The following article is one of the selected number of monographs prepared by officers attending the 19461947 class of the Command and General Staff College, which will appear in the MILITARY REVIEW from time to time.-The Editor.

THE

HE "deliberate type of river crossing" is characterized by careful planning and preparation, and its success is directly proportional to the thoroughness of the planning and preparation. The hasty, aggressive type crossing is characteristic of the pursuit phase of an operation when the enemy is off balance, and a commander may be justified in taking unusual chances in order to achieve surprise and assure the success of his mission.

An example of the deliberate type of crossing was the action of the 34th Infantry Division in its crossing of the Volturno River on the night of 12-13 October 1943. The crossing of the Inn River by a battalion of the 71st Infantry Division in the spring of 1945 affords a good example of a hasty crossing. The former was made against an enemy as yet unbeaten, while the latter was carried out against an enemy that was beaten and was exerting its last efforts to delay the relentless pursuit by the Third U.S. Army.

The Volturno Crossing

As the German forces were forced to retreat from Salerno, they conducted an

orderly withdrawal to the Volturno River, where it became evident that they intended to make a determined stand to secure time for the preparation of their winter line in the mountains.

On 15 September, the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, instructed Fifth Army to cross the Volturno River and drive the enemy some thirty miles into the mountains. To carry out this mission, Fifth Army had at its disposal the VI U.S. Corps, composed of the 3d, 34th, and 45th Infantry Divisions, and the X British Corps made up of the 7th Armored Division and the 46th and 56th Infantry Divisions. The total strength of this force with supporting troops amounted to approximately 100,000 men.

Arrayed against this force was Marshal Kesselring's Tenth Army, consisting of the Herman Goering Division, the 3d and 5th Panzer Grenadier Divisions and elements of the 26th Panzer Division. This force was outnumbered by Fifth Army, but it had both weather and terrain on its side.

The western part of the Fifth Army zone was a broad level stretch of farm land fifteen to twenty miles wide, extending northwest along the coast for thirty miles from Naples to the Mount Massico Ridge line. This area was assigned to the X British Corps.

The VI Corps was assigned the area of mountains and valleys extending from the coastal plain to the Matese Range. This country varies from low hills, covered

with olive groves and terraced fields, to barren rocky crags that tower to a height of 6,000 feet. The mountains present a formidable barrier to the movement of troops and their supplies, and is strongly reinforced by the Volturno and Calore Rivers. The Volturno is not a large river, generally not over 100 yards wide. Except after severe storms, it can be waded in several places. Its real strength as an obstacle lies in the steep, almost verticle banks which are from fifteen to forty feet high. It rises in the mountains north of Venafro and pursues an erratic course southeast to its confluence with the Calore. Together these rivers form an almost continuous barrier about sixty miles long directly in the

Regiment on the right of the 3d Division. The 45th Division had established a bridgehead across the Calore River and everything was set for the attack (Map 2).

Orders for the attack, issued 11 October, divided the 34th Division front of approximately eight miles between the 168th Infantry Regiment (which was to make the main effort on the left toward Caiazzo), and the 135th Infantry Regiment on the right.

The 133d Infantry was held in Division Reserve with one battalion ready to move whenever directed. The high ground north of the river precluded any use of tanks initially, so the 756th Tank Battalion was also held in reserve.

path of any advance on Rome from the south (Map 1).

The attack of Fifth Army was originally scheduled for the night of 9-10 October, but constant rain and mud had so slowed operations that it was postponed to the night of 12-13 October in order to allow X Corps and the 34th Infantry Division more time to prepare a coordinated attack across the Volturno, and to permit bringing forward sufficient bridging material.

By 12 October, VI Corps had reached the river all along the front. The 34th Division had relieved the 30th Infantry

On the two nights preceding the attack, patrols were very active, and in spite of intense counter-reconnaissance measures by the enemy, patrols of the two assault regiments and the Division Engineers carried out aggressive probing of the enemy's defenses and made careful reconnaissance of the river for fording, ferrying, and bridging sites.

