So those are some of my thoughts as we open this hearing. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for chairing the hearing. We look forward to hearing our government witnesses today. Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your statement, Senator Cochran. And now, I would like to proceed to our witnesses and ask Mr. Van Diepen to proceed with his statement. TESTIMONY OF VANN VAN DIEPEN,1 DIRECTOR OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran. It is my privilege to testify before you today on behalf of the State Department on the important subject of multilateral nonproliferation regimes, which play a vital role in the United States and international efforts to impede the spread of weapons of mass destruction, missiles for their delivery, and advanced conventional weap ons. Nonproliferation continues to be one of the most important and complex of America's foreign policy challenges. Preventing the spread of WMD and missiles is among the President's highest national security priorities. He has made clear that halting proliferation is a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy and that a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy is needed. We are responding to this challenge with the active use of a broad range of tools: Norms, export controls, interdiction, sanctions, counterproliferation, deterrence, and direct diplomacy. Our toolkit also includes the multilateral nonproliferation arrangements or regimes: The Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Members of these regimes agree as a matter of policy to control an agreed list of items according to agreed guidelines implemented according to national laws. The other key multilateral approaches are legally binding global treaties that establish basic norms: The Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. These regimes and treaties have made important contributions in conjunction with the rest of our nonproliferation strategy in slowing WMD and missile proliferation worldwide. Through effective enforcement of comprehensive export controls, broad multilateral cooperation in halting shipments of proliferation concern, and active outreach to key nonmembers to increase their awareness of proliferation threats, the regimes and treaties have made it more difficult, more costly, and more time-consuming for programs of proliferation concern to obtain the expertise and material needed to advance their programs, compelling them to rely on older and often less effective technology. The treaties also have established a global, political, and legal barrier against the spread of WMD. The Chemical Weapons Convention and Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, in particular, have international verification organizations that have a legal right to inspect and require other measures from states' parties in order to promote compliance and provide a basis on which the International Community can cooperate to enforce these norms. My written testimony, which I hope can be entered into the record, describes the background, purpose, and membership of each of these regimes and treaties. Each of them continues to serve a vital role in the fight against proliferation. Each has recorded a number of successes, and each faces unique challenges. I would like to review now the current effectiveness of the various mechanisms. By the 1990's, the Australia Group had largely succeeded in removing its members as an inadvertent source of supply for nation-state chemical and biological weapons programs. Since September 11, the group has been focusing on revamping its controls to better address the terrorist threat. In 2002, the AG adopted licensing guidelines that include CBW terrorism as a reason for control and became the first regime to require participants to have so-called catchall controls, controls that cover nonlisted items when destined for a CBW program, and the first regime to control intangible transfers of technology. The AG also agreed to control technology for the development and production of listed biological agents and equipment. In recent years, AG members have begun to consider measures to address the cooperation between nonmember countries on CBW programs. While the AG has been attacked in the BWC and the CWC by some nonaligned countries seeking to abolish export controls, AG participants agree on the continued necessity and viability of the group, its compatibility with the conventions, and the need to educate nonmembers on the regime. Dealing with a hostile environment in the BWC and the CWC will remain a priority. Over the course of the Missile Technology Control Regime's 15year history, the regime has persuaded most major suppliers to control responsibly their missile-related exports. We have reduced the number of countries with MTCR-class or Category I missile programs, eliminating programs in Latin American and Central Europe. MTCR countries have cooperated to halt numerous shipments of proliferation concern. The MTCR has established a broad outreach program to increase awareness of the global missile threat, and the MTCR Guidelines and Annex have become the international standard for responsible missile-related export behav ior. In addition to the MTCR, the United States supports the wide acceptance of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Initiated by the MTCR countries in 1999, the code is intended to be a new multilateral complement to the work of the MTCR. It will supplement but not supplant the MTCR. The code would consist of a small set of broad principles, general commitments, and modest confidence-building measures. It is intended to be a voluntary political commitment to establish a broad multilateral norm against missile proliferation. It will complement the MTCR and other national missile nonproliferation efforts by establishing a widely subscribed consensus that countries should cooperate on a voluntary basis to impede missile proliferation. We The Nuclear Suppliers Group's greatest successes included requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear states, and controlling nuclear dual-use equipment and technology. We have had notable success in gaining consensus within the Wassenaar Arrangement conventional regime on guidelines for the exports of Man Portable Air Defense Systems, expanding the arrangement's mandate to explicitly prevent terrorists from acquiring controlled items and increasing categories for arms reporting. Wassenaar provides a useful forum for discussing developments that have a bearing on national export control policies, regional developments, and possible mutual restraint. The Biological Weapons Convention has served for nearly 30 years as an important international prohibition on nearly all activities associated with biological weapons. The BWC does not include a mechanism for checking compliance, as it is inherently unverifiable. Although the United States concluded that we could not support the approach embodied in the draft BWC protocol and that the protocol's flaws could not be fixed, we have proposed several important alternative measures to combat the BW threat. Such proposed measures include promotion of standards for biosafety and biosecurity, scientific and industrial codes of conduct, and improved disease surveillance. Our goal is to highlight compliance concerns and gain support from states' parties for the U.S. package and other measures that would address the BW threat of today and the future. We hope that BWC parties can agree on measures that will effectively do so. The Chemical Weapons Convention has helped reduce the threat from chemical weapons, resulting in international disclosure of chemical weapons programs in India, China, and Iran. Stockpiles of chemical weapons, as well as chemical weapons production facilities, are being destroyed in Russia and a number of other countries. Around the world, facilities that could be used for chemical weapons-related purposes are subject to international inspection. The CWC demonstrates the value of properly designed multilateral agreements for placing constraints on potential proliferators. Our experience with the CWC demonstrates the need for supplementary mechanisms, such as the Australia Group, to assist likeminded states in coordinating national nonproliferation efforts, and it also demonstrates the critical importance of U.S. leadership not only in negotiating an agreement but also in ensuring that it is effectively implemented. