Second, a strategic response is also a multifaceted response. A range of tools must be exploited. These include intelligence, defenses (both passive and active), diplomacy, legal measures, preparedness efforts, financial measures, and military options. Arms control is also important, but, particularly with respect to biological weapons, classic multilateral arms control (of the kind reflected in the Chemical Weapons Convention) is unlikely to yield significant results. The combination of politics, science and technology, and treaty language that surrounds the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and efforts to negotiate a legally binding protocol to the BWC argue for an approach that goes beyond the traditional modalities of arms control to new ways of thinking about how to strengthen the Convention and the norm against BW which the treaty embodies. Export controls also have an important role to play, but it is not necessarily the traditional contribution of the past. Export control regimes - which do not really control but rather regulate through licensing systems - can be effective in delaying the acquisition of sensitive technologies, but in the longer term they cannot realistically be expected to stop the transfer of technology that may be used for weapons purposes, particularly since so much of that technology also has legitimate commercial, medical, and other uses. If Iraq was capable of assembling the necessary materials and equipment for a robust CBW program as much as 15 years ago, how much more difficult will it be to deny access to technology to a determined player in an era of rapidly expanding knowledge and accelerating global dissemination of capabilities? But this does not mean that export controls should be abandoned; they perform other functions. Regulation through export controls facilitates the global dissemination of materials and equipment. By defining the rules of the game by which companies must abide, for example, export controls is easier for those companies to engage in international trade and cooperation. As Brad Roberts, chair of the CBACI Research Council, has argued, export controls can, in fact, be trade enablers rather than trade constraints. It is this role for export controls that should be emphasized in the future. At the same time, the United States must maintain open markets and avoid neoprotectionist practices that deny or severely limit access to markets or appropriate technology which would make key states less inclined to pursue cooperative measures. Each tool of policy contributes something to an effective response to the CBW proliferation challenge. But each tool also has shortcomings that must be overcome, and none of them constitutes a silver bullet that provides the total answer. Rather, for an effective response, the individual tools of policy - including export controls - must be integrated into a coherent strategic framework that realizes the synergies among the various tools of strategy, and facilitates tradeoffs among them so that they do not work at cross-purposes but maximize their potential contribution. The CBW threat is not static and will continue to evolve. Changing actors and evolving technology - especially in biology-related areas - will be major drivers of such change. In this fluid environment, like the offense-defense relationship in military affairs, the relationship between CBW proliferators -- whether state or non-state -- and responders is constantly in flux. It is not always possible to state precisely at any given time how the balance stands between them. The important point, however, is that certainty will only be achieved if we take ourselves out of the game and do nothing. Then we are certain to lose. It is not a loss that the nation or the world can afford. The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials Testimony by Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D. Director, Chemical & Biological Nonproliferation Program before the Subcommittee on International Security, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs November 7, 2001, 2:30 p.m. Room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, and guests: Many thanks for the opportunity to testify before you this afternoon on a topic of great importance and concern in the aftermath of September 11: the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to states and terrorist organizations.' The recent series of anthrax attacks through the U.S. mail indicates that the global spread of dual-use technologies, materials, and scientific know-how relevant to the production and delivery of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) poses a direct threat to U.S. national security. Indeed, although to date the exposures to anthrax-contaminated letters have so far remained limited, a large-scale attack with a chemical or biological agent against U.S. targets at home or abroad now appears to be a real possibility. Until the recent wave of anthrax attacks, experts disagreed over the likelihood that such an attack would occur in the foreseeable future. Previously, only a few terrorist groups had acquired and used unconventional weapons, and nearly all had encountered major technical hurdles in doing so. Perhaps the best-known example occurred in March 1995, when the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo released sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 people and injuring nearly a thousand. While psychologically devastating, this attack fell far short of the cult's goal of killing tens of thousands of civilians with the aim of triggering widespread anarchy and enabling Aum to seize control of the Japanese government. Despite Aum's estimated net worth of roughly $1 billion and its active recruitment of chemists and biologists from Japanese universities to create a CBW arsenal, the cult failed in repeated attempts to carry out true mass-casualty I am grateful to Cheryl Loeb and Gary Ackerman of the Monterey Institute for their invaluable assistance in preparing this testimony. attacks with either chemical or biological weapons. This case suggests that terrorist acquisition and delivery of CBW agents on a large scale is technically challenging. Nevertheless, the ongoing anthrax attacks against the United States indicate that the prospect of sub-state groups acquiring and using a biological weapon is no longer theoretical; bioterrorism has become a clear and present danger. Moreover, the high quality of the anthrax mailed to Senator Tom Daschle's office, containing dried spores that were reportedly milled to an extremely fine powder and processed with chemical additives so that they would readily become airborne and infect through the lungs, suggests that the perpetrators had access to specialized technology