Jim Walsh, Ph.D., Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and Inter- national Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univer- Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware, Novem- Information submitted for the record by Mr. Billingslea entitled "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency" 90 USEC Inc., Executive Agent for the U.S. Government Implementing the Megatons to Megawatts Program, prepared statement, November 14, 2002. 379 Appendix -: Current and Future Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) -:Background on Non-proliferation Assistance Programs -: Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes Questions submitted for the Record by Senator Akaka with answers from: Questions submitted for the Record by Senator Cleland with answers from: CURRENT AND FUTURE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROLIFERATION THREATS WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2001 U.S. SENATE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Akaka, Cleland, Carper, Cochran, Stevens, and Thompson. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will please come to order. I welcome my friend, Senator Cleland, and our first panel. Today's hearing about export controls and weapons of mass destruction is not a new topic for this Subcommittee. Senator Cochran, our distinguished Ranking Member and good friend, also held hearings on export controls when he chaired this Subcommittee. It is not a partisan issue. I think it is fair to say that our witnesses today, who are all noted experts on the subject of proliferation and export controls, reflect the bipartisan nature of this discussion. Since September 11, however, developing an effective approach to controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction to both state and non-state actors has taken a new urgency. The terrorists of the 21st Century are not intent on using one bullet to assassinate political leaders, as did the lone Serbian nationals who triggered the First World War at the beginning of the last century with the shooting of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Twenty-first Century terrorists strive to cause the maximum amount of damage to the maximum number of innocent people. Their weapons of choice are amazingly simple and astoundingly deadly. But they are still the few against the many. As one of our witnesses today notes, contemporary terrorists have a mystical fascination with chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. Osama bin Laden and his followers would use these weapons to harm us all without regard to age, gender, or nationality. Men, women, and children from over 50 nations died on September 11. We cannot forget this fact as we prepare for future conflicts during the rest of this century, which has begun as sadly as the last. The technology that has made us rich, however, also threatens to be the technology that destroys us. High-speed computers, Internet access, dual-use materials, equipment, and know how are essential ingredients of these simple but deadly devices. Unfortunately, we know from sad experience with the recent anthrax attacks that these threats are real. Our hearing is about how we can prevent more laboratories with dangerous weapons capabilities from being developed. Some might argue that it is too late. Technology is loose. Dual-use items are too difficult to control, or trying to control dual-use exports will only hinder our own economy. I do not think we have the luxury of indulging in any of those arguments anymore. Our enemies are using our own technology and our own open society against us. We cannot declare war against international terrorism while saying at the same time that we should conduct business as usual. There is no more time for business as usual. We need to examine every aspect of our society to see how we can harden ourselves against terrorist attack and we need to examine every aspect of our international transactions to see how we can inhibit our enemies from gaining technologies to use against us. In World War II, export controls were not "dirty words." They were an essential part of our defense. In today's war, there is also a role for export controls because if we do not do everything we can do to deter our enemies from gaining deadly weapons, then we all will pay the ultimate price in our own backyards. This is the terrible message from today's terrorists. This hearing is an effort to start identifying those technologies and the means to prevent them from hurting us later. I am pleased to welcome my colleague, Senator Cleland, and ask him for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of our panel, thank you for coming. I am pleased that this Subcommittee is addressing this critical issue today and that we are further scheduled to address the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act next week. I note that a dear friend of mine, former Senator Sam Nunn, in his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee called once again for enhancing the cooperative threat reduction measures that he helped put in place several years ago. I strongly support such action. There is no more important topic for our national security than addressing the threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I have long advocated a comprehensive national strategy for dealing with this threat and I believe that our strategy must be based on the likelihood of each type of incident as well as on our vulnerability to it. For many years, I have argued that we were too focused on low probability, high-tech threats and not focused enough on high prob |