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Our previous efforts have yielded significant results, but there is far more work yet to do. Yesterday, Senator Dodd and I wrote in the New York Times that Presidents Bush and Putin should use the current summit as an opportunity to discuss effective ways to ensure that weapons and materials of mass destruction in and around Russia remain safe, accounted for, and secure.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the discussions between Presidents Bush and Putin are already yielding agreement in this area. As you noted, yesterday afternoon, President Bush noted that the United States and Russia will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise. Presidents Bush and Putin also announced yesterday that they will dramatically reduce nuclear arsenals in both countries. This will probably require more spending from the United States.

If we in Congress are asked to spend more of our budget on this effort, then we must ensure these funds are spent efficiently, effectively, and not on repetitive efforts. And again, Mr. Chairman, that is as much the focus of my legislation as any other part.

I appreciate the Subcommittee's serious review of this timely and relevant issue and I would say, Mr. Chairman, that if there is anything I can do to further that effort, I look forward to working with you and the members of this Subcommittee. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. Thank you for your leadership in this area. I really appreciate what you have said. It will be helpful to the Subcommittee and with you, too, in looking for ways of preparing us to deal with whatever threats that might be coming, so I thank you very much again for your

statement.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Now you will hear from the real pros.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

At this time, I will call our next panel, Ms. Gary Jones from GAO, Ms. Laura Holgate from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and Leonard Spector from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. They have been asked to discuss current nonproliferation programs, how they are coordinated with Federal, private, and international efforts, and how S. 673, the Hagel bill, would make these programs and efforts more effective.

Ms. Jones, please proceed with your statement at this time. I want all of you to know that your full written statements will be entered into the record.

TESTIMONY OF MS. GARY L. JONES,1 DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR AND NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Ms. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are pleased to be here today to discuss our recent work on U.S. nonproliferation programs and to comment on S. 673, a bill to establish an interagency committee to review and coordinate U.S. nonproliferation programs.

As others have said, the events of September 11 have heightened the importance of these nonproliferation programs to our national security. Let me first briefly summarize the results of our work on several of the U.S. Government's nonproliferation programs. We have found that they have achieved some success, but more needs to be done to keep nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies out of the hands of terrorists and countries of concern.

Successes include improved security systems, which have reduced the risk of theft of nuclear material in Russia; the purchase of weapons grade uranium that is equivalent to 4,000 nuclear warheads that has been turned into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors; and the creation of non-military jobs for some weapons scientists.

But the task is far from over. Hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material remain at some risk because improved security measures have not yet been installed. This is because DOE's program to secure this material has experienced problems with access to sensitive Russian sites. Further, DOE does not know how much and for how long additional assistance will be needed to sustain the operation and maintain the new security equipment already involved. Two DOE programs and one at the State Department share the goal of employing Russia's weapons scientists in non-military work and thereby preventing them from selling their knowledge to terrorists or countries of concern. With hundreds employed by one program and several thousand employed part-time by another, these programs are a long way from reaching the 30,000 to 75,000 senior nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons scientists without full-time employment.

Even when jobs are created, these programs face difficulty in conclusively demonstrating that they are achieving their intended goal of preventing the spread of weapons-related knowledge and expertise. Our reports on these DOD nonproliferation programs made numerous recommendations to improve their overall management and DOE has addressed or is in the process of making changes to address these recommendations.

Let me turn to the bill, S. 673, that the Subcommittee has under consideration. There is some debate among officials, both within and outside government, about the need for more coordination of U.S. nonproliferation programs. To prepare for this hearing, we spoke with representatives from the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and some private interest groups. They all believe that coordination among Federal agencies implementing nonproliferation programs is already taking place and the mechanism envisioned by the bill may not be needed.

However, based on our work and the findings of two independent groups that recently examined these programs, the Deutch Commission and the Baker-Cutler Task Force, we believe that additional coordination would be helpful. For example, some officials told us that better coordination is needed between the United States and international programs, such as those implemented by the European Union. Further, program officials have also noted that although coordination does occur at some level, it is frequently informal and subject to changes in program personnel. We believe

resources, and focus programs more clearly on common goals and objectives.

However, the legislation did not address a number of other problems that I have just talked about, such as limited access to sensitive Russian sites and various program management concerns. However, the coordinating body envisioned by the legislation could serve as a vehicle to share information and best practices for addressing these types of problems.

We also believe the bill could be strengthened by mandating development of an overarching strategic plan that clearly identifies overall goals, time frames for meeting these goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating resources government-wide to address nonproliferation concerns. Both the Deutch Commission and the Baker-Cutler Task Force believe that such a strategic plan was the missing element from the U.S. Government implementation of nonproliferation programs.

Building on the individual programs' strategic plans, a government-wide plan could also address questions such as are the end dates for the completion of the various nonproliferation programs, such as securing nuclear materials in Russia, still viable? How can the security improvements made be sustained beyond the completion of the programs? And in light of September 11, do we continue to have the right mix of nonproliferation programs needed to address the varying security problems facing our Nation?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Jones.
At this time, I would like to yield to Senator Cleland.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank particularly our colleague, Senator Hagel, and the witnesses who appear here today to testify about this important subject.

