The Part Played by the Allied Air Forces in the Final Defeat of the Enemy in the Mediterranean Theatre, March to May, 1945: The ... Despatch was Submitted to the Secretary of State for Air in September, 1946H.M. Stationery Office, 1951 - Всего страниц: 30 |
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15th Army Group 24th April 57th Wing 8th Army Front Adriatic advance air attacks Air C.-in-C air effort air operations air power aircraft Allied Air Forces April 8th Army Argenta Gap Army offensive Army's assault Austria Balkan Air Force battle area Bihac Bologna Brenner route bridgehead bridges close support co-ordination Corps craft crossings defence Desert Air Force dropped effect Eighth Army enemy enemy's Ferrara Fifth Army fighter fighter-bombers final offensive flank formations Fourth Army ground forces Headquarters heavy bombers Italian theatre Italy Jugoslav Army Jugoslav Fourth Army Jugoslavia March marshalling yards Mediterranean Allied medium bombers MEDME ment movement naval Northern Jugoslavia organisation Partisans Po River Po Valley rail reconnaissance road Route 16 Royal Air Force Santerno sorties were flown Special Operations squadrons Strategic Air Force supplies Supreme Allied Tactical Air Force tanks task three services tions tons of bombs traffic Trieste troops Valley Zadar
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Стр. 5560 - Germany was also approved, aimed at 'the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened'.
Стр. 5557 - Part Played by the Allied Air Forces in the Final Defeat of the Enemy in the Mediterranean Theatre, March to May, 1945.
Стр. 5560 - Command were the. Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force, the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force, the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force, and the Balkan Air Force.
Стр. 5585 - The smashing of all communications connections was especially disastrous. Thereafter, the orders failed to come through at all, or failed to come through at the right time. In any case, the command was not able to keep itself informed of the situation at the front, so that its own decisions and commands came, for the most part, too late.
Стр. 5582 - It was the bombing of the river Po crossings that finished us. We could have withdrawn successfully with normal rearguard action despite the heavy pressure but owing to the destruction of the ferries and river crossings, we lost all our equipment. North of the river we were no longer an army.
Стр. 5576 - ... provide for any possible contingency. The operation was divided into three phases. During Phase I, the Eighth Army was to breach the Santerno River and attack toward Bastia and Budrio; the Fifth Army was to debouch into the Po Valley with the secondary mission of capturing or isolating Bologna. Phase II provided for a breakthrough by either or both armies to encircle the enemy forces south of the Po. The Eighth Army was to break through the Argenta Gap to seize the Po crossings at Ferrara and...
Стр. 5576 - He could attempt a voluntary withdrawal to a position behind the Po and subsequently the Adige. Since he desperately needed the Po Valley, it was believed he would contest every foot of ground. It appeared to the Group Commander that if the i5th Army Group could achieve a quick break-through and a rapid exploitation, huge enemy forces might well be destroyed or captured before they could retire across the Po. The Plans General Clark weighed his decisions with extreme care. The possible lines of attack...
Стр. 5584 - In the first place, the enemy's position on the eve of the battle was undoubtedly critical, and air power was the major factor in causing this situation. Though his ground positions were strong enough, he was desperately short of all those things which are required to wage modern warfare successfully, eg fuel, ammunition, transport, aircraft, tanks and guns.
Стр. 5576 - ... some 30 divisions of the Nazis' Army Group Southwest before they could retire to the northeast into the Alps toward Austria and prolong the struggle. For any force, in any terrain, the task would have been formidable. On the west, the enemy right was firmly planted on the rugged mountains. On the east he was solidly entrenched behind the Senio, Santerno, Sillaro, and Idice Rivers, all comparatively wide and steeply banked. An attacker there faced a maze of dikes, ditches, and flooded fields....
Стр. 5563 - s directive that the primary object of transAdriatic operations was " to contain and destroy as many enemy forces as possible in the Balkans.