When we talk about response, we are talking about what I think Governor Gilmore has very eloquently laid out, this response depends heavily on local and State organizations, but you do not get these things to work right unless you do a lot of war gaming, if you will, long before these things happen.

And one final thing. We have all admired Mayor Giuliani and Governor Pataki and the extraordinary job that they have done, and they have done it in an incredible city that has incredible resources of fire and police and emergency workers, and they have done war gaming in New York. I am aware of it. Their hospitals have gone through a number of exercises to deal with things. But the fact is that most places in our country do not have that capacity or that experience or have not exercised these things. And that is why the response side of it is so very important, and I think to some extent the Gilmore Commission properly, because of its charge, has dealt more directly with the response side of this than certainly we have. We have talked about it generally, but not with that kind of specificity.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So one of the responsibilities of the agency or the office would be to aggressively see to it that local, State, and Federal agencies are better prepared than they are today to respond to such attacks.

Senator RUDMAN. The major responsibility. In fact, it is being done now. It has been done by a number of cities with the aid of the military in some cases. One of the Marine divisions has done exercises in the Southwest in local communities to try to help them. But the fact is, it is sporadic. The resources have not been there, and we have got to get the resources out there.

Let me just say one other thing, because I know we are going to get to it, and I would rather say it now and then let the other panel talk about it. This is an honest disagreement about organization between people of good will who respect what each other have done, and I admire what they have done, and it is a major contribution. But, I come at it differently based on my experience in government, and let me just lay it out in a way that I think everybody can understand. We have an intelligence czar in this country. He is called the Director of Central Intelligence, and everybody really believes that he runs intelligence in this government, but anybody on the Intelligence Committee can tell you that-and I cannot talk in detail because it is classified-but with a relatively small percentage of the intelligence budget being in the CIA. He is also dual-hatted. He is the Director of the CIA and he is Director of Central Intelligence, and some people do not understand the distinction. He has no control over the budget authority, the activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has little control over the National Security Agency and many other defense agencies. And everyone who has studied it has said that it does not work as well as it should because he does not have the budget authority for the command or the control.

We have come at this by saying that at least when it comes to our borders, Border Patrol, Customs, Coast Guard, and FEMA, because of what it does, which the Gilmore Commission has written about, we believe that that consolidation is important because it

certainly are not talking about taking all of those other activities and moving them into this new agency, certainly not.

But I want to answer your question more broadly than you asked it. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The kind of straight talk we have come to respect from you, Senator Rudman. Thank you.

Senator Hart, before you answer, let me add an addendum to the question as you are prepared to answer in this way. But one of the things, I think, we are all feeling now after September 11, as we saw the insanely inhumane acts of these terrorists, that one of the things we are not doing is thinking like they are. So as we talk about preparation, we have to really begin to think beyond what would be normally unthinkable for us, and one of the things that I think we have to think about, and I know that your commission looked at, is the possibility of a chemical or biological attack on the United States.

So I wonder, as you give the answer to my initial question, whether you would give us some help in examples of what a homeland security agency would do to, in some sense prevent, but also protect and respond to such an attack if it ever occurred?

Senator HART. Well, obviously, such an agency would not itself combine either the military or the police functions of our country which are, as Governor Gilmore said, distributed on at least three levels of government. The direct response, counterterrorism, if you will, will come from the military and come from police agencies broadly defined. Senator Rudman accurately stated the way our commission broke down the threat. Try to find out who has evil intent against this country, who they are, how they are organized, how they are financed, and to the degree possible, what their intentions are. Now, their intentions are to do harm to the United States. What you try to find out is when and how, and that is the hardest part.

Then if you get a sense, any sense that this threat is imminent, you try to stop it at the borders using all the assets that we have presently uncoordinated.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is a very important point. Excuse me. And that is why you focused on the coordination of the agencies that control access of people or goods into the United States.

Senator HART. And the reason why I stress, frankly, this problem with bureaucracy is that those agencies had a different mission. I mean they are where they are for a different purpose. Border Patrol is in Justice because it is a law enforcement agency. It is trying to prevent people from illegally entering the country. Customs is the Treasury because its purpose originally was to collect revenues. Coast Guard regulates incoming and outgoing seaborne traffic, makes rescues and so on, but that historic function was a Transportation function. Now these are front-line defense organizations. It frankly makes little sense for them to be where they are given their new responsibility. If we are in fact in war, and I believe we are, in a prolonged war, the nature and function of these agencies has changed. So the reason why they are where they are, frankly, makes very little sense any more, and to protect that bureaucratic turf, as I have indicated, under these circumstances is

If the bad guys get inside our country, then the prevent is to try to get them before they act, any way you can, and again, this is FBI, local law enforcement, every asset you have.

And finally, if they act, to limit the damage, bringing together FEMA, State and local agencies, and so forth, under one command. I think what is important, on September 11 the nature of warfare changed. You have to get your mind around that concept, the nature of warfare changed. Now, it has been changing since the colonial area. The rise of guerilla warfare, that gave way to terrorism. In the Cold War we helped support some people that are now-these people that are now trying to kill us on the theory that the enemy of our enemy is our friend. But the nature of warfare has changed, and the distinction between war and crime has changed.

Had there been a couple of fewer zeroes, had 50 or 60 people been killed, it would have been a crime-6,000 to 7,000 is war. Now, how many people have to die when it quits being crime and becomes war is a matter that theoreticians can debate. So what we are seeing now, what we have to think about differently is to bring assets of the military and policy together, and frankly, I think it will lead to the creation of an entirely new kind of paramilitary capability, something combining Delta Force, Rangers, Seals, some Special Forces of the Marines, and maybe they will not wear uniforms. But that is another whole subject.

