our allies, and our friends. Where we once faced thousands of nuclear weapons under centralized command of a rival great power, September 11 and the biological attacks since have shown how much more diverse and less predictable the threat has become.

While we must be prepared to address the many avenues from which rogue countries and terrorists and their supporters may choose when seeking to advance their attack capabilities, we must also, as both of you have noted in your statements, address the Soviet legacy and its proliferation implications.

The State Department has direct responsibility for several nonproliferation programs directed at or relevant to the countries of the former Soviet Union. In addition, the Department provides foreign policy guidance and diplomatic support for the programs of other agencies.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the new countries lacked the laws, expertise, and technical resources to implement effective export controls. State's Export Control Assistance Program was created to help establish or strengthen export controls in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. As funding increased and the program matured, the scope has expanded to include key countries through which weapons of mass destruction, materials, and technologies are likely to transit while continuing to support the development of more robust systems in potential supplier states. This program has grown from less than $5 million per year in the mid-1990's to the President's request for $39 million for this fiscal year.

State Department chairs an interagency working group on export control assistance which directs and coordinates the work of the various U.S. agencies that implement these programs in over 25 countries worldwide.

Another concern was the threat posed by the thousands of Soviet weapon scientists who no longer would be supported after the Soviet Union's demise, and this is something that Senator Cleland made clear in his statement.

The International Science and Technology Centers began their work to address this problem in Moscow in 1994 and in Kiev in 1995. As the program has matured, the focus has shifted from simply stemming brain drain to also redirecting scientists towards sustainable careers in peaceful, transparent, civilian endeavors in their home countries, be these commercial endeavors or scientific endeavors.

The program now includes nations of particular interest to the U.S. war in Afghanistan: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, and Georgia. Other key regional states, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, are in the process of joining one of the science centers.

For the past 4 years, the State Department has been an active participant in the U.S. effort to redirect former Soviet biological weapons scientists. The program provides incentives for scientists to refrain from cooperating with terrorist groups or states harboring them and focuses their expertise on critical public health needs such as HIV/AIDS, multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, and a number of plant and animal diseases. The solid collaborative re

springboard for expanded work that will respond to the Bush-Putin initiative to counter bioterrorism.

The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, created to permit a rapid response to unanticipated requirements or opportunities, is a flexible responsive nonproliferation tool. Of particular relevance to the request of this Subcommittee is the NDF's work on Tracker, a stand-alone software package that permits a country to use modern computer tools to track export licensing and enforcement matters from a license application through the process, among central government agencies, and with the export control personnel at ports and border posts. This system is now deployed in eight countries with further applications in process.

State Department also plays a key role in efforts concerning plutonium disposition, eliminating Russian plutonium production reactors, support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and safeguarding nuclear materials worldwide and coordinating efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling.

Another priority is making sure that our friends and allies shoulder their fair share of the burden. It is important to build a community committed to paying more than lip service, and we are not shy about letting our allies know when we think they should be providing more resources.

On your question concerning how these programs are funded and how they are coordinated, all U.S. policy implementation and oversight of nonproliferation assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union is coordinated at senior levels by the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, or PCC, chaired by a National Security Council senior director with Assistant Secretary-level representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and other concerned agencies.

This committee works to ensure that individual assistance programs are coordinated within and across agencies and that they serve nonproliferation threat reduction priorities effectively. The PCC has also been charged to develop the strategic plan to guide near- and farther-term nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation with Russia and Eurasia.

In addition, there are standing working groups to ensure close day-to-day coordination among programs so that the programs complement, not compete, with each other in addressing U.S. nonproliferation objectives. The work of these groups feed directly into the PCC. This structure works well and substantially addresses what is proposed in the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001.

As noted in several of the statements from the witnesses in your November 14 hearing, despite the number and complexity of nonproliferation assistance programs, effective implementation and senior-level coordination already exists.

As you know, President Bush directed that a rigorous review be conducted of all U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. That review is now in the final stages.

Without prejudicing the White House's final decision, we expect

will continue to play a critical role in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the post-September 11 world, we believe that stemming the flow of WMD materials, technologies, and expertise worldwide has to be among our highest national priorities and our programs must address that challenge.

The private sector and nongovernmental organizations play several important roles in this endeavor. In our efforts to redirect former weapons scientists to peaceful civilian scientific and commercial research, U.S. industry is helping scientists and their institutes make a permanent transition to peaceful pursuits.

The Science and Technology Centers' industry partner program, for example, now attracts over $20 million annually in corporate funding.

In export controls, U.S. companies have a great deal of expertise in implementing export control regulations. They know the ins and outs of licensing systems, and they have a great deal of knowledge to share with countries and foreign companies that are new to this world. U.S. companies play an important role in our effort to inform and educate their foreign counterparts.

During the past year, a new opportunity for public-private nonproliferation partnership emerged with the establishment of Ted Turner's Nuclear Threat Initiative. Its management and board of directors, which includes several members of Congress, have consulted actively with the administration on their program and have made a commitment to coordinate their activities with those of the government.

