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. Thank you.

Major ANDERSON. After we were sent back to the prison compounds for the indoctrination program, the Chinese doctors took over the treatment of the American prisoners.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to ask—and maybe you will point it up at this time why the privilege of treating the patients was withdrawn from you.

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir. That was so we could learn who to

cure.

The CHAIRMAN. Learn whom to cure?
Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us a little explanation of that.

Major ANDERSON. The Chinese felt that, although we were properly indoctrinated in how to cure illness, we were not properly indoctrinated in what types of people we should practice medicíne upon.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words you had not had proper instruction as to whom you should let die?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir; right.

Senator MCCARTHY. Could you tell us roughly what percentage of the prisoners died?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir. Approximately 38 percent of all the prisoners of war in Korea died.

Senator MCCARTHY. At what camp were you?

Major ANDERSON. I was first at a camp known as the Valley Camp. Following that I was at Camp 5. Following that I was at Camp 2. Camp 5 was at Pyukdong. Camp 2 was at Pichong-ni. Camp 5 at the time I was there was a major collecting camp and a major effort camp insofar as getting prisoners together and starting the indoctrination program.

The Chinese doctors who practiced medicine on our prisoners of war were a sort of motley crew insofar as their background in medicine was concerned. On the average, although there was one exception to this, their medical training had consisted of everything from no formal training whatever to approximately 6 months in a hurry-up aid-man course designed for bandaging, something similar to the course which we send our aid men to.

These men did several interesting things insofar as the practice of medicine was concerned. One of them whom we called the needle doctor was a pure out and out quack. Any prisoner who would come on to sick call complaining of pain in any part of the body, for example, I will say headache, was treated by the needle doctor in the following manner:

A short, rather blunt needle, which was connected to a spring device and a handle, was placed immediately under the skin in various mysterious spots on the head. After the needles were placed the doctor would very scientifically thump the handle of the needle so the spring would cause a vibration of the needle. This was hardly scientific medicine, but it did cure some headaches.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the purpose of that sort of treatment to discourage the prisoners of war from complaining and coming for treatment?

Major ANDERSON. I am certainly not sure about that. I believe that that treatment was probably a manifestation of the ignorance of medicine which was present among the so-called doctors who were practicing medicine on our American prisoners.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would tend to discourage a fellow from going on sick call for a headache.

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir; it certainly would.

Another practice of Chinese medicine was the administration on a group of some 50 American prisoners of chicken-liver treatment. In this case a piece of chicken liver approximately the size of a 25-cent piece was implanted in the prisoner under his skin at a site on the right side of the chest wall somewhat in the region of the liver. This treatment was designed as a sort of cure-all. It would cure anything.