refuses to give them up-and we are thus exposed to perpetual altercations with our neighbours. In 1862 Governor Pine wrote to the Colonial Office, The refuge afforded to runaway slaves and pawns* under the British flag has, during my long experience, proved the source of the greatest irritation and annoyance to native kings and chiefs, and the wound most 'difficult for Her Majesty's representatives to heal; and un'fortunately I find here such questions of everyday occurrence.' This difficulty and the dislike of the natives to our scale of import duties, however moderate, are the chief causes, we believe, of their opposition to our rule. For it must be borne in mind, in dealing with these people, that the objects to which we attach the highest importance-such as the repression of slavery and of their barbarous feuds and customs-are the very things that render our interference most obnoxious and hateful to them. The Dutch were far more popular, because wherever they go they are content to trade without any attempt to raise the moral condition of the people, and they do not disdain to turn the depraved habits of the natives to their own advantage. But, in fact, we aspire to no rule and no authority over these native tribes. We only desire that they should learn to govern and defend themselves; and the sooner their advancing civilisation enables us to withdraw our intervention, the better it will be for this country. When war broke out with the King of Ashantee in 1863 (in consequence of the refusal to surrender slaves), Governor Pine, who appears to have been the best governor we have had on the Cape Coast since Mr. Maclean, declared to the Duke of Newcastle that he entertained the earnest desire 'that a final blow should be struck at Ashantee power, and the question set at rest for ever, as to whether an arbitrary, cruel, and sanguinary monarch shall be for ever permitted to insult the British flag and outrage the laws of civilisation. This desirable object (he added) can be attained only by the possession of such a force as I fear the Governor of these settlements can never hope to command, unless your Grace should be pleased to urge upon Her Majesty's Government the policy, economy, and even the mercy, of transporting to these shores an army of such strength as would, combined with the allied native forces, enable us to march on Coomassie and there plant the British flag. To a stranger the course I point out may appear a visionary one, but I am convinced that, even with all the disadvantages of climate, the expedition would not be so dangerous, so fatal, or accompanied with such loss of life as have assailed expeditions in other and apparently more genial climes; and with 2,000 disciplined soldiers, *A pawn is a man who has pledged his own liberty as security for a debt. On payment of the debt he is free again. followed by upwards of 50,000 native forces, who require only to be led and inspired with confidence by the presence of organised troops, I would undertake (driving the hordes of Ashantees) to march to Coomassie.' (Despatch of May 12, 1863.) We are happy to quote this very remarkable passage because Governor Pine is a very high authority-his policy is at last likely to be adopted-and he entertained very sanguine hopes of its success. The Duke of Newcastle replied, naturally enough, that the proposal of a regular invasion to be made on the Ashantee nation, and of a march upon their capital, were 'too serious to admit of his encouraging it, and that he should 'feel very averse to its adoption except in case of overruling 'necessity.' In the course of the same year (December 18, 1863), a letter was addressed by the Colonial Office to the War Office, in which the principles which ought to govern these operations, were thus laid down: 'His Grace would be understood to continue to maintain, as he has always maintained, that the principle of all military proceedings on the West Coast of Africa should be that of defence, not of aggression. It is upon this principle alone that the Governors are authorised to make war, and no invasion of neighbouring territories can be sanctioned, unless it can be shown that it is really a defensive measure— safer, less costly in blood and money, and more likely to be decisive in its results than waiting for an attack which is being prepared, and which no peaceful measure can ward off without loss of that dignity and position which are essential to our security. It cannot be denied that, in dealing with savage nations, such may be the case; and although his Grace is by no means prepared to affirm with certainty that such is the case on the Gold Coast at the present moment, yet he regards it as quite possible either that it is so, or that it may shortly become so, owing to the loss of military reputation consequent on recent occurrences, and the spirit of presumption and audacity which has been generated amongst the Ashantees. His Grace feels, therefore, that he cannot refuse to Governor Pine a conditional authority to strike a blow within the Ashantee territory, if such a blow can be struck without making any other or further advance than in his own opinion, and that of the officer in command, may be consistent with the utmost consideration for the safety of the troops, and provided also he can satisfy himself that the result will be to remove the disastrous impressions caused by the impunity of the Ashantees when they last ravaged the protected territory, and to obtain reparation and secure the peace of the Protectorate. His Grace will impress upon the Governor that these results, and not the gratification of revenge on the part of the protected tribes, or of the love of glory of the Black troops, would constitute the only justification of an aggressive movement.' It may be assumed that the principles laid down by the Duke of Newcastle in this despatch are adhered to by the British Government and will be followed on the present occasion. For although this question has only now assumed an imperial importance, and has seldom attracted much public attention, it is one with which every successive Colonial Minister has acquired an irksome familiarity, and our more or less unfriendly relations with the Ashantees have been a source of annoyance to us for more than half a century, and have not unfrequently broken out into actual warfare. This warfare has always been of an indecisive character, because it never before was thought worth while by the British Government to incur the expense, and send out the forces, necessary to terminate it. If, therefore, the present emergency should induce the Government to adopt Governor Pine's policy, and should establish a lasting peace by inflicting a crushing blow on the enemy, it is possible that the result may repay us for the sacrifices such an expedition may require. The great obstacle to the development of the country and of its trade has been these incessant paltry wars. The whole object of our policy has been to establish and maintain peace, not only between the native tribes and the British authorities, but between the native tribes themselves. If the British Protectorate is to be something more than a name, and if we are to remain on the Gold Coast at all, we must insist on the fulfilment of this condition of mutual peace, and we trust this may be accomplished without a more direct interference with the native government of the country. On this point, however, we speak with hesitation, because it is obvious that we occupy the Gold Coast as the enemies of slavery-but slavery is an indigenous institution in Africa, and African chiefs like the Kings of Ashantee and Dahomey are used to regard it as of the very essence of their power. The worst enemy of the unhappy African is his nearest neighbour; and if the time is now past when he might be torn from his native shores to labour in the plantations of America, he is still liable to bear a still more oppressive and intolerable yoke, as a captive taken in barbarous warfare. How far can we prevent these evils? How far is it our duty to seek to prevent them, beyond the range of our own jurisdiction? These are questions not easy of solution. But this much is clear, that when an occasion, like the present, arises, and a deliberate attack is made on the British possessions and forces, it imposes on us the obligation to vindicate our authority, in defence, not only of a small colonial interest, but of the great principles of civilisation, peace, and freedom. No. CCLXXXIII. will he published in January, 1874. INDEX. A Afghanistan, recent events in, review of works relating to, 245-the B Beethoven, Lives and Letters of, review of works relating to the, 366- с Court, Antoine, review of the Life and Labours of, 203-prophecy of Cuban insurrection, review of works relating to, 395-richness of the Q Q ་ 414-6--proclamation of General the Count of Valmaseda, 417- E Elgin, Lord, note on the operations against the forts at the mouth of F Fergusson on Rude Stone Monuments, review of, 186-the Dome of G Gold Coast, affairs on the, review of works relating to, 569-Colonel Grimston, Edward, 'Narrative of his Captivity in the Bastille,' referred Grote, George, review of the 'Personal Life of, compiled from family H Horses, breeding of, review of works relating to the, 426-European |