COMBATING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) WITH NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS: NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE COORDINATION ACT OF 2001 THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2001 U.S. SENATE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Akaka, Cleland, Cochran, and Carnahan. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will come to order. I want to thank our witnesses from the administration for being here with us today. We are joined by Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations; Kenneth Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation from the Department of Energy; and Matthew Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. I would like to reiterate that our Subcommittee rules require all testimony to be submitted 48 hours before the hearing. The Departments represented today were invited to testify at this hearing more than 2 weeks ago. In spite of this and repeated reminders as of yesterday afternoon, we had received only one statement. This was as of yesterday. I would like to apologize to the Members of the Subcommittee for the administration's inability to comply with the Subcommittee rules. This morning's hearing is a continuation of one we held on Wednesday, November 14. The reason I called these hearings is because I have been deeply concerned about potential proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union. Since September 11, I think this is an issue that we have to focus on with even greater intensity. President Bush came into office declaring that he would ask, “the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible as quickly as possible." He began his administration announcing a review of Russian nonproliferation programs. This was a welcome first step. One of the reasons for this hearing is to determine how we can focus our aid efforts more effectively. Unfortunately, the administration cut the budgets for these programs before completing its review. This approach does not seem to me to make sense, particularly in light of the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks. I hope today the administration will be able to brief us on the results of its review and indicate to us what its intentions are concerning funding for the future of these vital programs. If it still proposes to advocate cutting these programs, the administration needs to justify why these cuts increase our security. We have lost valuable time in figuring how to recork the bottles containing dangerous chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. I hope the administration shares my sense of urgency, and if it does not, I would like to know why not. After the first day of the Bush-Putin summit, President Bush remarked that, "Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. .. we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons material and expertise." Today's witnesses will discuss how the administration proposes to carry out that pledge. I hope we may learn how the various programs in the different agencies involved in nonproliferation and threat reduction work together, how these agencies include private sector and nongovernmental efforts in nonproliferation activities. We must make certain that government and non-government spending on nonproliferation programs complement each other so that resources are used effectively and efficiently. Let me again thank our witnesses again for being with us today. I look forward to your testimony on these important and timely questions. At this time, I would like to call on my colleague for his statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It has been clear to me for some time that nonproliferation is an absolutely critical element to our national security. I believe that we must expand and enhance our current nonproliferation programs to eliminate as quickly as possible the threat posed by inadequately controlled weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. A bipartisan task force led by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler recently concluded that the funding for these programs should be increased to four times the current level. As I stated at our previous hearing on this topic, the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 is a useful step to take in conjunction with the increased funding recommended by the Baker-Cutler task force. In their recent book, "Plague Wars"-and I have a copy of it here it is a fascinating book. Investigative journalist Tom Man cal weapons research that was conducted by the Soviet Union. They portray a bureaucracy run amuck with layers of secrecy that prevented effective oversight by any responsible agency. Furthermore, they cite Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA reports that as late as 3 years ago, we could not preclude the potential of ongoing biological warfare research in Russia. Some reports even suggest the Russian program has produced genetically engineered anthrax and other pathogens resistant to existing antibiotics and vaccines. The proliferation problem is two-dimensional. We must ensure that any existing stocks of biological agents are properly secured and destroyed as soon as possible. We must prevent Russian scientists with expertise in such weapons from selling their skills to rogue states or terrorists. In the face of this clear and present danger, we have disturbing evidence that our own capacity to respond to bioterrorist attacks is inadequate. Besides the difficulties in coordination revealed by the recent anthrax attacks, Department of Defense exercises over the past several years have highlighted problems in our preparedness. Even with this overwhelming evidence that more must be done quickly, my efforts to speed funding to improve the facilities at the CDC have met with opposition. The CDC is the arm of our government responsible for controlling outbreaks of disease. The almost accidental involvement of the CDC in the first anthrax mailing in Florida is all that stood between this country and a far higher casualty count from these anthrax attacks. The current facilities at the CDC that house these critical links in our ability to detect and respond to a biological attack are painfully and woefully inadequate. In the middle of the anthrax crisis, a broken cable line interrupting the CDC's testing of samples for 12 hours was found. With a finite window of opportunity to test, diagnose, and treat victims of a possible biological attack, every minute of testing counts. To lose half-a-day is an eternity for scientists and technicians. Yet, it has happened, and it will happen again if Congress does not act to upgrade these facilities quickly. That is why I introduced the Public Health Emergencies Accountability Act earlier this month. This act puts in place a procedure that allows clear assignment of responsibility in cases where the public health is threatened. It further mandates the exchange of information between institutions primarily responsible for public health, such as the CDC, and those primarily responsible for countering criminal and terrorist activities. We must resource the CDC to carry out its critical function. The CDC currently has a 10-year construction plan to make these necessary upgrades, but since September 11, it has been painfully obvious that we do not have 10 years to get the CDC ready for what we now know is a very possible bioterrorist attack. We need a 5-year plan at the very least. That means Congress needs to approve the $250 million in funding this year. The Senate has approved the full $250 million, and I helped to get $100 million here, added on in the Senate, over the $150 million the President proposed, but I am getting very concerned that the Members of the The Members of the House who are participating in the Labor/ HHS/Appropriations Conference Committee are not willing to fund the CDC above the $175 million for construction which passed the House this fall. I do not know what else has to happen in this country to demonstrate to the Members of the House that this construction is not only important, but mandatory, to upgrade the CDC as soon as possible. And I call on them today to match the Senate's mark of $250 million in construction aid to the CDC. My friend, the former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, continues his tireless advocacy for the nonproliferation initiatives begun under his sponsorship 10 years ago. He has recently provided testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee upon which I sit with a series of recommendations for enhancing our counter-proliferation programs as well as improving our ability to respond to a bioterrorist attack. These recommendations include increase funding for nonproliferation programs, including a program to actively engage the scientists of the Russian and former Soviet Union programs in our own defensive research. Such a program could enhance our ability to produce and stockpile needed vaccines while preventing the loss of dangerous skills to other parties. I am convinced that our national security depends upon the effective coordination and resourcing of our nonproliferation programs. I support both the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 of which I am a co-sponsor and the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor committed exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction. We can no longer afford to under-resource nonproliferation. Many distinguished of both parties have cited the need for increasing nonproliferation funding. Our intelligence community continues to highlight the threat of improperly controlled weapons falling into the wrong hands. The time to act is now. I encourage the administration and my colleagues in Congress to support the full resourcing of required nonproliferation programs and our public health infrastructure. There is no higher national security priority. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement, Senator Cleland. Now I would like to ask for the statements of our witnesses. Mr. Van Diepen, you may give your statement at this time. All the witnesses will have their full written statements entered into the record. You may begin, Mr. Van Diepen. TESTIMONY OF VANN H. VAN DIEPEN,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator. I am very pleased to be here to discuss nonproliferation assistance programs and coordination. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them is a central security threat facing the United States, 1 The prepared statement of Mr. Van Diepen appears in the Appendix on page 268. |