House and Senate, authorizers and appropriators, and Foreign Relations and Armed Services can result in half-a-loaf compromises that complicate or disrupt program implementation.

Coordination with recipients: International activities require the participation of the recipients. Several trends have converged to complicate relationships with recipient nations. Project areas have moved from very specific and measurable (e.g., remove all 1,400 strategic nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan) to diffuse (e.g., prevent Russian bioscientists from aiding proliferators). Projects with clear prior commitment (e.g., eliminate Russian nuclear weapons to achieve START I levels) have been joined by projects with only grudging acceptance (e.g., permanently dispose of 34 tons of weapons plutonium). Projects with built-in reciprocity (e.g., bilateral verification of START eliminations) have led to projects with unilateral inspection rights (e.g., U.S. monitoring of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility).

National attitudes towards the U.S. on the part of the recipients have swung from euphoric openness to annoyance to fatigue to suspicion Security officials have reasserted themselves both in the U.S. (after the Los Alamos spy imbroglio) and in Russia (after the election of an ex-KGB president). Ever-increasing U.S. demands for accountability and access to sensitive facilities reinforce suspicions of Russian security officials, and the cancellation of site visits slows down programs. Congressional limitations on U.S. support to Russia's top priorities (retiring officer housing, elimination of general purpose submarines, conversion of military cities and populations) make it harder to achieve U.S. priorities, which the Russians do not take as seriously (fissile material control and disposition, closure of biological weapons institutes). Efforts to condition nonproliferation cooperation on changing undesirable Russian behavior (e.g., Iranian nuclear cooperation) are ineffective, because many Russians would prefer that these programs, and the burden of U.S. cooperation, simply go away. Yet, terminating these programs would be devastating to our national security.

Recommendations

Today's heightened awareness of the threat posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons makes consideration of the organization and coordination of our nonproliferation programs essential and timely. At the same time, re-organizing these programs, no matter how wisely, will not by itself make a significant improvement in program effectiveness. Several commissions, including the Baker-Cutler Commission, the Deutch Commission, and the Hart-Rudman Commission all recommended the creation of a high-level White House position dedicated solely to nonproliferation programs. Administration responses to such directives have typically been limited to renaming existing officials or committees, leaving the status quo essentially unchanged. Without senior-level commitment within the White House to improving and maintaining a high-quality interagency coordination process, the actions of Congress will not have the

In light of the recommendations of these prestigious panels, I am not about to win an award for original thinking. I recommend the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor, committed explicitly and exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction. High-level attention to nonproliferation programs within the White House is the single most effective step we can take to make our programs match the growing threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Better interagency coordination, improved funding, more flexibility will follow from this appointment, and won't happen without it.

This new Deputy National Security Advisor must have, and must be seen to have, the personal confidence of both the National Security Advisor and the President. He or she would convene regular and substantive "principals meetings" to ensure all agencies are acting cooperatively toward a common purpose. He or she would develop a unified presentation of agency budgets for nonproliferation programs to allow both the President and Congress to see clearly what is being done and to understand the justification for each operating entity's role and function. Such a high-level official assigned to this issue would be able to command more attention to these issues in recipient countries.

This new Deputy National Security Advisor would speak for the President and National Security Advisor to all relevant Congressional committees and panels. He or she would be the ultimate authority and bear the highest responsibility for the state of our nonproliferation efforts. This would ensure consistency and authority in statements of Administration positions and broader coordination and vision across program areas.

Congress should also explore how it might more effectively exercise its oversight of these important responsibilities. A unified budget presentation, a more effective and transparent coordination of Executive branch functions, a high-level White House authority who can speak for all programs, should win greater confidence from both houses and both parties, and encourage the Congress to authorize and appropriate monies in larger packages allowing much greater programming authority and flexibility.

Ten years ago, a group of bipartisan Senators convinced their colleagues to allocate $400 million to help secure the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union. This expenditure was not embraced by everyone. Some argued that the prospect of these weapons falling into the wrong hands was far off and remote. The threat today is neither far off nor remote. It can be seen by the untrained eye; and so combating it is no longer a matter of vision; it is a matter of common sense and self-defense. Our nonproliferation programs today need to be clearly defined, well coordinated, better funded, and led at the highest levels.