I think Senator Rudman, for the commission, has very accurately answered your original question.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you want to take me up on the question of how, just to give an example, a homeland security agency would prevent or protect and respond regarding chemical or biological attack?

Senator HART. Try to find a way to inspect more than 2 or 3 percent of the containers coming into the country. We had one scenario we discussed of a small tactical warhead, nuclear warhead, begin in one of the inspected sealed containers, shipped from Shanghai or from Singapore to Newark by way of the Chicago Rail Yards, off loaded in the Long Beach Port, put on a train. The train is reorganized in the Chicago yards, and you use global positioning triggering to blow up the nuclear warhead. Got to stop them at the borders I think.

Now, you get the chemical, everybody knows chemical is hard to do. All the experts will tell you how hard it is to disperse the chemicals. Biological agents is a little bit different, and here, Ambassador Bremer is much more an authority than I and many members of the commission were, but I am told you can disperse smallpox virus from an aerosol can. now, how we are going to find every aerosol can coming into this country is going to be very, very tough.

The only answer I can give you is do our very, very best to stop whatever the agent is at the border.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Governor Gilmore.

Governor GILMORE. Senator Lieberman, there is so much to say, let me see if I can organize this in a way that is efficient. Our panel evaluated chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological.

them. We were absolutely unwilling to dismiss the possibility of those kinds of attacks, although we examined very closely the difficulty of delivery of those kinds of attacks. Yes, you can certainly deliver them in an aerosol can and so on like that, so we have focused our attention, for example, on the organization of health and medical, which will be discussed in our next report, so that physicians and the communities will begin to trigger those kinds of responses with the Center for Disease Control in a rapid way so that we can address those kinds of issues.

Biological is an extremely serious matter, nuclear as well, although we considered them relatively unlikely, although catastrophic, and that is why we must address them. On the other hand, a conventional attack, such as the one we have just experienced we thought was highly likely, and that is why we call for a national strategy not a Federal strategy, a national strategy that absolutely incorporates in the locals and the States. They are the cops on the beat. They are the State troopers. They are the local physicians in the local clinics. They are the people in the hospitals that are going to be the responders who are going to see these issues first, and then allow a circumvention of the problem at the earliest possible moment.

I know you are going to go to the issue of the national office and coordination types of issues. That has been the central point of our commission, and we are anxious to talk about that, but we have not discussed moving agencies because, as has been so widely discussed by everybody on this panel, it is fairly fruitless to move agencies. They are doing other things, too, besides terrorism. But aside from that, there are so many, that it requires not movement or restructure, but coordination, and we will be happy to return to that topic, but we will put it aside for just a moment so that I can be responsive to your question.

The terrorist has the absolute advantage. He picks the time and the place and the manner of the attack. And the freer the society, the stronger the terrorist is. That is why America becomes the target of opportunity because we are the freest society in the world. So we have tried to analyze this into two pieces. Let me just take them up quickly.

One is the issue of response. The Pentagon is a perfect example, and I am the Governor of the State in which the Pentagon is located. The minute that I saw the second plane go into the World Trade Center, we triggered the Emergency Operation Response System in Virginia immediately. What that does is automatically hooks into FEMA. This is a program that has been in place for years and years. And I have some good news for you, Senator-this is something that actually works, and it works very well. You do not get competition between FEMA and the local State authorities and localities. All of these professionals work well in coordination together, and they did in the Pentagon situation, as a matter of fact. I will not dwell on some of the other issues that I took specifically in Virginia, but I want to say that our panel has concluded that there is a system in place on the response already that works well, although there is, of course, much to do to prepare for that response. That is the office of the local and national coordinator

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me just interrupt and punctuate that. I think it is an important point, because though all of the work that has been done here has shown inadequacies either in preparedness or in organization, perhaps it is saying the obvious, but it bears saying at a time when the American people's confidence has been shaken, there is a lot out there now in all these three categories-prevent, protect and respond-not as much as any of you or we would like, and not as well organized or coordinated as we would like, but I appreciate your example.

Governor GILMORE. And it is working in New York also very, very well. Now, when you get over into the issue of chemical, biological, nuclear, and you go into a factor of 10 or 100 times what we have already seen this week, then it requires a coordinator to do a national strategy to be prepared.

But the final point that I would make is the one that you, I think, were approaching before you move onto your governmental structure issue, and that is the one of prevention. We have thoroughly addressed that issue as a matter of fact. We focused a great deal of attention on the intelligence community. I was in the intelligence community in the early 1970's as a low-level agent in the U.S. Army. I was trained on human intelligence. But it was very clear very quickly that the intelligence community was getting out of human intelligence in the early 1970's. We were moving more technologically into satellites, into your electronic intercept, which are doing extremely well. But we have been out of the human intelligence for a long time in its most complete and comprehensive fashion. We believe you must go back in. How can you determine intent of conspirators unless you make an effort to get into the conspiracy and find out the information from the inside. And there are many ways you can confirm the reliability of that kind of information. One of our points is we believe that the rule against the recruitment of terrorists and criminals overseas should be dropped. It is not fun to do business with bad guys, but bad guys are the ones that we have to try to stop. And as a result of that, you have to find as I have said in local media and national media, the terrorists worldwide must wake up every morning wondering who in their organization is informing on them to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well said.

Governor GILMORE. That is what we must do.

And then third, we believe that there must be dissemination of intelligence up and down the line vertically, Federal, State and local. Unheard of in the intelligence business, but we believe, as a panel, that you can qualify people, that you can clear them, you can give them need-to-know, and you can have the same security that you would have inside any given agency, and we believe that begins to disseminate the information as necessary.

In addition, of course, we focused a great deal of attention also in health and medical and on border. I emphasized border in my opening statement, because we believe that you can in fact apply all of these approaches in order to secure your border types of issues, and you must use the locals. When the terrorist picks the