and know-how related to the "weaponization" of anthrax. Perhaps they acquired a limited supply of the material on the international black market, or more worrisome developed a manufacturing capability for dried anthrax powder. If the latter is true, the perpetrators would have the potential to disseminate larger quantities of dried anthrax spores through the air, potentially exposing thousands of people. Given the real possibility that the perpetrators have received assistance from former weapons scientists or from a state-sponsor, it is important to assess: (1) which states have been assessed to possess chemical and biological weapons, and (2) the extent to which trade in dual-use materials and technologies contributes to clandestine CBW programs. My testimony will first discuss the state and sub-state actors of CBW proliferation concern. I will then turn to technologies and materials that could be employed to produce and deliver these agents. States of CBW Proliferation Concern Evidence from open sources indicates that roughly 13 countries are actively seeking biological and chemical warfare capabilities. Proliferant states of particular concern to the United States include Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. (For more information on state-level chemical and biological weapons programs, see Table 1.) Iraq The current status of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs is unknown because of that country's efforts since 1991 to conceal the full extent of its prohibited activities. Iraq's expulsion of inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in December 1998, and Baghdad's continuing refusal to admit inspectors from the successor agency, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), has further impeded international efforts to assess the status of Iraq's prohibited weapons programs. It appears likely, however, that Iraq has rebuilt key elements of its chemical and pharmaceutical production infrastructure that were destroyed during the Gulf War and by UNSCOM. These dual-use facilities could easily be converted to the production of CBW agents, and probably already have been. Various reports indicate that Iraq may retain a sizable stockpile of chemical munitions, including 25 or more special chemical/biological warheads for the al-Hussein ballistic missile and 2,000 aerial bombs. Iraq is also believed to possess sufficient precursor chemicals to produce hundreds of tons of mustard gas, VX, and other nerve agents. In short, Iraq retains the materials and technical expertise to revive its chemical warfare program within months, if it has not already done so. Iraq has not signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.2 Iraq is also believed to retain a substantial offensive biological warfare (BW) capability. During the UNSCOM inspections, Iraqi officials repeatedly misled the inspectors as to the nature and extent of its BW program and prevented them from verifying its claim to have unilaterally destroyed its biological arsenal. According to some estimates, Iraq may retain a stockpile of BW munitions, including more than 150 R400 aerial bombs and 25 or more special warheads for the al-Hussein ballistic missile. Iraq may also have retained a mobile production facility with the capacity to produce dried biological agents, which are particularly lethal. Iraq has not accounted for 17 metric tones of BW growth media, and may possess undeclared stocks of smallpox virus. Iraq currently maintains the technical expertise and equipment to reconstitute its biological warfare capabilities within months, including production of anthrax bacteria, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene) toxin.3 Iran Although Iran has ratified both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, it continues to pursue the acquisition of technologies and materials needed for the production of chemical and biological agents. Iran began its chemical weapons program in the mid-1980s, in response to Iraqi chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq War. After 1985, Iran began manufacturing and stockpiling blister, blood, and choking agents, including cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and mustard gas. Reportedly, Iran began nerve agent production in 1994. Iran continues to augment its chemical weapons production capability by seeking to acquire relevant production technology, technical expertise, and precursor chemicals from other states, including Russia and China.4 2 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," September 7, 2001 <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm>; Javed Ali, "Chemical Weapons and the IranIraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance," Nonproliferation Review 8(1), Spring 2001, p. 43-58; Kelly Motz, "What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left? What Is On Its Shopping List?" Iraq Watch, http://www.iraqwatch.org/updates/update.asp?id=wpn200107231601; United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), "Report: Disarmament," January 25, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm; Steve Bowman, "Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 17, 1998), pp. 1-5; U.S. Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," February 13, 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html; Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001, <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_mideast.pdf>, pp. 75-79; United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), “UNSCOM Main Achievements," May 1998, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/achievement.htm>; Physicians for Human Rights, Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against its Kurdish Population (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, February 1989), pp. 1-2. 3 United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), "Report: Disarmament," January 25, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm; Kelly Motz, "What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left?" Steve Bowman, "Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 17, 1998), pp. 1-5; Barbara Starr, "UNSCOM Inspectors Still Doubt Iraq's Arms Claims," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 25, 1998, p. 18; U.S. Government White Paper 1998; Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, 2001, pp. 81-84; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control/Contemporary Security Policy, 14(3), December 1993, pp. 229-271. E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 10, 1997, p. 37; Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons,” in Planning the Unthinkable, Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, eds., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 79 |