MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2002 U.S. SENATE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE, OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Akaka, Thompson, Stevens, and Cochran. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will please come to order. I want to thank our witnesses, Ms. Elisa Harris of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland and Dr. Amy Smithson of the Stimson Center for being with us this morning. I want to also welcome Dr. Jim Walsh of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Dennis Gormley of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Today's hearing about multilateral non-proliferation regimes is the fourth of a series of hearings this Subcommittee has held on the issue of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Last November the Subcommittee held a hearing on current and future weapons of mass destruction and proliferation threats and a second on combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with nonproliferation programs. This Subcommittee has jurisdiction over intergovernmental relationships between the United States and international organizations of which the United States is a member. In holding today's hearing we will explore ways in which these organizations may be used more effectively to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver them. Since September 11 we have all become aware of the dangers directly posed by these weapons. Attacks against the United States are no longer in the realm of science fiction or Hollywood. As technology evolves, these weapons threaten to become even more deadly and more difficult to detect and to prevent from being used. If we do not take September 11 as a wake-up call history may well repeat itself with even more terrible consequences. We must use every tool at our disposal to deter the development and use of these weapons. We know now that the al Qaeda network was busy trying to develop biological, chemical and so-called dirty nuclear weapons. These were not weapons that al Qaeda could develop on its ownthey needed access to foreign technology and foreign scientists. Fortunately, so far it appears that they did not get enough information to perfect these weapon systems before we disrupted their efforts. This demonstrates why it is so important that we choke off the proliferation of WMD technology at its source-government labs and commercial enterprises. Terrorists can gain access to weapons of mass destruction or the technology to make them but they can only do so if foreign governments or foreign scientists or foreign companies willingly provide that information or technology to them. Multilateral agreements are one way to prevent terrorists from gaining weapons technology but multilateral regimes are worthless if they are not effective. China, for example, adheres to most of these agreements but as a recent unclassified report to the Congress by the CIA notes, China continues to provide missile-related technology to a variety of countries of proliferation concern. The CIA cannot rule out contacts by China with foreign nuclear weapons programs and Chinese firms continue to supply chemical weapons production equipment and technology to Iran. If we cannot get countries to abide by the international agreements they have adhered to, then our only alternative may be to take unilateral action to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is not the preferred step but it may be our only choice if multilateral agreements do not work. I welcome our witnesses to today's hearing. I look forward to their suggestions as to what works and what does not work in our effort to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction. I want to welcome Senator Thompson this morning to this hearing and ask him for his statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing today. I think it is an extremely important one. We, of course, these days are very concerned about the terrorism problem, but it is really hand in hand with the proliferation problem. At least 25 countries now possess or are in the process of acquiring and developing capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction-nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or the means to deliver them. The nexus between terrorism and proliferation is very disturbing. The possibility that a terrorist organization will acquire a weapon of mass destruction from one of the many countries developing weapons of mass destruction capabilities is increasing daily. According to a recent intelligence report, several of the 30 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other non-state actors worldwide have sought chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Many of these terrorists are receiving assistance from countries of concern. Highlighting this danger is the fact that our troops recently uncovered rudimentary designs of a nuclear weapon in an al Qaeda facil The rapid spread of information and technology has greatly complicated our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The information on chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons is widely available on the Internet. Multilateral nonproliferation regimes are one of several tools that our country, and the global community at large, uses to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Today we will be discussing the strengths and weaknesses of those regimes. These regimes are not perfect. Each has significant shortcomings. Collectively, though, they have apparently made a difference in slowing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, we should keep in mind that a multilateral nonproliferation regime is only as effective as the strength of each member's commitment to abide by the principles and rules of the regime. Unfortunately, some regimes have members with weak national export control systems that invariably permit elicit technology transfers. Despite being a member of all of the regimes that we will discuss today, Russia, for example, has yet to develop an effective national export control system. Russia's export controls are still apparently incapable of preventing the illicit transfer of WMD technologies. Other regimes have members that are covertly seeking weapons of mass destruction. Iran, for example, is a member of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, but has not honored the commitments to either regime. Intelligence reports tell us that Iran has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons and aggressively sought biotechnical materials and expertise for its offensive biological weapons program. Compounding these problems is the fact that some regimes have members that deliberately sell weapons of mass destruction technologies to countries of concern. These suppliers, though publicly supporting the aims of multilateral non-proliferation regimes, are covertly selling dangerous technologies to rogue states. The most flagrant example of this behavior is China's WMD assistance to Pakistan. Though a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a proclaimed