On the night of 10-11 October, a pa trol from the 168th Infantry probed the area west of Limatola. They followed a tree-lined ditch to within fifteen feet of the river and three enlisted men waded out into the water. As they tried to cross, they were fired upon and forced to with

draw. They reported that this was a good place for a ford but that it was well guarded. The following night, engineers accompanied a patrol to a spot about 600 yards downstream where assault boats could be used to carry infantry across the river.

During the day of 12 October, all men in the 1st and 2d Battalions, 168th Infantry were given dry-land training in the use of assault boats. Patrols of the 135th Infantry were also active and found fords in their zones. In most places the muddy banks and muddy bottom prevented the use of vehicles, although a spot was found near an old dam where waterproofed vehicles might cross.

The plan for the 135th Infantry called for the 1st Battalion and Company E to cross and capture the high-ground back of the village of Squille. When this had been accomplished, the 2d Battalion was to pass through the 1st Battalion and continue the attack. After dark 12 October, the engineers joined the two assault regiments and moved with them to their final assembly areas.

At 0145 the Division Artillery, supported by the fire of the attached Tank Destroyer Battalion began the preparatory barrage. At 0200 the fire was shifted to prearranged targets and the infantry began their attack.

In the zone of the 168th Infantry, one company of the 1st Battalion, crossing by the ford as planned, ran into a minefield and suffered several casualties. The balance of the battalions started across in assault boats about 800 yards downstream. The first wave of this group made the crossing in good order, but the boats drifted so far downstream with the swift current that they could not be used for the next wave. The troops had no alternative but to wade across in shoulder-deep water (Map 3).

The 2d Battalion, in column of companies, started to cross the ford north

east of L'Annunzizata, but in the darkness the leading troops lost their way, and as a result the guide ropes were strung over water that was much deeper than anticipated. Some men were drowned and a large amount of equipment was lost. Because of this unforeseen delay, the battalion did not complete the crossing until 0640. Having reached the other side, the battalion pushed rapidly forward and by 0730 had reached its initial objective, the high ground east of San Giovanni.

The 1st Battalion did not meet with the same measure of success. Running into heavy fire, it was unable to advance beyond a point about 400 yards from the

river until shortly after noon. At 1400, the battalion was ordered to continue the attack supported by the fire of the Division Artillery. Advancing closely behind this fire, the battalion fought its way up the hills, and by dark had reached its first objective, the high ground above San Giovanni. In this attack the battalion received unexpected assistance from Company "G" which had been directed to support it by fire. One platoon of Company "G" penetrated to the streets of San Giovanni, but as no one was aware of this uncoordinated effort they were caught in the fire of the supporting artillery and suf fered some casualties. They did however,

succeed in causing the enemy to withdraw sooner than he had planned.

Having secured the hills above San Giovanni, the 168th continued the attack against Caiazzo, the division objective. This was captured shortly after daylight, 14 October. The 1st Battalion pushed on to the north and the 2d Battalion moved northeast to protect the right flank of the regiment.

In the zone of the 135th Infantry, the 1st Battalion and Company "E," supported by the fire of the 125th Field Artillery Battalion, jumped off at 0200, and meeting practically no resistance initially, moved rapidly across the plowed fields

toward the objective. One company of the 1st Battalion was across the river and by 0220, the battalion had closed on the first phase line and was pushing toward the second. The enemy now began to put up a much stiffer resistance. His fire became more intense and his minefields more numerous. The 1st Battalion made little progress during the afternoon. The 2d Battalion, moving up after dark, had to fight through a pocket that had been bypassed earlier. As the day came to a close, the regiment had failed to reach the second phase line (Map 4). Continuing the attack on the following morning, the 1st Battalion occupied Hill 283 at 0400 and brought up four tank de

stroyers that had managed to ford the river. These tank destroyers from the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion supported the infantry from hull-down positions, and by the end of the morning, the area south of the second phase line had been cleared of the enemy. Contact was made with the 168th Infantry on the left and the 45th Infantry Division on the right.

