We also called for improvement of health and medical response capabilities and I think everybody is very proud of the hospitals and medical services that have been called into action over the past weeks. Our report, however, recognized that our public and private hospitals are prepared for the routine, but in the case of a high concentration of traumas resulting from a weapon of mass destruction - especially biological in nature - or a catastrophic conventional attack such as we have seen, our medical system might become overloaded. Therefore, we intend to address this issue further in our final report.

And, finally, we have focused a great deal of attention on the use of the Armed Forces, their appropriate role and how they should be used. We expressly recommended that the U.S. military not serve as the lead federal agency in responding to a domestic terrorist action. Although it is generally accepted that events could occur where the military needs to be engaged, particularly the National Guard, nonetheless, we have expressed an abiding caution about deploying a military response to a domestic situation and only then in support of a civilian federal agency like FEMA.

These are the highlights of our work to date. Our work is not yet complete, but we intend to make it so in a short time. Our next meeting will be held next week, on Monday, September 24, where we will decide upon our final set of recommendations. Among the topics we expect to address in our final report are U.S. border security, cyber terrorism, proper role of the military in domestic response scenarios, and necessary medical strategies to plan for a biological or chemical weapon.

I would like to focus your attention today on two central recommendations that implicate the organization of government agencies and coordination: first, the creation of a "National Office for Combating Terrorism" located in the White House with a direct report to the president, and second, U.S. border security proposals that will require unprecedented coordination of resources, intelligence and effort between U.S. Customs and the Immigration & Naturalization Service.

A White House "National Office for Combating Terrorism"

Let me start by outlining the panel's recommendation for a National Office for Combating Terrorism in the White House. As I mentioned earlier, we called for statutory creation of a new National Office for Combating Terrorism to coordinate national terrorism policy and preparedness in the Executive Branch - located in the White House and directed by an individual with high rank appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Our panel's review of the federal bureaucratic structure, spread across numerous agencies vested with some responsibilities for combating terrorism, revealed a structure that is uncoordinated, complex, and confusing. Our first report included a graphical depiction of the numerous federal agencies and offices within those agencies that have responsibilities touching upon terrorist threats. Our research indicated that attempts to create a federal focal point for

coordination with state and local officials - such as the National Domestic Preparedness Office have met with little success. Moreover, many state and local officials believe that federal programs intended to assist at their levels are often created and implemented without sufficient consultation. We concluded that the current bureaucratic structure lacks the requisite authority and accountability to make policy changes and impose the discipline necessary among the numerous federal agencies involved.

Therefore, we have recommended creation of the National Office for Combating Terrorism to serve as a senior level coordinating entity in the Executive Office of the President. The office would be vested with responsibility for developing both domestic and international policy as well as coordinating the Nation's vast counter-terrorism programs and budgets.

There is an important distinction here. Our proposal is an office located in the White House, reporting directly to the President of the United States - not a separate agency that competes for turf against other agencies and even Cabinet Secretaries. Instead, this office will invoke the direct authority of the President to coordinate various agencies, receive sensitive intelligence and military information, and deal directly with Congress and state and local governments.

First and foremost, the office's principal task will be to develop a comprehensive national strategy that is approved by the President and updated annually to respond to the latest intelligence. The national strategy will address the full range of domestic and international terrorism deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response. The approach to the domestic strategy should be "bottom up," developed in close coordination with local, state and other federal agencies.

Second, the office should ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to support execution of the national strategy, and should be vested with budgetary control over significant counter-terrorism resources for domestic preparedness. (However, the U.S. strategy for detection and deterrence, prevention and response for terrorist acts outside the United States should remain vested with the Department of State.)

The office's budget authority should include responsibility to conduct a full review of federal agency programs and budgets to ensure compliance with the programmatic and funding priorities established in the approved national strategy and to eliminate conflicts and unnecessary duplication among agencies.

Third, the office should coordinate foreign and domestic terrorism-related intelligence activities, including the development of national net assessments of terrorist threats. A critical task will be to develop, in concert with the intelligence community, policies and protocols for dissemination of intelligence and other pertinent information regarding terrorist threats to designated entities at all levels of government - local, state and federal. We also recommend that an Assistant Director for Intelligence be appointed within the office to assume these responsibilities, and to

ensure strict adherence to applicable civil rights and privacy laws and regulations in the context of "domestic collection" of intelligence.

• Third, the office should be vested authority to review state and geographical area strategic plans for consistency and effectiveness in fulfilling the national strategy. That review authority will allow the office to identify gaps and deficiencies in the national strategy as well as federal programs, and to assess the need for additional federal funds to assist state and local governments.

Fourth, it would be the responsibility of the National Office for Combating Terrorism to propose new federal programs or changes to existing federal programs, including federal statutory or regulatory authority, to ensure an effective national strategy.

• Fifth, we recommend that an Assistant Director for Domestic Preparedness Programs be appointed to direct coordination of federal, state and local response agencies, funding and programs - especially in the areas of "crisis" and "consequence” planning, training, exercises, and equipment.

Sixth, we recommend that an Assistant Director for Health and Medical Programs be appointed to coordinate federal health and medical programs addressed at terrorism response with state and local health officials, emergency medical services, public and private hospitals, and emergency management offices.

