securing weapons of mass destruction from theft, and engaging scientists formerly engaged in weapons development in peaceful projects in the hope that they will not be tempted to sell their skills to terrorists or countries of concern. Reducing the formidable proliferation risks posed by former Soviet WMD assets is clearly in the U.S. national interest. U.S. efforts have helped make large quantities of WMD-related materials more secure and have supplemented the incomes of several thousand former Soviet scientists. However, the cost of such efforts has been substantial and will continue to grow, and the timeframes for completing them have been extended considerably. Since 1991, the Congress has authorized about $5.5 billion for U.S. programs to reduce former Soviet WMD threats and is now doing so at a rate of several hundreds of millions of dollars annually. U.S. agencies plan to spend billions of dollars to continue to address these threats over the next two decades. For example, the Department of Energy now estimates that it will spend more than $2.2 billion by 2020 to help Russia secure certain nuclear materials that could be used for weapons. The Department of Defense also is seeking to build a $890 million facility that would destroy Russian chemical weapons at one of Russia's several chemical weapons storage sites. While these efforts are potentially valuable, the reliability of such cost estimates is uncertain, at best, due to Russia's apparent inability to shoulder a substantial portion of the burden and to changing Russian requirements. For example, the United States estimated in 1996 that the Department of Defense would pay no more than $275 million to help Russia design and build a facility intended to store plutonium extracted from dismantled weapons. However, in 1998, Russia's apparent inability to contribute its share of funding to the project led the United States to agree to pay more than $412 million for a substantially downsized version of the facility. It is worth noting that the Department of Defense's recent estimate that it will pay $890 million to design and build a Russian chemical weapons elimination facility rests on the assumption that Russia will pay more than $750 million in related infrastructure and operations costs. In addition, the Department of Energy's hopes of controlling the cost of securing Russian nuclear materials by consolidating storage sites rests on Russia's willingness to reduce its requirements by closing certain sites and consolidating nuclear material. The ability of the United States to conclusively demonstrate that its efforts are having a positive impact is limited at best. In many cases, it may never be proved that these programs have substantially achieved their intended purpose. We can be fairly confident that DOD aid has helped two former Soviet states meet their arms control obligations by destroying launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, we may never know if our aid to underemployed former Soviet weapons scientists has reduced the desire of any one of them to sell his or her skills to terrorists or countries of concern. Also, because U.S. assistance generally employs these scientists part-time, they often continue to work at former Soviet WMD research institutes. Under certain circumstances, aiding such scientists without careful screening and monitoring could create new risks for U.S. national security. Our ability to assess the impact of our aid is also made difficult, in some cases, by Russia's reluctance to provide U.S. officials with full access to relevant sites and materials. Conclusion The tragic events of the last few months provide the impetus for reexamining the U.S. policy instruments used to restrict the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and rogue states. Ten years ago, the international community made major changes in its controls over nuclear technology after revelations about the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. We may be at a similar juncture today. We need to reassess the adequacy of our current policy tools to address our new vulnerabilities and changed perceptions of the threats we face. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. Contacts and Acknowledgments For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Joseph Christoff at (202) 5128979. F. James Shafer, Stephen M. Lord, Eugene Aloise, Lynn Cothern, Diana Glod, Jeffrey D. Phillips, Nanette J. Ryen, and Pierre R. Toureille made key contributions to this testimony. |