I think it is clear that the Bush Administration fully shares the objectives that led Senator Hagel and the other sponsors of S. 673 to offer this legislation. I believe a close examination of how we are coordinating policy and implementation of these programs today will provide clear evidence that we are already doing what Congress would have us do in this regard. S. 673 is not needed, as the Bush Administration has already acted and has already taken the kind of steps this legislation calls for.

We look forward to working with you and other committees and to keeping you fully informed on how we conduct these programs of U.S. nonproliferation assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union, on how we work with other concerned governments to increase their contribution and ensure that our respective assistance is complementary and not duplicative, and on how we seek to work with private-sector donors of assistance in these areas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Van Diepen, for your statement.

Mr. Billingslea, you may give your statement now.

TESTIMONY OF MARSHALL S. BILLINGSLEA,1 ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATION POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before your Subcommittee this morning to discuss nonproliferation assist

ance programs to the republics of the former Soviet Union and the need for careful interagency coordination of these projects.

A key objective of this hearing, as I understand it, is to obtain administration views on S. 673. So I will address this legislation first and then will turn to a brief discussion of the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and our views on proliferation issues in general. And with your permission, I will simply summarize and highlight my testimony and submit the remainder for the record.

The Department of Defense has reviewed S. 673, legislation that would establish an interagency committee within the Executive Branch to review and coordinate U.S. proliferation prevention efforts. We agree that interagency coordination of nonproliferation programs is crucial, but the Department of Defense believes that the Bush Administration is already doing precisely that.

We believe that a legally mandated interagency committee could complicate the existing interagency coordinating process that is currently managed by the National Security Council. We must be careful not to preclude delegation of authority below the Assistant Secretary level since this would be inconsistent with the way the Executive Branch is currently doing business. A great deal of coordination and policy work is done at successive levels beginning with action officers proceeding through office directors and on to Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense and up.

The strategy that the Executive Branch is pursuing is straightforward. First and foremost, we seek to destroy weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, if possible, at their existing location. If it is not possible to destroy such weapons, as is sometimes the case with pathogen stocks that might be needed for disease research, then we will seek to consolidate and secure them. Further, we seek to prevent weapons of mass destruction materials and knowledge from leaving the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The Department of Defense has worked closely with the NSC and other Departments such as the Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce to ensure effective execution of these programs. We also work closely with other agencies to ensure that there is no duplication of effort.

Finally, we must take great care to ensure that U.S. assistance to the former Soviet republics cannot be diverted, cannot contribute to offensive weapons programs or proliferation, or subsidize or otherwise offset other military activities.

A good example of this coordination that is ongoing is found in the Department of Defense's efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. The Department of Defense is part of an interagency group that reviews all biological weapons proliferation prevention projects that are proposed through the Department of State's International Science and Technology Center. Based on those reviews, approved projects are matched to various departments' areas of expertise and authority.

For our part, the Department of Defense is most concerned with the threat that is posed by dangerous pathogens, particularly the infectious diseases such as smallpox. Over the years, we have

sights into the pathogenesis of various biological agents. The Department of Defense engages in targeted biodefense research projects with Russia in these areas, as agreed to in the interagency process. These projects are designed to cooperatively exploit knowledge to enhance U.S. detection of, protection from, and treatment of these potentially deadly substances. I will return to the matter of biological weapons in a moment, but I use it here to illustrate that we do have a good process in place and that that process is working well.

Let me turn now to an overview of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the areas of activity in the former Soviet Union. We believe that the CTR program is an important part of our national security strategy. We are privileged to have enjoyed sustained congressional support and robust funding since the inception of this program.

The President's fiscal year 2002 budget request included $403 million for the DOD CTR program, $403 million, which was virtually the same amount budgeted by the previous administration. We appreciate the House Appropriations Committee's full funding of our request and are hopeful that the Senate Appropriations Committee will be equally supportive.

The funds that we have asked for will be used in a variety of program areas that I can summarize. In the nuclear weapons and delivery systems area, we maintain a Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program that is reducing Russia's strategic offensive arms by destroying strategic WMD delivery systems. I can give you a breakout of the numbers of nuclear submarines, launchers for submarine launch ballistic missiles and SLBMs. It is in my testimony. We also have a Weapons Transportation Security program with Russia that assists in the movement and consolidation of nuclear weapons from Russia's Ministry of Defense operational sites to Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities, and we are providing assistance to the Russian MOD to bolster their ability to respond to and to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapons accident or an attempted theft.

For instance, in fiscal year 2001, we funded 53 train shipments designed to carry nuclear weapons to dismantlement sites. We funded the maintenance of 79 railcars and contracted for special emergency response vehicles and equipment to be given to the MOD.

We continue to be concerned, Mr. Chairman, with the potential for theft or diversion from Russia of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we have developed the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program to make physical security upgrades to key sites, to install inventory control systems and practices to account for these weapons in the custody of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

During fiscal year 2001, we completed testing and we finalized selection on an approved suite of sensors and equipment to be installed at Russian weapon storage sites. We shipped six sets of Quick Fix fences and sensors to various sites in northern Russia. We funded and verified installation of such kinds of equipment at numerous other sites, contracted for additional guard equipment, training, and facilities, and delivered certified computers to help in