The threat posed by the weapons of mass destruction that are retained in the states comprising the former Soviet Union is actually mind boggling. I was struck by the fact that a bipartisan task force headed by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler has recently called this, "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States," and called for a four-fold funding increase for our threat reduction efforts.

In the wake of September 11, we cannot hesitate to take strong action to implement this recommendation. We are indeed fortunate that 10 years ago, a group of distinguished Senators, including my friend and the former Senator from Georgia, Sam Nunn, put in place what has come to be known as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. The programs that have been carried out under this legislation have, without a doubt, profoundly improved the security of the United States and may well have prevented a far worse catastrophe than what we have recently experienced. I reiterate my support for these programs and call for the enhanced funding recommended by the bipartisan task force mentioned previously.

To the purpose of this hearing, I say that the proposed legislation

sources for cooperative threat reduction and I support it. I also believe that the committee proposed by the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 will need a highly-placed advocate to ensure that its mandate is effectively carried out.

To that end, I endorse Ms. Holgate's recommendation for the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor committed exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction. This threat is far too grave to go without such an advocate. I am convinced that our national security depends upon the effective coordination and resourcing that this position will enable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement and your support.

I would like to now call on Ms. Holgate for her testimony.

TESTIMONY OF LAURA S.H. HOLGATE,1 VICE PRESIDENT FOR RUSSIAN NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE

Ms. HOLGATE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and other Subcommittee Members for the opportunity to testify today about how the U.S. Government can strengthen its efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and keep them from falling into the hands of groups and states who would do us harm.

The Nation and the world discovered on September 11 that there are terrorist forces in the world who will stop at nothing in their efforts to take innocent lives. The work that the U.S. Government does to reduce the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials is our first line of defense in keeping these weapons out of terrorist hands.

Dismantling weapons, securing material, eliminating infrastructure, and directing know-how to peaceful pursuits, all of these play an essential role in fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We have taken important steps towards these problems, but to protect the security of the American people, we need giant strides, so I would like to thank the Chairman and the Members of the Subcommittee for putting the spotlight on this issue and giving me and others a chance to contribute our ideas.

President Bush clearly shares the concern that has been noted by Howard Baker, Lloyd Cutler, and many others in the introductory comments to this hearing. Two years ago at the Reagan Library, candidate Bush praised, "the foresight and statesmanship of Senators Lugar and Nunn for their legislation to improve security at many Russian nuclear facilities," and then he added, "A great deal of Russian nuclear material cannot be accounted for. The next President must press for an accurate inventory of all this material and we must do more. I will ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible as quickly as possible."

Sadly, the administration's actions in the first months of its tenure fall short of the vision and purpose articulated by President Bush. Earlier this year, the administration announced a review of

nonproliferation programs, then cut the program budgets back before it even began the review. The review itself stopped action in its tracks. Travel was halted. Work was postponed. Momentum was lost. And program managers felt they lacked the authority to go forward. The review was undertaken without even the courtesy of telling our partners in Russia. Now we are told the review is complete, but we have not seen its outcome.

I strongly support a review of our nonproliferation programs. We have not had one since 1993. But it needs to be broad and it needs to be strategic. The review that was recently completed appeared to be aimed merely at finding inefficiencies in individual program activities. That is a worthy purpose in its own terms, but it is no substitute for strategic thinking about U.S. national security goals and how threat reduction programs can help achieve them.

I worked for many years in many capacities, first at the Department of Defense in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, then at the Department of Energy, and now at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, to implement and advance these programs to prevent nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons from falling into the wrong hands. It is my view that these programs are critically important, largely effective, and because of the obvious urgency, more in need than ever of high-level attention, increased funding, greater staffing, and continuous fresh thinking to help speed up the pace and widen the scope of these programs. If terrorists are racing to acquire weapons of mass destruction, we ought to be racing to stop them.

Ten years after the passage of the landmark Nunn-Lugar Act to establish the legal basis of nonproliferation cooperation with Russia and other former Soviet States, U.S. Government activities in this area approach $1 billion annually and involve multiple agencies from Defense to Health and Human Services, myriad contractors, and over a dozen Congressional committees and subcommittees. This growth has been, by and large, organic, with each agency pursuing its own contacts and relationships in recipient countries, assembling and justifying its own budget, implementing programs based on its own culture and approaches, and interacting with its own Congressional oversight committees.

This is a complex task. Some point to the involvement of so many agencies as evidence of poor management. It is not. It is evidence that such a program requires wide-ranging expertise and, therefore, will always be a challenge to administer, a challenge that can be fully met, in my view, only with high-level leadership and coordination. This leadership and coordination has been hard to come by since the early days of these programs.

Where it has worked well, it has been a consequence of personalities, committees, or commissions that are not enduring features of the organizational structure, either within the U.S. Government or in relations between the United States and states of the former Soviet Union. Coordination with nongovernmental organizations like mine also occurs primarily ad hoc, based on personal relationships and our own initiative. Relationships with other countries working in these areas tends to be intermittent and opportunistic.

Despite the complexity of these nonproliferation cooperation ac

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