Before the 34th Division could continue its advance, it was necessary that bridges be constructed to permit essential supplies and supporting weapons to be brought forward. This proved to be the toughest part of the battle.

On the morning of 13 October, Company A, 36th Combat Engineers, began moving the divisional bridging material to previously selected bridging sites north of L'Annunzizata. In an effort to speed up operations, the rubber floats were inflated prior to loading on trucks. This attempt to save time nearly proved disastrous, because the enemy guns opened fire and scored hits on several of the trucks. Shell fragments pierced many of the floats and damaged them beyond repair. The repairable floats were patched and the other material was repaired and carried to the river by way of an unimproved dirt road. The bridge was scarcely started when the enemy again opened fire, destroying more floats and equipment and causing heavy casualties among the engineers. Operations had to stop. During the afternoon, the equipment was pulled back to a concealed position and again repaired. In the evening, under cover of a smoke screen, another attempt was made to construct a bridge. No sooner had the smoke started than the enemy started shelling the area again and made work impossible.

In the meantime, a reconnaissance party had found another bridge site in a defiladed spot near Squille. This place presented more difficult technical problems than had the first site, because the river was wider and the banks and approaches

were more difficult to exploit. However, the advantage offered by the defilade outweighed all of the disadvantages, and the bridging equipment was moved to the new site. By borrowing floats from another unit, Company A was able to finish a workable bridge by 1030, 14 October, and shortly thereafter the approaches had been improved and the roads cleared of mines, assuring the 135th Infantry a supply route. To supply the 168th Infantry, it was planned to construct a thirty ton ponton bridge at the old ferry site below Caiazzo. The enemy, by means of the artillery observers located on the high ground around Caiazzo, prevented Company B, 16th Armored Engineers, from starting work on this bridge until the afternoon of 14 October. Once started, the work went rapidly forward and the bridge was completed by the next morning.

With winning the fight to construct the bridges and get the supplies rolling across the river, the first battle of the Volturno was won, and the division took up the pursuit of the fleeing enemy.

Lessons

In the action just discussed, the 34th Division was confronted by very difficult problems of weather, terrain, and enemy. The success achieved was proportional to the care with which the action was planned.

Lives and equipment were lost due to the fact that after suitable crossing sites had been found, one unit neglected to provide a means by which the troops could find the correct crossing under cover of darkness and smoke during the excitement of battle. Guides or other means must be provided to assist troops in moving from their final assembly areas to proper crossing sites.

Much time was lost and a good deal of valuable equipment destroyed because of failure to pick a defiladed bridging site when one was available.

Artillery observation posts available to the enemy must be neutralized or cap

tured, before successful bridging operations can be undertaken.

The aggressive patrolling prior to the attack paid off in several instances where battalions were able to make crossings practically unopposed. Patrolling prior to a river crossing should, therefore, be aggressively carried out in order to locate the enemy's defenses.

Coordination of plans down to company and platoon level is important. Because of the lack of coordination in the case of the penetration of San Giovanni by Company "G," 168th Infantry, our troops were killed by their own artillery and full advantage of their move could not be exploited.

The Inn Crossing

On the afternoon of 2 May 1945, the Commanding General, 71st Infantry Division, found that the only crossing over the Inn River, in the zone of his division, were two dams, one of which was located at Ering and the other at Obenberg, Austria. Since the leading elements of the division were still thirty-five to forty kilometers from the dams, it was apparent that some action must be taken without delay, or the division would be forced to make an assault crossing of the river when it was reached. The Commanding General immediately decided to attempt to seize the two dams intact, in the hope that at least one of them could be used to carry the division into Austria.

It was decided to motorize one battalion from the 66th Infantry and one battalion from the 5th Infantry and to make a headlong dash for the two dams, counting heavily on surprise and aggressive action to decide the issue in our favor.

The 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry, was ordered to capture the dam at Obenberg. In order to make the utmost speed and assure success, the Battalion Commander decided that rather than wait for sufficient vehicles to motorize his battalion, he would organize a small task force