adherent to the Missile Technology Control Regime, China has armed Pakistan with nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles to deliver them. We must never assume that because a country is a member of a multilateral non-proliferation regime that it will abide by its commitments. To do so, would lead us to a false sense of security. We must be cautious and diligent. And we must be careful not to rely on those regimes as the sole means of stopping the spread of WMD information and technology. Moreover, it is critical that we effectively use our other foreign policy tools, as well. Sanctions, national export controls, foreign aid, and military force are just a few examples of tools that could be used to address the growing threat of WMD proliferation. I am pleased that we have such a distinguished panel of experts with us today to discuss these issues, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again. I have some brief questions for you. Before I ask you the questions I would like to ask you for your statements. So will Miss Harris please begin? TESTIMONY OF ELISA D. HARRIS,1 RESEARCH FELLOW, Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my testimony this morning I would like to address three issues, consistent with your letter of invitation: First, the nature of the chemical and biological weapons threat to the United States; second, the impact of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention on this threat; and third, measures for enhancing the effectiveness of these multilateral treaties in preventing the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by both national and subnational-in other words, terrorist-groups. I will summarize my prepared statement but would request that the full text be included in the hearing record. Senator AKAKA. Without objection, it will be included. Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. Prior to September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks, the threat of national and terrorist acquisition of chemical and biological weapons were often seen as separate issues requiring separate solutions. Now, however, we must recognize that these two proliferation problems are closely linked in that assistance from national programs is likely to be critical to terrorist efforts to acquire and use chemical or biological weapons successfully. According to the U.S. Government, about a dozen countries are believed to have chemical weapons programs and at least 13 are said to be pursuing biological weapons. These national programs pose a direct threat to U.S. military forces and to our friends and allies in the two regions where the weapons are proliferatingNortheast Asia and the Middle East. They also pose an indirect threat because of their potential to serve as a source of chemical and biological weapons expertise or materials to other national or terrorist programs. One cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that terrorists will acquire chemical or biological weapons on their own without assistance from a national program. But to date, the three most significant terrorist incidents involving chemical or biological weaponsthe recent anthrax attacks here, the Aum Shinriko CBW attacks and the Rajneeshee salmonella attack-all suggest that assistance from national programs is likely to be crucial to terrorist efforts to acquire and use chemical or biological weapons successfully. Of course, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention have had some impact on these national programs. But the 1972 BWC lacks enforcement provisions and has been violated by a number of countries, including the former Soviet Union, and more recently, Iraq. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration has opposed efforts to negotiate legally binding measures to strengthen enforcement with the Convention. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, by comparison, contains the most extensive enforcement provisions ever negotiated in the arms control area. But it, too, faces a number of challenges in these first years of its implementation. Clearly steps can and should be taken to enhance the effectiveness of and reinforce the prohibitions in each of these treaties. In the time that I have left, I would like to just mention a few of those steps. First, with respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, we should resume multilateral discussions on measures to strengthen the BWC. Specifically, the United States should abandon its opposition to multilateral discussions and agree at the November 2002 continuation of the BWC review conference on a process that will allow both U.S. proposals and other proposals for strengthening the Convention to be explored. Second, pending international agreement on legally binding measures to strengthen the Convention, the United States should support efforts to expand the U.N. Secretary General's authority to investigate allegations of the development, production or possession of biological weapons. Today the Secretary General can only investigate the use of these weapons. We should give him the power to investigate activities prior to use. Third, we should strengthen controls over dangerous pathogens. The United States should take the lead in securing tighter international controls on culture collections and other repositories of biological materials. We should also work with other countries to strengthen oversight of laboratories to prevent either deliberate or inadvertent misapplications of biotechnology research for destructive purposes. And fourth, we should enhance oversight of the U.S. biological defense program. Revelations that the United States has produced weapons-grade anthrax and replicated a Soviet era biological bomblet as part of its biological defense program have raised questions both here and abroad about the nature and scope of U.S. activities in this area. Today, there are no comprehensive review mechanisms in place for these secret biological defense activities. The U.S. Congress should hold oversight hearings on the biological defense program to ensure that its scientific, legal, and foreign policy impact is consistent with U.S. non-proliferation interests. With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, we should, first, make adherence to the CWC an explicit foreign policy goal. Libya's recent decision to join the Chemical Weapons Convention demonstrates that even in complicated regions like the Middle East there are opportunities for expanding membership in this treaty. It is not unimaginable that North Korea might agree to abandon its chemical weapons program and join the convention as part of a broader security arrangement on the Korean Peninsula. The United States should ensure that CWC adherence is a prominent issue in its foreign policy toward the key hold-out countries, including North Korea. Second, we should be prepared to use challenge inspections to address serious compliance concerns, especially in countries where bilateral consultations have been either unsuccessful or are not appropriate. Third, we should devote the resources necessary to meet the |