Seventh, the office should coordinate research, development, test and evaluation programs directed at counter-terrorism.

Eighth, we recommend that the national office serve as the information clearinghouse
and central federal point of contact for state and local entities. We have heard many
comments about the difficulties encountered by state and local government officials
to navigate the maze of the federal bureaucracy. The national office should serve as a
"one-stop-shop" for state and local agencies in their efforts to counter terrorist threats.

Before leaving this subject, let me suggest a few attributes the new National Office for ombating Terrorism must should possess. Most importantly, the Director must be politically ccountable and responsible. Therefore, he must be vested with sufficient authority to ccomplish the office's goals. Congress must have someone to go to assess out Nation's reparedness. That is why we have recommended the Director be appointed by the President, ›nfirmed by the Senate, and serve in a "cabinet-level" position.

The office should have sufficient budget authority and programmatic oversight to fluence the resource allocation process and ensure program compatibility and effectiveness. he best way to instill this attribute is to give the Director a "certification" power - a process by hich he could formally “decertify" all or part of an agency's budget as "non-compliant" with e national strategy. This "certification" power would act as a veto of all or any part of any gency's budget, but would be sufficiently powerful to effect the coordination responsibility.

Finally, while the National Office should be vested with specific program coordination and budget authority, it is not our intention that it be given actual "operational" control over various federal agency activities. Under our paradigm, the office would not be “in charge" of response operations in the event of an actual terrorist attack. It's job will be ensuring existing bureaucracies are prepared to respond in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. According, the word "czar" is inappropriate to describe this office.

U.S. Border Security

While we are on the subject of govemment organization, I also would like to offer the Committee a preview of one of the panel's upcoming recommendations for U.S. border security. As many of you know, several of September 11 hijackers may have entered the United States on forged visas or by car from Canada. A truck carrying explosive materials bound for Seattle for New Year's eve 2000 was interdicted at the Canadian border.

If America is to be secure, we must have a coordinated policy of immigration enforcement and border security, and it must address the totality of all avenues of entry into the United States - land, air, and sea. This effort will require unprecedented coordination between the U.S. Border Patrol, the Immigration & Naturalization Service, U.S. Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Federal Aviation Administration - as well as state and local law enforcement..

In its previous two reports, this panel acknowledged that the laws and traditions of the United States creating and maintaining a very open society make us vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Some statistics emphasize this stark reality:

Over 100,000 miles of national coastline

Almost 2000 miles of land border with Mexico, another 4000 miles with Canada, most of it essentially open to transit

· Over 5.8 million containers enter annually from maritime sources

The movement of goods, people, and vehicles through our border facilities is characterized by vast transportation, logistics, and services systems that are extremely complex, essentially decentralized, and almost exclusively owned by the private sector. Despite valiant efforts by personnel of the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (including the U.S. Border Patrol), the Federal Aviation Administration, and other Federal entities, as well as State and local enforcement authorities, the

challenge is seemingly insurmountable. Those efforts are further hampered by a lack of full interagency connectivity and information sharing.

With adequate coordination of effort and resources - and primarily through information sharing these agencies could significantly improve a seamless enforcement and detection system without unduly hindering the flow of goods and people. However, still, simply increasing enforcement of current laws and regulations through existing mechanisms may not provide the ultimate solution. That activity could result in further delays at very busy ports of entry. The likely “domino” effect of further delays will generate opposition from many U.S. commercial interests whose businesses depend on carefully timed delivery of goods, political pressure from states and localities whose job markets would likely be affected, potential retaliation from foreign countries who export goods to the United States, and increased complaints from the millions of business and tourist passengers transiting our border-many of whom are already unhappy about the queues at airports of entry.

Given the nature and complexity of the problem, the panel recognizes that we as a nation will not likely find the "100% solution" for our borders. We should, nevertheless, search for ways to make it harder to exploit our borders for the purpose of doing harm--physical or economic-to our citizens. The confluence of these issues calls for new, innovative approaches that will strike an appropriate and more effective balance between valid enforcement activities, the interests of commerce, and civil liberties.

Among the Advisory Panel's upcoming recommendations to accomplish these objectives are the following proposals:

⚫ First, we must improve intelligence collection and dissemination between and among agencies responsible for some aspect of border protection. This panel is strongly committed to the proposition that relevant, timely intelligence is crucial in the campaign to combat terrorism. That is especially so in the arena of enhancing the security of our borders. New and better ways must be developed to track terrorist groups and their activities through transportation and logistics systems. All agencies with border responsibilities must be included as full partners in the intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination process, as related to border security. This process is a "two-way street;" all entities involved must be willing to share information, horizontally and vertically. This will represent a departure from the current "culture" of many agencies to cloister information. The structure and procedures that the panel recommended in its second report, for the establishment of intelligence oversight through an advisory board under the National Office for Combating terrorism could facilitate a new paradigm in this area.

The fact is that no single framework exists to look at terrorist and security threats across all the various agency functions. And what is critically needed is connectivity across agencies to create a virtual national data repository of data that will serve as the focal point for the fusion and distribution of information on all border security

matters.