In whatever manner Congress and the Executive decide to organize our programs - and there are many effective ways to do so - they must have high-level Presidential attention. Any organizational structure with high-level attention will be better than the best

Testimony of Leonard S. Spector
Deputy Director

Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on improving the effectiveness of U.S. nonproliferation programs in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. I am currently Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, based at the Center's Washington, D.C., office. The Center is the nation's largest organization for research and training on the subject of nonproliferation. Prior to joining the Center, I served during the second Clinton Administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

It is a particular honor for me to appear here today because, earlier in my career, I served as Chief Counsel of this Subcommittee, and I am familiar with its many important contributions to curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

My remarks today are based on my own scholarship and experience, as well as upon those of a number of colleagues at the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies who have worked for many years on these questions, including the Center's director, Dr. William Potter.

The Subcommittee has requested that I begin my remarks with a review of U.S. nonproliferation programs in the New Independent States (NIS) and that I highlight the challenges that they are currently encountering. To help the Subcommittee understand these issues I have prepared a table consolidating this information with respect to the major U.S. programs in this field. (Attachment 1.) In the interest of time, however, I will speak today only about the most significant issues that must be addressed to reduce the threats posed by the Soviet WMD legacy.

I. Importance for U.S. Counter-Terrorism Policy

The fundamental goal of the majority of these programs – in particular, those programs aimed at eliminating or securing fissile material and at employing Soviet WMD scientists - is to prevent terrorist organizations or states of proliferation concern from obtaining WMD materials or expertise. As such, these programs are an integral and highly important component of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. Osama bin Laden, is known to be seeking weapons of mass destruction, and, of course, recently claimed to possess chemical and nuclear weapons. (Most observers disbelieve the latter claim.) Bin Laden is also known to have extensive links, through the al Qaeda network, in the former Soviet Union.

It is worth recalling the scale of the Soviet WMD legacy. The Department of Energy estimates that Russia possesses 603 tons of weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium

or highly enriched uranium) outside of nuclear weapons, enough for 41,000 new nuclear armaments. To provide a benchmark, North Korea's nuclear potential, considered a serious U.S. national security threat, is based on its apparent possession of enough plutonium for one or two nuclear devices – less than .005 percent of the Russian stockpile I described above. One shudders to imagine the mischief that Osama bin Laden might cause if he were he to obtain a comparable amount of nuclear weapons material. Russia also possesses a vast arsenal of chemical weapons, currently awaiting destruction, as well as the ability to manufacture the world's most potent biological weapons. The bulk of these various WMD materials are not subject to adequate security measures.

Despite new evidence of terrorist interest in acquiring and using WMD, the Bush administration has not acted to accelerate efforts to improve security over WMD materials and expertise in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, nearly ten months after taking office - and after a complete budget cycle -- the administration is still "reviewing" U.S. nonproliferation programs in Russia, apparently unable to decide whether and/or how to pursue a number of these critically important initiatives. Inexplicably, the one point it apparently has decided is that the programs do not need additional funding and that, accordingly, no monies from the $40 billion anti-terrorism package will be used for this purpose.

2

II. Securing WMD Materials and Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the NIS3

Russia possesses the world's largest stocks of weapons of mass destruction and WMD materials. This inventory includes hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons-usable fissile material, thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, 32,000 tons of weaponized chemical weapon nerve agents, and unknown quantities of the world's most potent biological weapon (BW) agents. Nuclear weapon materials and BW agents are also located in other Soviet successor states. In addition, Russia and other NIS countries are home to WMD experts, numbering in the tens of thousands. This part of my testimony will concentrate on three areas: securing fissile material; addressing the dangers posed by tactical nuclear weapons; and reducing the threat posed by the Soviet BW legacy.

Fissile Materials Tactical Nuclear Weapons. The U.S. Department of Energy has an active and highly successful cooperative program with Russia to improve the security at Russian nuclear sites, known as the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program. To date, however, facilities housing less than one third of Russian nuclear weapons material has received “rapid security upgrades," such as bricking up windows, installing security cameras and alarms, and hardening guard posts -- the first major step toward enhanced protection under the MPC&A program. Rapid security upgrades will not be completed on all 603 tons of fissile material until 2007, and

1 Department of Energy, Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program Strategic Plan - 2001 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, July 2001).

“Interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph," The Nonproliferation Review (Winter 2001), p. 3, http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/83/jos83.htm

U.S. programs to secure WMD expertise in the NIS appear to be working smoothly and will not be addressed in this portion of my remarks. However, these programs would benefit from improved strategic planning and coordination, as discussed below.