Slide 32: One of the problems that already has been touched upon is the research and evaluation of the materials. We have so little experience in this. We expect to get a lot more. During 1959 and 1960 I took teams to 25 major commands overseas to try to evaluate just what the effectiveness of the materials was and how well they were distributed. We know a little about it. So from production we will measure the distribution processes, find out what happens at the audience level. We will begin to analyze whether the material is hitting the target or not and go back for improved processes to start production on another cycle. We are well on the way to this. We don't know how successful it will be but we believe our efforts will pay fruitful dividends.

Slide 33: Now what do we plan for the future? Well, we have spoken about the long-range plan. I would like to mention for a moment the themes and materials plan. There have already been some questions asked on how do we intend to integrate our whole effort? During this trip that I just mentioned to you, I became convinced of the fact that we had some pretty powerful tools to work with but we weren't using them as well as we ought.

We started at that time with a themes and materials plan. That was in November of 1959. The objective was to go through major documents of the U.S. Government, find out what themes we could construct and what themes the Communists were using. We came up with 27 themes.

Now we will integrate those themes into a plan that will take in all of our media-motion pictures, publications, the Armed Forces radio and television-and support these themes in some harmony to the U.S. Armed Forces worldwide. Now I am not talking about a party line. I am talking about the importance of major themes to be played to all the Armed Forces simultaneously during a particular quarter.

This particular theme and materials plan is underway. We spent this 2 years perfecting the plan and we believe we have it ready to go. Our media are already working at it.

The research and evaluation part has already been touched briefly. We believe that foreign officers coming to the United States need to know what America is, what it stands for, and we hope to be able to construct some kind of a positive program to help in this regard.

Command responsibilities we know that troop education is always the commander's responsibility. We simply can't ever do it from one central source any more than any citizen of the United States can expect Congress to do all of his thinking for him.

Therefore, participation in the program by the commander we feel is very essential and we hope that we can provide the kind of material that will give him the opportunity of putting on a first-rate information and education program.

We also know that the Reserve Forces are important in this world struggle. At this present time my office has no authority and has done nothing for the Reserves from the I. & E. standpoint officially. I have had many reservists write to me and I do send them material. I have many of them write back and say that they have not only used it in the Reserve groups but in other groups as well. As a matter of fact, I just got a letter from a Reserve officer about 3 weeks ago saying that their Sunday school had increased 300 percent by using the material we supplied them.

This gives you just a brief, Mr. Chairman, of some of our activities. I will be glad to answer any questions.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you very much.

May we take a recess for 7 or 8 minutes? (At this point a short recess was taken.)

Senator STENNIS. All right. If we may reassemble now. I understand Mr. Broger knows a lot about his subject. We will proceed in the regular way. Mr. Kendall.

BROGER'S DUTIES AS CONSULTANT TO JCS

Mr. KENDALL. Mr. Broger, what were your primary duties and responsibilities as consultant to the Joint Chiefs?

Mr. BROGER. Mr. Kendall, since this is a matter that involves security, do you mind if I read a prepared statement from the personnel form under which I was appointed as consultant to the JCS ? Mr. KENDALL. Certainly not, sir.

Senator STENNIS. He has been out of that for some time, has he not?

Mr. KENDALL. Since 1956, was it?

Mr. BROGER. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. All right. Proceed, Mr. Broger.

Mr. BROGER. Because of the highly classified character of the responsibilities and activities in the area of psychological operations, the functions cannot be explained in detail. Therefore, certain generalities cannot be avoided.

My responsibilities were to provide advice and assistance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the consideration of matters relating to the psychological implications in strategic national policy. I reviewed, analyzed, and evaluated and made recommendations on appropriate documents, plans, proposals, and so forth, submitted to or proposed by the Joint Chiefs or Staff or other agencies coming within the cognizance of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. I advised on psychological advantages which can accrue from the implementation of national policy and participated in the preparation of plans for psychological programs, including objectives, tasks, and themes to be employed in the Department of Defense support of national policy. I developed guidances for commanders in the theater which contribute to the particular climate of opinion the United States seeks to achieve.

My duties required experience in psychological operations on the national level in Washington and in the grassroots level abroad, planning experience and knowledge in the operations and functions of USIA, State Department, OCB, CIA, and NSC; a thorough understanding of the ideological conflict between communism and the free world, and experience in planning and implementing psychological operations.

Senator STENNIS. All right.

Mr. KENDALL. In other words, you have been involved in psychological operations and psychological training at least since 1954, is this correct, sir?

Mr. BROGER. Since 1945 actually, yes, sir; but specifically in answer to your question, yes.

AIM OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AT MAN IN UNIFORM

Mr. KENDALL. Now do you believe that the Communist propaganda is aimed with any particular emphasis at the man in uniform? Mr. BROGER. I do.

NEED FOR ADEQUATELY TRAINED INSTRUCTORS

Mr. KENDALL. Are you satisfied with the psychological training that servicemen are receiving today with reference to the enemy technique and methods?

Mr. BROGER. I am not being facetious, Mr. Kendall, when I say I am hard to satisfy. I am really never satisfied with the quality of the product in this regard.

Mr. KENDALL. Do you think the quality of the product can and should be improved?

Mr. BROGER. Indeed I do.

Mr. KENDALL. What do you consider today to be the greatest weakness in the troop information program, and what can be done to rectify it?

Mr. BROGER. In answer to your first question, no doubt there are several answers to it but one that I think is most important is adequately trained personnel.

Mr. KENDALL. And how would you recommend that this particular problem be overcome, and may I preface that by saying that I assume that when you say "adequately trained personnel," you mean instructors in the field?

Mr. BROGER. Yes, sir. These are personal opinions. I have discussed them with Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Runge but they are personal opinions.

I believe that one great need is an adequately staffed Armed Forces troop information school, whether separate or in conjunction with some other school, so that personnel are trained to go into the various activities of the Armed Forces of the I. & E. program, for example, into Armed Forces radio and television stations abroad. Also, I believe there is a need, as has been suggested, for teams which may assist service schools. If not teams, then perhaps what is necessary is that this Armed Forces information school should develop a kind of block of instruction that could go into the service schools, pointing out the