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has contributed importantly to stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation. States such as South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil decided against nuclear weapons and joined the NPT. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all former Soviet nuclear weapons were transferred to Russia. All other former Soviet States joined the NPT as non-nuclearweapon states. The NPT remains especially critical today with the threat of nuclear terrorism. The periodic NPT review process called for in the treaty is an important means for addressing these issues, including strengthening under the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency has performed well but has also been frank in recognizing its deficiencies and in proposing remedies. Over the past 10 years, the IAEA has taken several steps to improve its safeguard systems. Adoption by member states of the model additional protocol to existing safeguards agreements would strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system. After September 11th, the IAEA moved promptly to expand its programs to combat nuclear terrorism. The IAEA has served as an important source of assistance to developing countries, which might otherwise not obtain the benefits of peaceful nuclear applications as envisaged for NPT parties in good standing. A strong, effective, and efficient IAEA serves important U.S. interests. The IAEA must have sufficient and predictable funding resources to fulfill all aspects of its mission. The Zangger Committee, the committee of NPT nuclear exporters, has taken the lead in developing supplier consensus to add enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production commitment to the so-called trigger list that the group administers. This talks about what we have done up until now, but nonproliferation faces a challenging future. As events of the past year have demonstrated, we face an increasing proliferation threat from terrorists and their state sponsors. The treaties face a continuous threat from states that would seek to violate them. We must scrutinize not only the nonproliferation regimes and treaties but all of our nonproliferation tools with an eye toward improving their effectiveness. These regimes and treaties have contributed greatly to international nonproliferation efforts, but we cannot become complacent. As a starting point, rigorous, energetic, and ever-vigilant enforcement is essential. Nonproliferation remains a perpetually unfinished project. More work always needs to be done. We must deal with continuing proliferation threats posed by countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. We must strengthen cooperation and cope with the impact of technological advances. We must continue to combat the terrorist threat. We must consider new potential threats, expand our nonproliferation toolkit, and improve the efficiency of those tools we have. My written testimony describes our ongoing and future efforts to address these challenges in some detail. To summarize, I would note the need for the regimes and treaties to focus on the following five priority areas. First, regional nonproliferation, focusing on steps beyond simply controlling our own exports that we and our partners can take individually or collectively to impede proliferation. Two, look for ways that these mechanisms can help deal with the threat of terrorism. Three, continue to update control lists to reflect technological advances and ensure that they keep pace with proliferation trends, including terrorism and the use of so-called dirty bombs or radio Four, work to extend export controls in line with regime standards to all potential suppliers, as well as to those countries that serve as transshipment points. And five, increase efforts to make nonmembers more aware of the threat and consequences of proliferation, urge them to adopt polices and practices consistent with regime standards, and provide export control assistance as necessary. În closing, multilateral nonproliferation regimes and treaties have an important role to play as two components of a comprehensive approach to advancing U.S. national security and nonproliferation policy. They must remain vibrant, active tools, focused on their collective and individual core mission, impeding threatening weapons programs, especially via impeding the spread of weapons and related equipment and technology, and reinforcing and verifying treaty obligations against the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, these multilateral instruments must also possess the flexibility to adapt to new challenges on the battlefield of proliferation. The continued exercise of strong U.S. leadership will play an indispensable role in strengthening these multilateral regimes and treaties to better combat proliferation. Thank you. Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement. TESTIMONY OF MARSHALL S. BILLINGSLEA,1 DEPUTY ASSIST- Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Chairman Akaka, Senator Cochran, as requested, today I will provide the views of the Department of Defense regarding the effectiveness of current multilateral nonproliferation regimes and organizations in preventing WMD and missile proliferation. I will discuss some of the emerging trends that we are witnessing and how these regimes are able or unable to address such developments. I will then conclude with a look at where we should go from here. I will start by characterizing the growing WMD threat. In terms of the terrorist dimension to the problem, we see an alarming pattern developing. With increasing frequency since the mid-1980's, we have seen a steady growth in the awareness of and interest in WMD by terrorist groups. These groups are aggressively trying to procure the necessary materials to conduct a WMD attack. For instance, Osama bin Laden has publicly announced his WMD aspirations. He has likened the acquisition and use of WMD to a religious duty. Our friends and allies have, on several occasions, thwarted WMD acquisition efforts, whether we are talking about cyanide smuggling or trafficking in radiological materials. A few months ago, for instance, a terrorist cell was caught with a cyanide compound and a map of the U.S. Embassy in Rome. Though we have had some important successes, we know we are not completely blocking WMD procurement efforts by terrorist organizations. |